Law and Legitimacy: Toward a Rawlsian Solution by Riker, Walter Joram
University of Tennessee, Knoxville 
TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative 
Exchange 
Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School 
5-2007 
Law and Legitimacy: Toward a Rawlsian Solution 
Walter Joram Riker 
University of Tennessee - Knoxville 
Follow this and additional works at: https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss 
 Part of the Philosophy Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Riker, Walter Joram, "Law and Legitimacy: Toward a Rawlsian Solution. " PhD diss., University of 
Tennessee, 2007. 
https://trace.tennessee.edu/utk_graddiss/107 
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at TRACE: Tennessee 
Research and Creative Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized 
administrator of TRACE: Tennessee Research and Creative Exchange. For more information, please contact 
trace@utk.edu. 
To the Graduate Council: 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Walter Joram Riker entitled "Law and 
Legitimacy: Toward a Rawlsian Solution." I have examined the final electronic copy of this 
dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial fulfillment of the 
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, with a major in Philosophy. 
David A. Reidy, Major Professor 
We have read this dissertation and recommend its acceptance: 
Otis H. Stephens, John Nolt, Betsy C. Postow 
Accepted for the Council: 
Carolyn R. Hodges 
Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School 
(Original signatures are on file with official student records.) 
To the Graduate Council: 
 
I am submitting herewith a dissertation written by Walter Joram Riker entitled “Law and 
Legitimacy:  Toward a Rawlsian Solution.”  I have examined the final electronic copy of 
this dissertation for form and content and recommend that it be accepted in partial 




         David A. Reidy 
       ______________________ 
 




We have read this dissertation 
and recommend its acceptance: 
 
  Otis H. Stephens 
________________________ 
 
  John Nolt 
________________________ 
 




       Accepted for the Council: 
 
         Linda Painter 
       ______________________ 
 






(Original signatures are on file with official student records.)
 
 
LAW AND LEGITIMACY: 









Presented for the 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Degree 




































 John Rawls developed the most compelling normative account of liberal 
constitutional democracy of the 20th century.  Today, however, prominent political 
theorists such as Jeremy Waldron and Ian Shapiro are calling for post-Rawlsian, “power 
friendly” approaches to democratic theory.  Power friendly approaches surrender a 
significant historical strain of liberal democratic thought, often associated with Rawls—
the hope for a politics of shared reason.  Such “rationalist expectations” must be 
abandoned, says Shapiro.  Power friendly theorists hold that disagreements over justice, 
and other issues, are so deep that political philosophers cannot say what justice requires 
even under ideal conditions.  Democratic citizens can only constitute themselves as a 
democratic body politic through real time political processes.  But this means that, for 
nearly every constitutional and legislative issue, the will of some citizens will govern all.  
There is no hope for a politics of shared reason; what we have is a struggle between 
reasons, where one side wins and the other side loses.  Power friendly theorists seek to 
legitimate this unavoidable exercise of force by describing pragmatic, prudential or 
normative reasons for accepting such democratic outcomes as authoritative.  Democratic 
institutions that produce a stable modus vivendi, in which the spiritual and material needs 
of citizens are at least minimally satisfied, should be regarded as authoritative on those 
(or similar) grounds.  For instance, Shapiro argues that democracy deserves our 
allegiance because it is the best available way of “managing power relations among 
people who disagree about the nature of the common good,” but who must nevertheless 
live together.  Of course, the loser is never happy about losing these struggles, but she has 
sound reason to accept the outcomes anyway, and she lives to fight another day. 
 Power friendly theorists have a point.  But what they do not realize is that Rawls 
conceded this point around 1980, and then proposed his own power friendly account of 
democratic law and political authority.  Rawls’s account centers on his liberal principle of 
legitimacy.  What is significant about his approach is its faithfulness to the spirit, if not 
the fact, of the liberal ideal of shared reason.  That is, while Rawls is not the shared 
reason rationalist that many accuse him of being, he does not surrender as much of the 
liberal project as the power friendly theorists do.  Rawls’s view represents a third option, 
which sits between the rationalist and the power friendly poles.  Unfortunately, few have 
understood his account, because few have read all of his work, or considered his 
intellectual debts.  I construct a Rawlsian power friendly view of law and legitimacy that 
is philosophically rigorous, faithful to Rawls’s texts, and grounded in a thorough 
understanding of his intellectual debts, in particular to H. L. A. Hart and Philip Soper.  In 
the end, I argue that the Rawlsian power friendly view is philosophically superior to both 
the rationalist view (wrongly attributed to Rawls) and the newer power friendly views of 
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THE END OF LIBERALISM 
 
 “All government,” says John Dunn, “however necessary and expeditious, is also a 
presumption and an offence.”1  States typically provide citizens with many practical 
advantages, but they also “insist on a very large measure of compulsory alienation of 
judgement on the part of their citizens.”2  States claim they are justified in compelling 
citizens to follow certain rules and laws, through coercive sanctions when necessary, 
regardless of whether or not their citizens judge the rules or laws to be morally sound or 
otherwise in their self-interest.  This assumed right to demand and compel compliance, 
says Dunn, is largely what makes a state a state.  The levying of such demands, and the 
threats of sanction for noncompliance, are an affront to citizens in modern democracies 
because democratic citizens take themselves to be politically free and equal and capable 
of judging on their own exactly what they ought to do.  Political philosophers have long 
recognized that might does not make right, so a central problem in political philosophy is 
justifying (apologizing for, according to Dunn) this aspect of the state’s relationship to its 
citizens.  What we need is an account of justified political authority that is appropriate for 
modern democracies.  The term “political authority” here is a stand-in for a set of related 
problems in political philosophy.  When I say that we need to account for political 
authority in modern democracies, I mean, roughly, that we need to understand the source 
and nature of the law’s normative authority over citizens, and to know when, if ever, the 
                                                 
1   John Dunn, Democracy:  A History (New York:  Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005), p. 19. 
2   Dunn, Democracy, p. 19. 
1 
state has a right to use its power to compel citizens to act in certain ways, and when, if 
ever, citizens have a duty to obey, or at least to acquiesce or defer to, the state when it 
demands that its rules and laws be followed by all, and threatens to compel obedience 
with coercive force. 
 Ancient and medieval political philosophers justified political authority in terms 
of what they took to be uncontroversial natural or divine understandings of the human 
good.  That these understandings were not widely available to the public, and were 
known only by some privileged few, was not important.  What mattered was the fact that 
the nature of the human good could be known, and that the state could be an aid to, and 
might even be necessary for, the realization of this good.  Insofar as the human good was 
seen as natural or divine in nature, the resulting political orders were also seen as 
naturally or divinely mandated.  Plato’s Republic is but one example. 
 Under the influence of the Reformation and the Enlightenment, liberal political 
theorists abandon this general approach.  One type of liberal theorist, the social contract 
liberal, seeks instead to justify political authority by grounding it in public or shared 
reasons, reasons that all individuals could affirm.3  This strand of liberalism aims to make 
the state’s exercise of coercive power against citizens consistent with freedom of 
conscience, and at the same time an expression of the political freedom, equality, and 
sovereignty of citizens.  For when the state’s power is exercised in accord with and 
pursuant to political rules that all citizens could affirm, the state’s power ceases to be an 
                                                 
3   Two helpful accounts of the relationship between liberalism and shared reason are Charles Larmore, The 
Morals of Modernity (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1996), chapters. 6-7, and Jeremy Waldron, 
“Theoretical Foundations of Liberalism,” Philosophical Quarterly, v. 37 (1987), pp. 127-150. 
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external force exercised against citizens, and instead becomes an exercise of force by 
citizens for citizens. 
 This liberal ideal of shared reason has come under heavy attack in recent years, 
and not without some justification.  Nevertheless, it is an ideal that I seek to vindicate in 
this dissertation.  This liberal hope can be defended against many supposedly fatal 
attacks.  Moreover, liberal shared reason approaches represent a more attractive vision of 
democratic political community than those offered by what I will call “shared interest” 
approaches.  But I am getting ahead of myself.  The story I aim to tell begins with what I 
call good faith disagreement, so it is to this that I now turn. 
 
“Reasonable” or Good Faith Disagreement. 
 
 We know from experience that equally thoughtful and sincere individuals tend to 
disagree over how to answer many important questions about the human condition, 
including questions about the nature of the good life for human beings, and about what 
kind of political institutions we ought to have.  Experience has also taught us that free 
and open discussion of these questions does not generally lead to consensus.  In fact, 
deliberation sometimes sharpens disagreement, pushing us even farther apart.  This 
happens often enough for us to doubt that consensus on many important questions is 
within our reach.  It has become common instead to simply recognize that people tend 
naturally to affirm different and often irreconcilable answers to such questions, even after 
deliberation.  People tend naturally to disagree. 
3 
 Some of these disagreements are simple in nature, in the sense that they can be 
traced to e.g. uncontroversial factual or logical errors made by one or both parties to the 
dispute.  Many more of these disagreements are rooted ultimately in what John Rawls 
calls the burdens of judgment.4  Disagreements rooted in these burdens are not simple.  
The burdens explain how it is that equally diligent and sincere individuals can 
nevertheless reach different answers to questions about e.g. the nature of the human good.  
The burdens include the following conditions: 
(a) Empirical evidence is often complex and conflicting, and thus hard to assess. 
(b) Even when people agree about what the relevant considerations are, they may 
disagree about how to weigh them against one another. 
(c) Important concepts are often vague and subject to difficult, borderline cases. 
(d) The way a person assesses evidence and weighs values is partly determined by the 
totality of her experiences, but no two persons have had the same experiences. 
(e) There are often different kinds of normative considerations on both sides of an 
issue, so it is hard to make a judgment. 
(f) Any set of social institutions is limited in the set of values it can admit, so the 
nature of social life forces us set priorities among cherished values and make 
difficult choices about which to admit and which to restrict. 
What the burdens describe are some of the many ways that the intellectual tools we share 
are simply inadequate to the task of publicly justifying any unique and determinate 
answers to many of the most important questions we face as individuals and as a society.  
                                                 
4   John Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York:  Columbia University Press, 1992), pp. 54-8.  Hereafter 
PL. 
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What the burdens imply is that disagreements over questions like the nature of the human 
good are not ultimately rooted in defects of either intellect or character, but are better 
understood as the result of the inadequacy of the common resources of human reason. 
This is why this phenomenon is often referred to as “reasonable disagreement.”  
Two individuals may act “reasonably”—diligently and honestly trying to think through 
problems related to our human condition—and still come to affirm different and even 
irreconcilable answers.  There are both moral and epistemic issues at play here.  One 
moral issue has to do with honesty and diligence in the search for answers.  When we call 
such disagreements “reasonable” we affirm that each participant has acted responsibly—
each has honestly and diligently applied reasoning tools to the question—and thus 
deserves some measure of respect.  This does not imply any univocal understanding of 
reason.  My view is that reason is plural—there are many ways to do it.  How then can 
people know if others are honestly and diligently applying reason to an issue?  If pushed, 
I would appeal to something like Wittgenstein’s “family resemblance.”  I do not believe 
we can identify necessary and sufficient conditions that distinguish reason strictly 
speaking from all other approaches to problems.  We can, however, see some ways of 
approaching problems as resembling what we ourselves regard most fully as reason.  This 
may seem unsatisfactory, and there is undoubtedly much more could and should be said, 
but I believe this is simply part of the (post-modern?) condition we face today. 
One epistemic issue indicated by “reasonable” disagreement has to do with 
thinking.  “Reasonable” in this sense acknowledges that these questions require careful 
and deliberate attention.  We seek reasons for affirming that e.g. some ways of living are 
good for us, and that others are not.  By calling these disagreements reasonable we 
5 
acknowledge that the parties have reasons for holding the views they do.  Unfortunately, 
the intellectual tools we share cannot do all that we might want them to.  They 
underdetermine unique and determinate answers to many of the questions we ask. 
This leads, then, to another moral issue, what we might think of as each person’s 
moral right to take a stand on controversial issues.  The burdens explain not only why the 
diligent and honest search for answers does not lead to consensus, but also why we 
cannot simply reject other people’s answers as dumb or immoral, as unworthy of 
consideration and undeserving of a hearing in our public spaces.  So another reason for 
calling these disagreements “reasonable” is to acknowledge that, given the burdens of 
judgment, it is not a failing of some sort for a person to affirm a conception of the good 
life, or an understanding of politics or justice, that is different from our own, even if the 
view they affirm is controversial in some way. 
It is of course naïve to deny that disagreements are ever rooted in intellectual or 
moral failures.  Certainly some are.  Nevertheless, it is a mistake to think that even most 
of our disagreements with our fellow citizens are like this.  It is factually wrong, I 
believe, to insist that most of people who disagree with us do so because they are in some 
way intellectually or morally defective.  And it is morally wrong too, because this 
suspicious attitude toward others fails to accord them the respect that is often due to 
them, and because this kind of suspicion corrodes public discourse and can become a 
disruptive force in society.  In any case, although some people cheat, and all people make 
mistakes, it is nevertheless reasonable to believe that most of our fellow citizens are 
6 
sincere in their convictions, and that they have come honestly to the views that they 
affirm.5
Reasonable disagreement should not be confused with pluralism.6  Pluralism is 
the idea that there are many human goods, not just one, and that these different goods are 
not reducible to something more fundamental, such as happiness or freedom.  It is a claim 
about the nature of value.  Reasonable disagreement is different.  It is not a claim about 
the nature of value, but instead a claim about what we can justify to others.  Our 
deliberations about theories of value, such as pluralism, are not themselves immune to the 
burdens of judgment, and so we should not be surprised that there is reasonable 
disagreement over whether or not pluralism is true. 
 There are many good reasons for using the term “reasonable disagreement” to 
refer to disagreements ultimately rooted in the burdens of judgment, but I will not refer to 
them this way in what follows.  I prefer to use the term “good faith disagreement” to 
describe this phenomenon.  Different theorists mean different things by “reasonable 
disagreement,” and, in fact, there are reasonable disagreements over the causes and 
implications of reasonable disagreement itself.  (This is, in my view, one of the more 
interesting puzzles modernity forces on us.)  But my main reason for avoiding the term 
has to do with my ultimate purpose in this dissertation.  I develop a Rawlsian approach to 
law and the government’s right to enforce it, so I spend a good deal of time talking about 
Rawls’s work.  Unfortunately, Rawls is not very clear about what he means by reasonable 
disagreement.  Sometimes he appears to use the term to refer to any disagreement 
                                                 
5   John Nolt disagress.  That is, it is not obvious to him that it is reasonable to believe that most of our 
fellow citizens are sincere in the way I claim.  Nevertheless, he says, it may be reasonable to act on the 
assumption that most people are sincere, even if you do not in fact believe it. 
6   Larmore, The Morals of Modernity, p. 12. 
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between individuals that is rooted in the burdens of judgment.  This is what I will call a 
good faith disagreement.  At other times he appears to use it to refer only to 
disagreements between individuals who affirm views of the human good that do not 
conflict with the essentials of liberal democracy.  This is a more limited set of 
disagreements and represents just a portion of the total set of good faith disagreements.  
This significance of this difference will become clear later, as I develop my Rawlsian 
view.  So, from here forward, I will use the term “good faith disagreement” to refer to 
any disagreement rooted in the burdens of judgment. 
 There are many kinds of good faith disagreements, but two kinds are especially 
important for my dissertation.  Some disagreements are about the nature of the good for 
human beings.  Here I have in mind something like what Rawls calls a comprehensive 
doctrine.  These are more or less coherent moral, religious, or philosophical conceptions 
of the ultimate good for human beings.  In modern democracies, citizens affirm a 
plurality of different and irreconcilable comprehensive doctrines.  Other disagreements 
are over political matters.  For example, there are good faith political disagreements over 
exactly what sort of democratic decision procedures a society ought to institute.  Should 
we have winner take all democracy, or some form of proportional representation?  Which 
is more consistent with the ideal of shared political authority?  Which more reliably 
produces nearly just results over time?  Other good faith political disagreements are more 
abstract.  For example, there are disagreements over how we should understand and 
balance abstract ideals like freedom and equality, and how these abstract ideals should be 
implemented in actual policies.  There are even good faith political disagreements over 
what justice ultimately requires.  Though I single out good faith disagreements over (a) 
8 
the good for human beings and (b) political matters, in this preface, I do not take them to 
represent an exhaustive account of good faith disagreement.  In fact, there are many other 
kinds of good faith disagreements.  But I want to highlight this limited set of 
disagreements because they have a central place in this dissertation. 
 Good faith disagreements have played a role in the emergence of the modern 
liberal society.  Disagreements have long been rooted in the burdens of judgment, though 
this was not always recognized.  Our history is replete with examples of such 
disagreements being met with repression, violence, and even war.  Majorities have often 
sought to impose their views on minorities.  It is dissatisfaction with this constant 
struggle for supremacy, coupled with uncertainty about the possibility of final victory, 
that finally sets us on the path to our modern liberal society. 
 
The Liberal Society. 
 
 Modern liberal societies emerged historically as a response to the Reformation 
and subsequent debates over religious toleration in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries.7  At this point in history it became evident to many that toleration of 
differences was preferable to the continual fighting that resulted from efforts to impose 
views on others, especially since there seemed to be little hope that any final victory 
could be achieved.  A modus vivendi developed, where different factions stopped 
fighting, not out of respect for the other, or the implications of the burdens of judgment, 
                                                 
7   Nicholas Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have Good Reasons for Supporting Liberal Democracy?”, The 
Modern Schoolman, v. 78 (2001), pp. 232-4; Rawls, PL, pp. xxvi-xxvii. 
9 
but as a way of producing a tolerable if sometimes uneasy peace.  Through time, what 
began as a mere modus vivendi evolved into a precursor of the liberal society—a society 
organized around something like our idea of freedom of conscience or thought.  Thinking 
about toleration had changed.  What once was viewed simply a tolerable means of 
maintaining the peace between different people eventually became a core value 
commitment shared by people living in these societies.  This is the beginning of what we 
now think of as the liberal society. 
 The U.S. is a liberal society (liberal political society or liberal polity).  Other 
examples of liberal societies include Great Britain, France, and Germany.  Political 
theorists disagree about exactly what fundamental principles characterize such societies, 
distinguishing them from other, non-liberal polities, but the lists of characteristics they 
develop typically include principles of freedom, equality, toleration, individual rights, 
constitutionalism, and the rule of law.8  Rawls defines liberal societies as those that (a) 
secure for their citizens some set of rights, liberties and opportunities, such as are 
commonly found in constitutional regimes, (b) give priority to these individual freedoms 
over perfectionist values or the common good, and (c) ensure that all citizens have access 
to sufficient means to make effective use of their rights, liberties, and opportunities.9  He 
adds that they are well-ordered.  The members of liberal societies constitute and govern 
themselves as a body politic through a public and (for the most part) voluntarily affirmed 
                                                 
8   For a representative sample, see, e.g., George Crowder, Liberalism and Value Pluralism (New York:  
Continuum, 2002), pp. 22-5; Gerald Gaus, Contemporary Theories of Liberalism (Thousand Oaks, Ca.:  
SAGE Publications, Inc., 2003), pp. 1-22; Robert Talisse, Democracy After Liberalism:  Pragmatism and 
Deliberative Politics (New York:  Routledge, 2005), pp. 15-32; Bert van den Brink, The Tragedy of 
Liberalism:  An Alternative Defense of a Political Tradition (Albany:  State University of New York Press, 
2000), pp. 9-15; and Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have Good Reasons?”  
9   Rawls, LP, pp. 140-1. 
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conception of justice, without excessive coercion, manipulation or deception.10  They 
recognize that justice is centered on the inviolability of persons and understand their 
society to be a system of cooperation aimed at and justified by the good of all individual 
members, and not by some notion of aggregate or corporate good.   Nicholas Wolterstorff 
offers a similar account of the liberal polity: 
… a polity in which there is a constitutional-legal framework which guarantees to 
all its sane adult citizens due process of law along with the so-called “civil 
liberties,” foremost among those liberties being these:  freedom of conscience, 
freedom of religious practice, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, freedom 
from search and seizure without warrant, freedom from cruel and unusual 
punishment, and freedom from intrusions into one’s private life.11
The U.S., Great Britain, Germany, and France are certainly not perfectly liberal 
(according to either account or to common sense), nor are they perfectly just.  
Nevertheless, they each exhibit the core commitments of liberal societies. 
 None of the rights and liberties typically found in liberal polities are absolute.  
The lone exception may be freedom of conscience.  In any case, all liberal polities 
institute some restrictions on citizens’ rights and liberties.  For example, Germany is a 
liberal society, but it has laws that prohibit its citizens from denying that the Holocaust 
occurred.  France too is a liberal society, despite its recent decision to restrict the wearing 
of head scarves by Muslim women in certain contexts.  These and similar restrictions do 
not make these societies illiberal.  Such restrictions may give us reason to wonder if any 
                                                 
10   Rawls, The Law of Peoples (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 4, 19, 64-67.  
Hereafter LP. 
11   Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have,” p. 232. 
11 
society is fully liberal, but restrictions do not imply that any particular society is illiberal.  
Generally speaking, such restrictions on liberties are intended to promote liberty, either 
by securing the conditions necessary for any system of ordered liberty, or by making 
possible a more adequate system of ordered liberty.  
 Liberal societies can differ quite a bit from one another.  They often place 
different restrictions on the various fundamental liberties of citizens.  Rawls’s and 
Wolterstorff’s accounts both leave room for this variation.  This variation is rooted in the 
different histories, traditions, and self-understandings of different liberal societies.  For 
example, while both Germany and the U.S. secure free speech rights for citizens, they 
disagree about how to handle Holocaust denial.  German law forbids it.  This does not 
mean that Germans deny or do not understand the importance of free speech.  It may be 
that the German people have decided that the harm that accompanies Holocaust denial 
simply outweighs the value of allowing people to make such statements.  If so, Germany 
may be less than fully liberal.  Alternatively, the German people may have decided that 
Holocaust denial somehow threatens the conditions necessary for a system of ordered 
liberty at all, or that it somehow prevents them from securing the most adequate system.  
Exactly why the Germans have made this decision is not clear.  What is clear is that their 
decision is a response to their role in the Holocaust and their own historical failings.  On 
the other hand, the U.S. allows its citizens to deny the Holocaust.  This does not imply 
widespread acceptance of such claims in the U.S.  Rather, Americans have decided that 
limiting free speech is not the best way to handle this kind of claim.  Americans have 
faith that a free marketplace of ideas can show such statements to be false, and mitigate 
the harm they tend to cause.  There is nothing suspect about this variation among liberal 
12 
societies.  It is the normal result of reasonable disagreements over how to specify the 
fundamental commitments of liberal societies, and reflects the different histories, 
sociological and material conditions, and self-understandings of different liberal 
societies.  And any liberal society (in fact, any society) that respects the basic rights of its 
citizens can reasonably claim some measure of self-determination in setting up its own 
internal policies. 
 
Liberal Political Philosophy. 
 
Liberal political philosophy (or liberalism) attempts to offer a normative 
justification for the fundamental social and political institutions that characterize liberal 
societies.  Wolterstorff describes the task this way:  “assuming the liberties cited [in 
various accounts of liberal societies] and the restrictions allowed are not a mere grab-bag, 
what’s the governing Idea?”12   
Different liberal theorists defend different governing ideas.  Nevertheless, it is 
possible to identify certain key commitments shared by them all.  Alan Ryan says, for 
instance, that liberalism is “the belief that the freedom of the individual is the highest 
political value, and that institutions and practices are to be judged by their success in 
promoting it.”13  And Martha Nussbaum writes that 
Liberalism holds that the flourishing of human beings taken one by one is both 
analytically and normatively prior to the flourishing of the state or the nation or 
                                                 
12   Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have,” p. 233. 
13   See, e.g., Alan Ryan, “Liberalism,” in R. Goodin and P. Pettit, eds., A Companion to Contemporary 
Political Philosophy, (Malden, MA:  Blackwell Publishing, 1993), pp. 292-3. 
13 
the religious group; analytically, because such unities do not really efface the 
separate reality of individual lives; normatively because the recognition of that 
separateness is held to be a fundamental fact for ethics, which should recognize 
each separate entity as an end and not as a means to the ends of others.14
These statements point to key commitments shared by liberal political philosophers:  (a) 
the primacy of the individual, (b) freedom, and (c) equality.  In the next few paragraphs I 
will describe these commitments in an abstract and (I hope) uncontroversial way.   
 
(a) Liberalism holds that individual persons are primary in two ways.15  First, 
liberalism affirms that the individual person is the fundamental element for political 
theorizing.  Some see this commitment to the primacy of the individual as a metaphysical 
claim, while others see it as a prudential or practical one.16  In any case, the main idea is 
that individuals are always ultimately distinct or separate from the various associations 
and groups (religious, political, filial) that they have membership in.  The groups that 
individuals form do not have an ontological status equal to or more fundamental than that 
of the individuals themselves.  The individual person is the ultimate unit of analysis. 
Second, liberalism holds that the good of individuals—their liberties and 
opportunities—is normatively prior to the good of groups, including society as a whole.  
The good of individuals may not be subordinated to or sacrificed for the good or goals of 
                                                 
14   Nussbaum, quoted in Talisse, Democracy, p. 17. 
15   See, e.g., Talisse, Democracy, pp. 17-19. 
16   Talisse, Democracy, p. 17. 
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social groups.17  This does not mean that people cannot choose to make sacrifices for the 
sake of various groups.  It means that no one can be required to do so in a liberal society. 
 
(b) The second fundamental theoretical commitment of liberalism is freedom.  
Liberal political theorists hold that citizens should be free in two different, but closely 
related, ways.  The first kind of freedom is referred to as “personal freedom” or “moral 
autonomy.”18  It amounts to a deep respect for each individual’s capacity for self-
direction.19  Each normal adult human being is capable of developing, revising, and 
pursuing a “conception of the good,” a more-or-less systematic set of beliefs about what 
is valuable and worth pursuing for human beings.  The general idea of freedom here is 
that each person should be able to decide for herself how to lead her life.  Citizens respect 
one another’s freedom by allowing each other to exercise their capacities for self-
direction. 
 The second kind of freedom is the citizen’s right to play a role in the government, 
i.e., to play a role in the constitution of the political rules that bind citizens into a body 
politic and organize much of their collective behavior.  Some call this “public freedom” 
or “public autonomy.”20  Citizens have different conceptions of the good.  This would not 
be a problem if each of us lived on our own, in isolation from other citizens.  But we do 
not live alone.  We are social beings, and our goals and actions affect the lives of others.  
Sometimes one citizen’s understanding of the good conflicts with another citizen’s 
                                                 
17   This does not rule out practices like eminent domain, though it does require that such practices be 
limited to the purpose of securing the conditions necessary for a more adequate ordered system of liberty. 
18   E.g., van den Brink, Tragedy, pp. 10-2, and Talisse, Democracy, pp. 17-19, respectively. 
19   See, e.g., Talisse, Democracy, pp. 17-20; Waldron, “Liberalism,” Section 3; and Wolterstorff, “Do 
Christians Have,” p. 234. 
20   See, e.g., van den Brink, Tragedy, p. 11. 
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understanding.  In order to deal with these conflicts, liberal societies need institutions and 
rules, e.g., a constitution and laws that define offices and powers of government officials 
and citizens, and that define the limits of personal freedom.  The liberal political 
theorist’s idea of public freedom includes the freedom of citizens to reflect on the 
legitimacy and justice of their institutions, and a fundamental right to play a role in the 
development of these institutions. 
 
(c) The third fundamental theoretical commitment of liberalism is equality.21  This 
does not mean that liberal political theorists are economic egalitarians, though some are.  
Rather, liberal theorists affirm some principle of the equal basic worth or status of all 
citizens.  One aspect of equal basic worth is each citizen’s right to have her interests 
given equal consideration in the development and operation of social and political 
institutions.  A second aspect of it is each citizen’s right to equal respect of her 
entitlement to choose and act on a conception of the good.  This applies also to each 
citizen’s public freedom. 
 
Utilitarian versus Social Contract Liberalism. 
 
 Utilitarian liberals argue that the basic institutions characteristic of liberal 
societies are normatively justified because such institutions maximally promote the utility 
                                                 
21   See, e.g., Waldron, “Liberalism,” Section 3; and Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have,” p. 234. 
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of citizens.22  The freedoms secured and promoted in liberal societies tend to produce the 
most utility for all affected over time.  Some complain, though, that utilitarian liberalism 
is not liberalism at all, but rather a species of perfectionism.23  Roughly put, the charge is 
that utilitarian liberalism makes certain robust claims about the human good, e.g., that 
people’s conceptions of the good are rooted in some notion of individual happiness or 
preference satisfaction.  In making such bold claims, utilitarian liberals ignore good faith 
disagreement and the freedom to affirm one’s own conception of the good.  Liberalism is 
committed to the idea that people are free to choose even conceptions of the good that 
make no reference to happiness, or that are not rooted in the satisfaction of their own 
desires.  They may even choose to affirm a conception of the good that defines the good 
life in terms of the flourishing of some group they belong to, rather than the flourishing 
of individuals. 
 Whatever one makes of these criticisms, (and I’m not saying they prove decisive) 
worries like these have provided some motivation for social contract liberalism.  Social 
contract liberals argue that the basic institutions characteristic of liberal society are 
justified because they represent terms of political association that all citizens as free and 
equal might affirm or accept, from the common and shared moral point of view of 
citizen.  For example, Gerald Gaus says that “liberals insist that moral and political 
principles are justified if and only if each member of the community has reason to 
                                                 
22   For general discussion, see, e.g., John Christman, Social and Political Philosophy:  A Contemporary 
Introduction (New York:  Routledge, 2002), pp. 108-111.  For defenses of utilitarian liberalism, see, e.g., 
Russell Hardin, Morality Within the Limits of Reason (Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1988), and 
John S. Mill’s classic On Liberty (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 2003). 
23   See, e.g., Christman, Social and Political Philosophy, pp. 108-111. 
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embrace them.”24  In another work Gaus says that “this idea of public justification is at 
the heart of contractual liberalism.”25  Jeremy Waldron says something similar:  “liberals 
are committed to … a requirement that all aspects of the social order should either be 
made acceptable or be capable of being made acceptable to every last individual.”26  And 
Thomas Nagel says that “the task of discovering the conditions of [political] legitimacy is 
traditionally conceived as that of finding a way to justify a political system to everyone 
who is required to live under it.”27  Nicholas Wolterstorff agrees:  “the liberal theorist 
sees the liberal polity as committed to the ideal of establishing rules of engagement which 
all citizens reflectively agree to.”28
 This liberal ideal of shared reason can be traced to the Enlightenment, a time 
characterized by a growing faith and confidence in the human ability to understand the 
world.29  Many thinkers of this period felt that reason could free us once and for all from 
the tyranny of tradition and superstition.  Political and social theorists, made bold by 
progress in the sciences, sought to understand and justify our political and social worlds 
as well.  Here, then, is the germ of the hope of shared reason:  freedom of conscience, 
coupled with confidence in the human ability to understand and justify social and 
political arrangements.  These lead naturally (though not inevitably) to a desire for 
political institutions that could be justified to all. 
                                                 
24   Gerald Gaus, “Public Justification and Democratic Adjudication,” Constitutional Political Economy, v. 
2 (1991), p. 251. 
25   Gerald Gaus, Value and Justification:  The Foundations of Liberal Theory (Cambridge, Ma.:  
Cambridge University Press, 1990), p. 456. 
26   Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations,” p. 128. 
27   Thomas Nagle, Equality and Partiality (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1991), p. 3. 
28   Wolterstorff, “Do Christians Have,” p. 235. 
29   See, e.g., Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations,” pp. 134-140. 
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 For contemporary liberalism, the hope offered by shared reason is that free and 
equal citizens, deeply divided by their differing and irreconcilable understandings of the 
right and the good for human beings, might nevertheless find terms of political 
association that each could affirm, or could publicly see as justified, from the common, 
shared moral point of view of “citizen.”  If such terms are found, the state’s coercive 
power, exercised against citizens, is not only consistent with each citizen’s freedom and 
equality, but is also an expression of it.  For when the state’s power is exercised in accord 
with and pursuant to constitutional rules accepted by all citizens, it is not an external 
force exercised against citizens, but is instead an exercise of force by citizens. 
 Power-friendly theorists think it is time for us to abandon this strand of liberal 
political thought.  They hold that our disagreements over the right and the good are so 
deep that political philosophers cannot say what justice ultimately requires, even under 
the ideal conditions of political theory.  What justice ultimately requires on the ground 
can only be worked out—if it can be worked out at all—by citizens through real-time 
political processes.  An implication of this is that, for nearly every political issue, the will 
of some will govern all.  There is no hope for a politics of shared reason; what we have is 
a constant struggle, where one side wins, and other sides lose.  Of course, power-friendly 
theorists recognize that might does not make right, so they seek to legitimate the 
unavoidable exercise of force in democratic politics by describing normative, pragmatic 
or prudential reasons for accepting such outcomes as authoritative.  For instance, 
democratic institutions that produce a stable modus vivendi, in which the spiritual and 
material needs of citizens are at least minimally satisfied, might be regarded as 
authoritative on those (or similar) grounds.  No one is happy to lose these struggles, but if 
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the power-friendly theorists are right, those in the minority have sound reason to accept 
the outcomes anyway.  At the very least, they live to fight another day. 
 Power friendly theorists would be right to reject shared reason, if it required 
consensus over some specific and determinate set of social and political institutions.  
Consensus accounts of shared reason are doomed to fail.  For instance, a consensus 
account of shared reason would require that liberal democratic citizens find concrete and 
determinate democratic decision procedures for resolving disagreements.  That is, it 
would require citizens to find democratic decision procedures that no person could reject 
in good faith.  This would be possible only if questions of democratic institutional design 
were immune to the burdens of judgment.  But we know that they are not immune.  There 
are many good faith disagreements over what sorts of decision procedures are most 
appropriate for a liberal democracy.  For instance, is winner take all democracy or 
proportional representation most faithful to an ideal of shared political authority?  Is the 
ideal of shared political authority the right metric to apply to this question, or should we 
seek instead a decision procedure that will most reliably produce nearly just results over 
time?  If we choose this option, what exactly does justice require?  And so on.  Good 
faith disagreement infects this discussion all the way down.  This is but one example of 
the way that good faith disagreements put strong consensus accounts of shared reason 
well out of our reach. 
 Fortunately, the ideal of shared reason does not require consensus, at least not a 
consensus of this strong and implausible sort.  Consensus accounts of shared reason are 
doomed, but relaxed, power friendly accounts of shared reason are not.  For instance, 
Kant offers a non-voluntarist social contract theory that marries shared reason with the 
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fact that power must often be exercised in the face of good faith dissent and 
disagreement.30  He argues that the law must be based on “the will of the entire people,” 
because “the will of another person cannot decide anything for someone without 
injustice.”31  However, he continues, 
… we need by no means assume that this contract … based on a coalition of the 
wills of all private individuals in a nation to form a common, public will for the 
purposes of rightful legislation, actually exists as a fact, for it cannot possibly be 
so….  It is in fact merely an idea of reason, which nonetheless has undoubted 
practical reality; for it can oblige every legislator to frame his laws in such a way 
that they could have been produced by the united will of the whole nation….  This 
is the test of the rightfulness of every public law.  For if the law is such that a 
whole people could not possibly agree to it (for example, if it stated that a certain 
class of subjects must be privileged as a hereditary ruling class), it is unjust; but if 
it is at least possible that a people could agree to it, it is our duty to consider the 
law as just, even if the people is at present in such a position or attitude of mind 
that it would probably refuse its consent if it were consulted.32
Kant provides an example:  
If a war tax were proportionately imposed on all subjects, they could not claim, 
simply because it is oppressive, that it is unjust because the war is in their opinion 
                                                 
30   For discussion of Kant’s social contract theory see H. S. Reiss, ed., Kant:  Political Writings 
(Cambridge University Press, 1991), Allen D. Rosen, Kant’s Theory of Justice (Cornell University Press, 
1993), chapters 3 and 4, Waldron, “Theoretical Foundations,” pp. 141-143. 
31   Kant, “On the Common Saying ‘This may be True in Theory but it does not Apply in Practice’” in 
Kant:  Political Writings, p. 77. 
32   Ibid., p. 79. 
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unnecessary.  For they are not entitled to judge this issue, since it is at least 
possible that the war is inevitable and the tax indispensable.33
Kant recognizes that the exercise of power without any basis in public consensus is 
unavoidable in politics, but he does not give up on the liberal hope of shared reason.  
Instead, he offers a relaxed account of it.  He does not insist that the law be something 
that all citizens do in fact agree to, or something that no reasonable citizen could 
reasonably reject; it is enough for the law to be something that all citizens could agree to. 
 One might reasonably ask if this relaxed or power friendly approach to shared 
reason is shared reason at all.  After all, in Kant’s example the citizens do not agree that 
the war is necessary—some see no or insufficient reason for it.  Though this worry is 
reasonable, I think it is ultimately mistaken.  What Kant proposes is a shared reason view 
of legitimate state action.  The demand for shared reason is a demand for a certain kind of 
reciprocity.  The demand for reciprocity is, in turn, a demand for a certain kind of respect.  
It is a demand that persons be treated in ways that each could see as justified.  For now, I 
will set aside the issue of just what it means to offer reasons others “could” see as 
justified, since different political theorists take different positions on it.  I want to make a 
couple of more general points here instead.  First, by offering reasons at all for political 
activity, we show respect for each person’s rational agency, for each person’s capacity 
for judgment.  Second, when we offer reasons we think another person could accept, 
from a shared moral point of view, we show respect as well for that person’s political 
freedom and equal political status as a fellow citizen.  While Kant does not require shared 
reason in the fullest sense (terms of association all persons do in fact converge on, or that 
                                                 
33   Ibid.  See Kant’s footnote. 
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could not reasonably be rejected by anyone), his view nevertheless requires reciprocity 
(laws that could have been produced by the united will of the nation) and thereby evinces 
a respect for the rational agency, liberty and equality of citizens (a law has genuine force 
only when it is the kind of thing that citizens could freely affirm). 
 This sort of liberal “power friendly” shared reason requires two kinds of 
reciprocity.  First, it requires something similar to what Reidy calls “reciprocity in 
advantage.”34  Terms of association must respect the interests of all citizens.  Exactly 
what it means to respect the interests of citizens is a question I will leave open for now.  
But the basic point is that there is no reason to think any terms of association that ignored 
a citizen’s interests altogether, or, worse, positively threatened those interests, would be 
affirmed by that citizen.  Citizens have no reason to see such terms of association as 
preferable to anarchy, to the state of nature. 
 Second, shared reason requires something similar to what Reidy calls “reciprocity 
in justification.”35  This requires that citizens be prepared to defend their political activity 
in terms of reasons that are publicly available, that are part of some relevant public 
discourse.  Again, for now I will leave open the question of just what should count as a 
“relevant” or available public reason.  But the basic idea is that political activity should 
not be based solely on non-public reasons, as this does not properly respect others as free 
and equal citizens. 
 
 
                                                 
34   See David A. Reidy, “Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement:  From Liberal to Democratic 
Legitimacy,” in Philosophical Studies, forthcoming 2006. 
35   See Reidy, “Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement.” 
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My Aims in this Dissertation. 
 
 John Rawls developed the most compelling normative account of constitutional 
liberal democracy of the 20th century.  Unfortunately, Rawls is often read as offering an 
implausibly strong consensus account of the liberal ideal of shared reason.  As a result, 
much of his work has been pushed aside as old-fashioned and irrelevant in our modern 
context.  This is a mistake.  What Rawls proposes is a power-friendly shared reason 
account of liberal democratic law and political authority.  It centers on his liberal 
principle of legitimacy.36  Unfortunately, few have understood his account, because few 
have read all of his work on it, or considered his intellectual debts. 
 I have three main goals in this dissertation.  One of my goals is to construct a 
Rawlsian power-friendly shared reason account of political authority for modern pluralist 
liberal societies that is philosophically rigorous, faithful to Rawls’s texts, and grounded in 
a thorough understanding of his intellectual debts, in particular to H. L. A. Hart and 
Philip Soper.  Though some of the things Rawls says suggest that he might hold a strong 
consensus view of shared reason, I will show that there are sound exegetical reasons for 
rejecting this reading of Rawls.  In any case, the strong consensus view is not plausible.  
Whatever its apparent merits, it is simply impossible to achieve.  Rawls understood this, 
and instead offered a view that is in many ways like the views of his contemporary power 
friendly critics.  Whether or not the view I develop is actually Rawls’s view is a question 
that cannot be answered with any certainty, as Rawls’s death means that many such 
                                                 
36   Rawls discusses the liberal principle of legitimacy in PL, p. 136, 216, and “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited,” in The Law of Peoples (Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 137.  “Idea” will be abbreviated in 
the notes as IPRR. 
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answers are now lost to history.  But the view I develop is certainly Rawlsian, and I think 
it is one that Rawls would appreciate. 
 A second goal I have is to critically compare the Rawlsian view to those of 
political theorists such as Shapiro, Waldron, and Soper.  All of these theorists recognize 
the need for accounts of political authority that do not wish away the fact of good faith 
disagreement.  It is simply unrealistic to think that this will go away in our time.  And just 
as citizens will always be divided by their differing conceptions of the good, so too will 
they always be divided by their differing views of what political institutions are 
appropriate for a liberal society.  All of the views I discuss take this to heart.  I will 
subject each of them to internal, immanent critique, and compare them to Rawls’s view.  
In the end, I argue that the Rawlsian view is substantively (philosophically) superior to 
both the consensus view (wrongly attributed to Rawls) and the power-friendly views of 
Waldron, Shapiro, and Soper. 
 One reason for getting a good version of Rawls’s account on the table is its 
faithfulness to the liberal ideal of shared reason.  The liberal hope for a politics of shared 
reason is an overarching theme of my dissertation.  This hope is rooted in sound 
normative commitments and is worth pursuing.  But what it amounts to, once we 
recognize the depth and breadth of reasonable pluralism, is an open and largely 
unanswered question.  A third goal then is to reflect on this issue.  What hope do we have 
of achieving a politics of shared reason, given our deep disagreements over the right and 
the good?  Can the liberal hope for a politics of shared reason be vindicated at all?  As I 
will make clear, Rawls’s view gets us closer to this liberal hope than others.  However, 
his view may prove unworkable.   
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CHAPTER 1 
POLITICAL OBLIGATION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY 
 
 In this dissertation I develop and defend an account of the conditions under which 
a democratic government has the right to enforce the law, and the nature of the reasons 
that citizens have to obey, or at least to acquiesce to, the government’s demands when 
these conditions are in place.37  In developing this account I draw on work on political 
legitimacy and political obligation.  The problem of political legitimacy has to do with 
when, if ever, a state has sufficient normative justification to coercively enforce its laws 
against its citizens.  The problem of political obligation has to do with when, if ever, 
citizens have a duty to obey, or at least to acquiesce to, the state’s demand that its laws be 
followed.  In this chapter I survey recent work in these areas of political philosophy.  My 
purpose here is twofold.  First, this chapter describes broadly the areas of philosophy that 
my project falls into.  Second, it offers tentative accounts of concepts and themes relevant 
to my project. 
 I begin this chapter by discussing work on political obligation.  The question this 
work seeks to answer is this:  do citizens have a duty to obey the laws of their own 
government?  This is a very old problem in philosophy, one examined by Plato in his 
Crito.  Several traditional approaches have received extensive critical discussion.  
Unfortunately, dissatisfaction with the main traditional approaches to this problem has 
led to a general skepticism among political philosophers, many of whom now doubt that 
                                                 
37   The distinction between the duty to obey and the duty to acquiesce or defer to the government is 
significant and will be explained fully in the second half of this chapter. 
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a compelling account of political obligation is possible.  As a result, many have 
concluded that no citizen has a duty to obey her government’s laws.  Some go even 
further, and hold that this implies too that no government is legitimate, i.e., that no 
government has a right to enforce its laws.  This move requires something called the 
correlativity thesis, which holds roughly that the state has a right to enforce the law only 
if citizens have a duty to obey the law, and vice versa.  Under the sway of this thesis, 
many political philosophers now affirm a kind of philosophical anarchism. 
 There have been two kinds of responses to this development.  One response is to 
seek out new accounts of political obligation.  Some of these alternative accounts are 
discussed in this chapter.  One of them receives extensive critical analysis in Chapter 3.  
A second response has been to reject the correlativity thesis, in an effort to free the 
government’s right to enforce the law from the citizen’s duty to obey it.  This move has 
led to new work on political legitimacy.  In the last part of this chapter I develop a brief 
taxonomy of this new work. 
 
Justice, Political Legitimacy, and Political Obligation. 
 
 Most political philosophers hold that political obligation and political legitimacy 
vary somewhat independently of justice.  Justice refers in the broadest sense to some 
appropriate distribution of the benefits and burdens of social life (however defined) 
among the morally salient entities (e.g., individuals, groups, associations) in a society 
(domestic or global).  Political obligation refers to the citizen’s (supposed) duty to obey 
the laws in her own country.  Political legitimacy refers to the government’s (claimed) 
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right to coercively enforce its laws against its citizens.  These are distinct virtues that the 
law might possess, and represent different ways of assessing the same law.  In short, the 
question of whether or not a law is legitimately enforceable, or whether it generates a 
duty of obedience for citizens, is separate from the question of whether or not the law is 
just. 
 For instance, there is nothing implausible about the claim that some citizen might 
have a duty to obey a law, a political obligation, that she at the same time would have a 
moral duty to resist, out of considerations of justice.  This is just the kind of situation that 
gives rise to civil disobedience.  One example might be a law restricting gay marriages.  
Such a law might be unjust, perhaps because it treats people unequally, or because it fails 
to properly respond to their liberty rights.  Nonetheless, if the law is properly enacted, it 
might still generate a political obligation, a duty to obey the law.  What a person ought to 
do, all-things-considered, in such situations is not entirely clear.  What is clear is that 
there is nothing particularly odd about thinking that individuals have conflicting duties in 
situations like these.  Similarly, it could also be the case that a citizen would have no 
political obligation to obey a law that is clearly just.  We can see this by turning around 
the gay marriage law example:  a law permitting gay marriage might be just, but might 
not generate political obligations for citizens if the law were not enacted properly.  Here 
an individual might have good moral reason to obey a law that she otherwise has no 
political obligation to obey.  Similar examples could show political legitimacy varies 
independently of justice as well. 
 None of this implies that there is not, or cannot be, some relationship between 
justice, legitimacy, and obligation.  For instance, some hold that laws that are too unjust 
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simply cannot generate political obligations or be legitimately enforced.  Rawls holds, for 
instance, that laws allowing people to hold slaves could not be legitimately enforced, 
even if they were enacted properly.38  Edmundson holds that only a nearly just state is 
capable of being legitimate.39  But not everyone agrees.  Some think that even the worst 
Nazi laws could have generated real political obligations, if certain conditions were met.  
Of course, proponents of this position do not hold that people should have obeyed the 
Nazis, all-things-considered.  Rather, they hold that the law is a normative domain that is 
distinct from other normative domains, such as justice.  The point is that the relationship 
between justice and either political obligation or legitimacy, if one exists, is complicated.  
It is a mistake to assume that justice and obligation or justice and legitimacy are identical.  
If there is some relationship between justice and these other virtues that the law might 
possess, it needs to be explained and justified. 
 
The Problem of Political Obligation. 
 
 Socrates was sentenced to death for crimes he allegedly committed against his 
fellow Athenians.40  While he was waiting to receive his punishment, his friend Crito 
                                                 
38   Rawls, PL, pp. 427-9. 
39   William Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies:  An Essay on Political Authority (New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 1998), especially Chapter 3. 
40  See Plato’s Crito (New Jersey:  Prentice Hall, 1948).  It is perhaps anachronistic and a bit misleading to 
treat the problem Socrates faced in Athens, that Hobbes and Locke faced in seventeenth-century England, 
and that we face today as identical.  The differing social and political circumstances and different 
background beliefs and assumptions that inform and shape the discussion through history should not be 
ignored.  Nevertheless, we can acknowledge these differences without being forced to conclude that there is 
nothing we can identify as “the” problem of political obligation.  The issues that concerned Socrates, 
Hobbes, and Locke are not that foreign to us today.  If we back up a bit and look at the issue broadly, we 
can see that each confronts roughly the same issue.  For discussion of the history of the problem of political 
obligation, see, e.g., John Dunn, Political Obligation in Its Historical Context (New York:  Cambridge 
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came to visit.  Crito believed that the Athenians were being unjust, that they were making 
a terrible mistake, and that Socrates ought to try to escape into exile.  He developed a 
plan to spirit Socrates away, perhaps to Thessaly, where Crito had powerful friends, and 
he brought the idea to Socrates.  Of course, Socrates wanted to think about it.  He had to 
decide whether or not to obey a legal but apparently unjust decision by his government.  
This is the problem of political obligation:  do citizens have a duty to obey the laws of 
their own country, simply because they are laws, and regardless of justice? 
 Accounts of political obligation try to show that citizens do have a duty to obey 
the laws of their government.41  This duty is generally understood to be strict.  First, it is 
a duty to obey all of the laws of the state.  Second, it is a fairly strong duty, one that can 
only be overridden in extraordinary circumstances.  Neither of these conditions imply 
that political obligation is an absolute duty.  This is one common misconception about 
political obligation.  If citizens have political obligations, these should always factor into 
their calculations about how to act.  However, a duty to obey the law does not determine 
how a citizen ought to act, all-things-considered.  Political obligation is a prima facie 
duty.  It is one issue that anyone concerned to be moral ought to consider, but it is not the 
only one.  For instance, individuals may have other political duties that are distinct from 
the duty to obey the law.  We may have a duty of justice that is political in nature, but 
that is distinct from political obligation.  Many political theorists argue that political 
obligation and justice vary independently, so that it makes perfect sense to say that a 
person could have a political obligation to obey a law that they also have a duty, rooted in 
                                                                                                                                                 
University Press, 1980); John Horton, Political Obligation (London:  Macmillan Press, 1992), Chapter 1; 
and N. O’Sullivan, The Problem of Political Obligation (New York:  Garland Press, 1987), Chapter 1. 
41  Two good introductions to political obligation are Horton, Political Obligation, and A. John Simmons, 
Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1979). 
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considerations of justice, to resist.  This is the essence of civil disobedience.  And citizens 
may have non-political duties as well, such as person-to-person moral duties, that are 
distinct from political obligation.  This is not meant to minimize the seriousness of the 
duty to obey the law.  Citizens want to know how they ought to act, all-things-considered, 
so they need to understand how the duty to obey the law figures into these judgments. 
 Three standard accounts of political obligation seek to ground the duty 
respectively in consent, fair play, and gratitude.  Voluntarist accounts of political 
obligation seek to ground an individual’s obligation to the law in some voluntary act of 
commitment, e.g., an individual decision or choice of some sort.42  The consent account 
is voluntarist.  One construal of the fair play account is too.  Non-voluntarist accounts 
seek to ground political obligation in something else.  A second construal of the fair play 
account is non-voluntarist, as is the gratitude account.  Before discussing these traditional 
accounts, I will discuss what can be called a “general moral reasons” approach.  This 
approach is not very good, but it is worth discussing because it draws out central themes 
in the debate over political obligation.  After that I will critically evaluate the three 
traditional accounts. 
 
A False Start:  The General Moral Reasons Approach. 
 
 Before I discuss the traditional approaches to political obligation, I want to 
introduce what we can call the “general moral reasons” approach.43  This approach fails, 
                                                 
42  Horton provides a good critical discussion of political voluntarism in his Political Obligation, pp. 19-50. 
43   My discussion of the general moral reasons approach is informed by Rex Martin, “Political Obligation.”  
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but its failure is worth noting, because it draws out central issues in the literature on 
political obligation.  The general moral reasons approach is fairly straightforward:  we 
have a duty to obey laws that have good moral content, and a duty to resist laws with bad 
moral content.  On this view, the only reasonable ground for any supposed duty to obey 
the law is the law’s moral worth.  This central claim of the general moral reasons view is 
correct, in a sense, but this way of putting it obscures more than it uncovers.  Whether or 
not we ought to obey the law, all-things-considered, is always an open question.  
However, this is not the question under consideration in the literature on political 
obligation.  The question of political obligation has to do with why, if at all, something’s 
“being a law” should factor into our deliberations about how to act, all-things-considered, 
and just what weight something’s “being a law” should have.  We want to know if law as 
such is one of the things that needs to be considered, and, if so, how it measures up 
against other “non-law” considerations.  But the general moral reasons approach moves 
us away from the idea that we have any special obligation to obey the law just because it 
is the law.44  In making this move, it abandons a central idea in the debates about political 
obligation.  In the end, then, the general moral reasons approach is not an account of 
political obligation at all. 
 In any case, there are several other problems with this general moral reasons 
approach.  First, people reasonably disagree about the moral content of different laws.  
Thus, in many cases it will be perfectly reasonable for those enacting a law to conclude 
that it has good moral content, even if it is reasonable for others to find it morally 
objectionable.  How are citizens supposed to regard such laws?  The general moral 
                                                 
44   Rex Martin emphasizes this feature of political obligation in “Political Obligation.” 
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reasons approach does not help us with this situation.  Second, some laws are morally 
indifferent.  If the duty to obey the law depends on the law’s moral content, we have no 
reason to obey these laws.  But this doesn’t seem right.  Again, the general moral reasons 
approach fails us. 
 Finally, the general moral reasons approach does not meet what political 
philosophers call the particularity requirement.  The particularity requirement demands 
that an account of political obligation explain why a citizen has a special relationship 
with her own government that she does not have with other governments.45  But if the 
ground of the duty to obey the law is the moral content of the law, then it seems like 
citizens have a duty to obey all laws with good moral content, regardless of what 
government enacts them.  This general moral reasons account makes no distinction 
between my own state and other states.  As a result, it fails to explain the special 
relationship citizens have to their own state.46
 
Consent Accounts of Political Obligation. 
 
 One traditional account of political obligation grounds the duty to obey the law in 
consent.47  This is actually a family of accounts, since there are three distinct but common 
                                                 
45   See, e.g., Klosko, Political Obligations, p. 12; Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 31-5. 
46   The particularity requirement does not imply that citizens of one state have no duties to other states.  
For instance, it is probably the case that all individuals have a duty (of justice) to support all just 
governments.  Political obligation simply refers to something more specific than this:  the citizen’s duty to 
obey her own state’s laws. 
47   Many works on political obligation discuss the consent theory.  For a classic statement of the view, see 
John Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, chapters 7 and 8.  For a sustained contemporary defense 
of consent theory, see Harry Beran, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation (London:  Croom Helm, 
1987). 
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versions of it:  express consent, voting, and residence.  On all of these accounts, citizens 
have a duty to obey the law because they have in some deliberate fashion promised or 
agreed to obey the government.  This promise to obey the government is cashed out as a 
duty to obey the government’s laws. 
 A. John Simmons offers one fully developed and powerful consent account.48  His 
view grows out of his understanding of Locke’s political philosophy.  According to 
Simmons,  
Political power is morally legitimate, and those subject to it are morally obligated 
to obey, only where the subjects have freely consented to the exercise of such 
power and only where that power continues to be exercised within the terms of 
the consent given.  The legitimacy of particular states thus turns on consent, on 
the actual history of that state’s relations with its subjects.49
Here Simmons affirms a version of the correlativity thesis, but I will set this aside for 
now.  I want to emphasize two other points he makes.  First, on his view a citizen’s 
political obligation can only be grounded on free consent.  No other account, he thinks, 
respects our fundamental commitment to the political freedom of all individuals.  
Simmons, like Locke, affirms an initial state of nature, which includes freedom from 
political association.  Individuals leave the state of nature and become citizens of some 
state, with all of the duties that implies, only when they consent to be governed.  What 
should count as consent is still an open question.  Second, this account of political 
obligation turns on actual, lived history.  Simmons thinks this is very important. 
                                                 
48   See, e.g., A. J. Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy:  Locke, Consent, and the Limits of Society 
(Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 1993) and Justification and Legitimacy (New York:  
Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
49   A. J. Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” Ethics, v. 109 (1999), p. 745. 
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How we have actually freely lived and chosen, confused and unwise and 
unreflective though we may have been, has undeniable moral significance; and 
our actual political histories and choices thus seem deeply relevant to the 
evaluation of those political institutions under which we live.50
Appeals to what would move us, were we perfectly rational (according to whose 
measure?), or even to what should move us (again, according to whom?), seem 
paternalistic and to have only impersonal and indirect moral force, if they have any moral 
force at all.  Appeals to what I have actually chosen seem direct and personal:  “I am 
constrained only by how I have in fact lived and chosen.”  This makes the moral 
constraint of political obligation seem less external and more obvious, and also makes it 
more likely to be efficacious.  “And it seems appropriate to suggest that a state’s 
authority over an individual ought to depend on some such personal transactions, given 
the coercive, very extensive, and often quite arbitrary sorts of direction and control that 
state authority involves.”51
 But what counts as consent?  One version of the consent account grounds political 
obligation in express consent.  Express consent is an explicit and solemn promise to obey 
the government, to accept all valid laws and to be bound by them.  Most believe that a 
promise of this sort could ground political obligation.52  The main problem with this 
account is that it fails to meet what political philosophers call the “generality 
requirement.”  The generality requirement holds that political obligation must bind all (or 
                                                 
50   Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” p. 763. 
51   Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” p. 762. 
52   While most think express consent could ground political obligation, some are not so sure.  See, e.g., Rex 
Martin, “Political Obligation,” for one argument that express consent could not actually ground an 
obligation to obey all of the laws that a state might pass. 
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nearly all) citizens in a society.53  Those who insist on this requirement hold that if we 
cannot give an account of why (nearly) everyone in some society has a duty to obey the 
law, then we can only conclude that no one has such a duty. For this reason, the express 
consent account fails.  Few citizens, if any, have ever made any such promise to the 
government.  Nor, many think, is it reasonable to expect that citizens generally would 
make such a promise, if (say) the government were to set up “pledge booths” in every 
city, in an effort to correct this problem with political obligation.  So most conclude that 
express consent is an inadequate account of political obligation. 
 Express consent may not be the only way to promise to obey the government.  
Some argue that voting in free elections counts as consent.54  Proponents of this view 
argue that the act of voting is a promise to obey the government.  It would be odd to say, 
for instance, that someone who voted for Jane Smith did not consent to be governed by 
her if she won the election.  In this situation, a free vote constitutes consent.  But what 
about citizens who voted for the loser (say, John Kerry)?  More broadly, voting 
constitutes consent because it is one form of political participation in the processes of 
government.  From this perspective, a vote for a candidate is also a vote for a political 
system.  It would be odd to say that someone who participates in the actual processes that 
constitute her government does not consent to that government as a political system. 
 But some simply deny that voting amounts to any such promise.55  Simmons 
argues that we must distinguish acts that imply consent from acts that are signs of 
consent.  Consent is a deliberate act of acceptance, a promise.  But an act that merely 
                                                 
53   See, e.g., Klosko, Political Obligations, p. 10-11; Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 55-6. 
54   See, e.g., Simmons, Moral Principles, and Martin, “Political Obligation,” for discussion of this 
argument. 
55   Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 92-3. 
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implies consent may not in fact be such a promise.  For instance, if citizens do not know 
that voting counts as consent—if they are not aware of the fact that voting constitutes 
consent to be governed—then we cannot count a vote as consent in anything but a 
“metaphorical” sense.  We simply do not know if the consent-implying act of voting is in 
fact intended by the citizen as consent to anything.56  While voting may imply consent, 
since most people have no awareness or intention of consenting to anything when they 
vote, we cannot assume it is a sign of consent.  Some argue that it is possible for a state to 
turn voting into such a sign, e.g., by altering political processes in ways that make 
citizens aware of the fact that voting constitutes consent.57  But no states have done this. 
 Another consent account is based on residence.  On this account, when adult 
citizens have a right to emigrate, the fact that they have not exercised this right 
constitutes a promise or agreement to be governed by their country of residence.  This is 
a common but controversial account of political obligation.  Locke, Rousseau, and, more 
recently, W. D. Ross, all affirm versions of this account.58  The heart of the controversy 
over it is whether or not residence, or rather the unexercised right of emigration, can be 
seen as a genuine choice situation.  That is, is continued residence the kind of choice that 
constitutes consent? 
                                                 
56   This does not mean that consent requires positive action.  For instance, suppose the board of directors of 
a hospital has a meeting one Friday, and at the end of the meeting the board’s chairperson says “we’ll have 
a mandatory meeting next Friday – does anyone have a conflict?”  In this situation, silence can be taken as 
acceptance, as consent to appear at the meeting.  Silence is a consent-implying act, but the circumstances in 
the boardroom case are such that silence is also a sign of consent.  The fact that the chairman puts the 
question as he does, in the circumstances of the boardroom case, means that silence is a promise to attend 
the Friday meeting. 
57   This is what Klosko calls “reformist” consent (Klosko, Political Obligation, Chapter 6).  Reformist 
consent theories argue that consent could ground political obligation, if political institutions were reformed 
in certain ways. 
58   Locke, Second Treatise of Government, section 119; Rousseau, Social Contract, IV.ii; W. D. Ross, The 
Right and The Good, p. 27. 
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 In the Crito, the Laws insist that Athens did present itself to citizens as such a 
choice situation: 
We openly proclaim this principle, that any Athenian, on attaining to manhood 
and seeing for himself the political organization of the state and us its laws, is 
permitted, if he is not satisfied with us, to take his property and go away wherever 
he likes.  If any of you chooses to go to one of our colonies, supposing that he 
should not be satisfied with us and the state, or to emigrate to any other country, 
not one of the laws hinders or prevents him from going away wherever he lies, 
without any loss of property.  On the other hand, if any one of you stands his 
ground when he can see how we administer justice and the rest of our public 
organization, we hold that by doing so he has in fact undertaken to do anything 
that we tell him.59
The question for us in the contemporary world, says Simmons, is whether or not we can 
alter our political processes in ways that make continued residence a sign of genuine 
consent.60  If so, this is a plausible account of political obligation. 
 One popular objection to residence accounts was first suggested by Hume.61  
Residence simply cannot constitute consent, the argument goes, because it is possible for 
self-professed revolutionaries, anarchists, spies, outlaws, and so on, to reside in a state.  
But it is absurd to insist that such people consent, even tacitly, to be ruled by the 
government in their state of residence.  So, even if we did arrange our political processes 
                                                 
59   Plato, Crito, 51d-e. 
60   Simmons, Moral Principles, p. 96. 
61   Simmons, Moral Principles, p. 97.  This argument appears, for instance, in J. P. Plamenatz, Consent, 
Freedom, and Political Obligation, second ed. (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1968), p. 7, and J. W. 
Gough, John Locke’s Political Philosophy, second ed. (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1973), p. 70. 
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so that continued residence did count as a choice, still we could not hold that residence 
constitutes consent to be governed.  The scoundrels scuttle the project. 
 Despite its popularity, Simmons thinks this argument misses the point.  The 
reason it seems absurd to conclude that (say) the anarchist consents to be governed is 
presumably the fact that she actively rejects the authority of the government.  But this 
makes consent a matter of attitude, and not of residence.  To make this scoundrel 
objection work, we have to assume that the anarchist cannot consent to be governed, no 
matter what she does.  But, Simmons says, this is just false.  Whether or not the anarchist 
has an attitude of consent is beside the point, if we see consent as some deliberate act that 
generates obligations (what Simmons calls the “occurrence” sense of consent).  On this 
account, the act of consent is residence.  It simply does not matter how the scoundrel 
feels about the government. 
 Another common objection to residence accounts is the difficulty inherent in 
exercising the right to emigrate.  Hume put the problem like this: 
Can we seriously say, that a poor peasant or partizan has a free choice to leave his 
country, when he knows no foreign language or manners, and lives from day to 
day, by the small wages which he acquires.  We may as well assert that a man, by 
remaining in a vessel, freely consents to the dominion of the master; though he 
was carried on board while asleep, and must leap into the ocean, and perish, the 
moment he leaves her.62
                                                 
62   David Hume, “Of the Original Contract,” in A. MacIntyre, ed., Hume’s Ethical Writings (Collier-
Macmillan, 1965), p. 263. 
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Hume makes two points here.  First, just like the man who is carried on board ship while 
asleep, none of us chooses our initial state of residence.  We simply find ourselves in one, 
either by birth or by being carried to one by our parents or guardians.  Second, the social 
nature and other exigencies of human life make it very difficult, if not impossible, for 
most citizens to emigrate.  The truth is this:  fate simply plunks us down in one place or 
another, and it is not easy or even possible for most of us to go someplace else.  Thus, 
continued residence cannot be considered voluntary, and so it cannot be regarded as 
consent. 
 Not everyone finds this argument compelling.  Joseph Tussman, for instance, 
argues that it mistakenly conflates convenience with consent.63  As long as citizens know 
that residence constitutes consent, and know that emigration is possible, then we need not 
worry that emigration is unattractive or even difficult.  The fact that a choice is 
unpleasant does not render it involuntary.  But this clearly understates the problem.  
Emigration is not merely unpleasant or inconvenient.  Many of the things we value most 
in life—home, family, friends—cannot be moved.  These are tied to our state of residence 
and cannot be taken with us when we leave.  For most of us, then, emigration would not 
be merely inconvenient, but would be a catastrophe.  It would mean leaving behind many 
of the things that give our lives meaning and purpose.  Thus, continued residence is not a 
politically meaningful choice.64
 So consent accounts do not justify political obligation.  Express consent accounts 
fail to meet the generality requirement, because few citizens have ever made an explicit 
                                                 
63   Joseph Tussman, Obligation and the Body Politic (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1960), p. 38. 
64   Simmons considers this objection to residence accounts to be decisive.  See Moral Principles, pp. 99-
100. 
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promise to the government.  Voting consent accounts also fail.  Citizens do not generally 
regard a vote to be a sign of consent, so it cannot be counted as such.  And even if 
citizens did regard a vote as consent, many citizens do not vote.  Thus, the voting account 
fails the generality requirement.  Residence consent accounts fail because continued 
residence cannot be seen as a politically meaningful choice.  Continued residence does 
not count as consent because there is good reason to doubt that continued residence 
constitutes a politically meaningful voluntary act. 
 
Fair Play Accounts of Political Obligation. 
 
 Another traditional account of political obligation grounds it in a duty of “fair 
play.”  Both H. L. A. Hart and John Rawls defended versions of the fair play account.65  
The general idea is this.  People are engaged in a cooperative practice or enterprise that is 
widely beneficial.  For instance, many people must work together to produce the 
conditions necessary for a market economy, or to protect and preserve our environment.  
These and other important social goods are only possible through the concerted and 
coordinated efforts of large numbers of individuals.  The benefits of these cooperative 
schemes emerge only if many people join in and maintain them.  Joining the cooperative 
scheme comes with certain costs.  People must restrict their behavior in certain ways if 
many social goods are to be possible.  The problem is that many of these socially 
produced goods are free, in the sense any single citizen can gain the benefits, without 
                                                 
65   See H. L. A. Hart, “Are There Any Natural Rights?,” Philosophical Review, v. 64 (1955), pp. 185-6; 
and John Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play,” in S. Freeman, ed., John Rawls:  Collected 
Papers (Cambridge, Ma.:  Harvard University Press, 1999), pp. 117-129. 
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contributing to the cooperative activity and incurring the associated costs of participation, 
just as long as most of the other citizens continue to do their part.  This is the free-rider 
problem.  The fair play account claims that a citizen who gets the benefits of some 
cooperative scheme has a duty of fair play to do his part to contribute to their production.  
Strictly speaking, the obligation each citizen owes is to other participants in the 
cooperative scheme.  This obligation to other citizens becomes an obligation to obey the 
law because many of the beneficial cooperative schemes in question are organized 
through laws.  For instance, the conditions necessary for a market economy can be 
maintained only if citizens follow the laws designed to promote and protect those pre-
conditions.  And government itself is a cooperative activity that produces important 
social benefits, as long as large numbers of people do their share to maintain it and do not 
cheat.  It is not clear, though, if this argument is supposed to be voluntarist or non-
voluntarist.  Both alternatives will be considered in due course. 
 Robert Nozick rejects the fair play account in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.66  He 
makes his case through a series of examples.  Here is his Public Address (PA) example: 
Suppose some of the people in your neighborhood (there are 364 other adults) 
have found a public address system and decide to institute a system of public 
entertainment.  They post a list of names, one for each day, yours among them.  
On his assigned day (one can easily switch days) a person is to run the public 
address system, play records over it, give news bulletins, tell amusing stories he 
has heard, and so on.  After 138 days on which each person has done his part, 
your day arrives.  Are you obligated to take your turn?  You have benefited from 
                                                 
66   Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York:  Basic Books, 1974), Chapter 5. 
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it, occasionally opening your window to listen, enjoying some music or chuckling 
at someone’s funny story.  The other people have put themselves out.  But must 
you answer the call when it is your turn to do so?  As it stands, surely not.  
Though you benefit from the arrangement, you may know all along that 364 days 
of entertainment supplied by others will not be worth your giving up one day.  
You would rather not have any of it and not give up a day than have it all and 
spend one or your days at it.  Given these preferences, how can it be that you are 
required to participate when your scheduled day comes?67
Nozick recognizes that the PA example attacks a weak version of the fair play principle, 
so he makes suggestions for improving it.  For instance, he suggests that a stronger fair 
play principle would build in the condition that the benefit should outweigh the cost of 
participation.  The cooperative scheme should be useful to participants.  But Nozick has 
an argument against this improved version of the principle too.  For instance, what if 
others benefit more from the PA system than you do?  Or what if you prefer some other 
joint activity to the one the group chooses, and you express your opinion by refusing to 
take your turn at the PA?  Suppose that you would prefer that the group take turns 
reading the Talmud over the PA system instead of philosophy, and you believe that by 
reading philosophy when your turn comes up, you reinforce the status quo and make it 
harder to effect changes of the sort you envision.  Nozick says even if the benefits 
outweigh the costs in these cases, it would be wrong to enforce the principle of fairness.  
And so on.  Nozick further develops the fair play principle, in response to his own 
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objections, and then provides more examples meant show its failings.  In the end, he 
rejects the fair play argument. 
 There are a couple of ways to respond to Nozick’s argument.  Simmons provides 
one voluntarist response.  He argues that we need to distinguish participants from 
innocent bystanders to make the fair play argument work.  Participants voluntarily accept 
the benefits of the cooperative scheme, and so owe something to other participants.  
Bystanders do not.  Nozick’s man is a bystander, not a participant, so his criticism of the 
argument misses the mark.  Klosko provides a non-voluntarist response.  He argues that 
Nozick’s examples are weak, because they all describe trivial benefits that are readily 
available.  On Klosko’s view, the fair play argument only works when the benefits are 
indispensable and can only be provided by the government. 
 Simmons rejects Nozick’s arguments, because the individual in Nozick’s PA 
example is not a participant in the sense that the fair play principle requires, but is instead 
merely an “innocent bystander.”68  Nozick’s man has not volunteered for anything.  
Participants voluntarily take part in the cooperative scheme.  The most that Nozick’s 
examples could show is that no one should be able to force just any scheme and its 
obligations on us.  But Simmons does not think that the fair play principle is meant to 
work in this way.  If it were, he says, it would be just as outrageous as Nozick thinks it is.  
People who have no significant relationship to a cooperative scheme might benefit from 
it in incidental ways, but this does not mean that they have any duties as a result.  For 
example, if your friend participates in a cooperative scheme that makes her a lot of 
money, and you benefit from the scheme incidentally, in the form of expensive gifts she 
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gives you, you have no obligation to do your part in the scheme.  To put this in a political 
context, citizens in Canada benefit indirectly from the efforts of the U.S. government to 
maintain the rule of law in the U.S., but this does not mean that these Canadian citizens 
have a political obligation to obey the U.S. government.  The principle only works, 
Simmons argues, if it applies to individuals who are participants in the scheme in some 
significant sense.  The dilemma faced by fair play theorists, then, is offering some 
meaningful account of the distinction between participants and bystanders.  One problem 
to watch out for is that the participant/bystander distinction does not accidentally reduce 
the fair play account to a consent account. 
 Simmons suggests that we can get past this problem by making a distinction 
between accepting benefits and merely receiving them.69  This is the heart of his 
voluntarist construal of the fair play argument.  A participant in a scheme is someone 
who accepts the benefits of the scheme.  People who simply receive benefits, like 
Nozick’s PA man, are merely bystanders and not participants.  But isn’t accepting the 
benefits of a scheme the same as consenting to the scheme?  Doesn’t this move reduce 
the fair play argument to a consent account?  Not according to Simmons.  You can accept 
the benefits of a scheme without consenting to it.  Suppose that Nozick’s neighborhood is 
having trouble getting clean water.  The water they get from the city lines is polluted, and 
nearly everyone wants something to be done about it.  The government is unresponsive, 
so the neighborhood has a meeting to decide what to do.  At the meeting, a vote is held 
and the majority votes to dig a public well in the neighborhood, that members of the 
neighborhood will pay for and maintain.  But Jones voted against this scheme.  He 
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announces that he does not consent to this ridiculous plan, and that he will not support it 
in any way.  Despite his objection, his neighbors dig, pay for, and maintain the well.  
Now that clean water is available to the neighborhood, Jones starts to envy his neighbors’ 
easy access to clean water.  So he goes to the well each night and gets some for his home, 
knowing that the water will never be missed.  Simmons thinks this example shows two 
things.  First, since Jones accepted the benefits of the cooperative scheme, he now has a 
duty to do his part.  Second, Jones has not consented to this cooperative scheme.  Jones 
may think his neighborhood’s scheme is completely idiotic and absolutely the worst way 
to get water, and so he frequently and loudly expresses his dissent.  Thus, the fact that he 
needs water and gets it from his neighborhood well instead of some other source does not 
show that he consents to the scheme.  However, there is no question that he accepts the 
benefits of it.  To Simmons, Jones has made himself a participant of the well scheme by 
taking the water, and has thereby accepted the duties of a participant, despite the fact that 
he refuses to give consent to it. 
 One serious problem for this voluntarist approach to fair play is created by open 
or non-excludable benefits.70  These are benefits of government that citizens cannot 
easily avoid.  For instance, the benefits we receive from the efforts of police officers who 
patrol our streets, catch criminals, and eliminate potential threats to our safety are open or 
non-excludable.  Other examples include goods like national defense, public health 
measures, and efforts to protect the environment.  The problem is this:  does it make 
sense to say that citizens accept open benefits?  Is there some way in which citizens could 
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refuse them?  If not, then Simmons’s strategy for defusing Nozick’s objection does not 
work. 
 Simmons argues that we can make sense of the idea that some citizens accept 
open benefits, and that others do not.  The crucial difference between them has to do with 
the citizen’s attitude toward the open benefits received.  We can say that a citizen accepts 
open benefits if she receives them “willingly and knowingly.”71  To say that a citizen 
knowingly accepts open benefits is to say that she understands that the benefits result 
from a cooperative scheme.  She knows how the benefits are generated.  And to say that a 
citizen willingly accepts open benefits is to say that she does not regard the benefits as 
forced on her.  Citizens who do not know, or who never think about, where the benefits 
come from cannot accept them.  Simmons is not clear about why this is so, but I think it 
has something to do with the fact that such citizens do not really know (a) what they are 
accepting, and (b) that what they are accepting comes with political obligations attached.  
And citizens who regard the benefits as forced on them do not accept them.  Thus, he 
concludes, it is possible for citizens to accept even open benefits.  However, this may be 
a pyrrhic victory. 
 Simmons thinks the fair play argument ultimately fails the generality requirement.  
It is implausible to hold that most citizens have accepted the benefits of government in 
the relevant sense, so it does not explain why nearly all citizens have political obligations.  
Many citizens barely notice the benefits they receive.  Many other citizens think the 
benefits they receive from the government are not worth the costs of participation (e.g., 
taxes, military service, laws restricting personal behavior, and so on).  Still other citizens 
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think that we buy benefits from the government (e.g., with our taxes).  Thus, Simmons 
argues, most citizens do not accept the open benefits of government, either because they 
do not understand that the benefits result from a cooperative scheme, or because they 
regard the benefits as forced on them by the government.  Thus, the fair play account fails 
the generality requirement. 
 Klosko offers a non-voluntarist response to Nozick.  His account focuses on 
features of the benefits received instead of on features of the individuals who receive 
them.72  On his view, Nozick’s examples all share one fatal flaw—they describe 
cooperative schemes that produce benefits of strikingly little value.  How valuable, really, 
is Nozick’s communal PA system?  It certainly does not provide anything citizens need in 
order to have decent lives.  Nozick’s other examples describe similarly trivial benefits:  
one example refers to a cooperative effort to sweep dirt from the street, while another 
describes a cad who enters your house to thrust books into your arms.  Who needs these 
goods?  No one, really.  This, Klosko thinks, is what is wrong with Nozick’s argument:  
Nozick’s rejection of fair play accounts relies too heavily on benefits that no citizen 
really needs.  To Klosko, Nozick simply misrepresents the fair play account.  Fair play 
generates strong obligations only when the goods supplied by the government are 
“indispensable for satisfactory lives.”73  A good provided by the government is 
indispensable when (1) individuals must have them in order to have satisfactory lives, 
and (2) they can only be provided by the government.  Examples of indispensable 
benefits include physical security (national defense and domestic law and order), 
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protection from a hostile environment, and public health measures.74  To Klosko it does 
not matter that these are open benefits, because the issue does not turn on whether or not 
citizens voluntarily accept them.  What matters is that citizens receive benefits from the 
government that (a) they must have in order to live decent lives, but that (b) they cannot 
secure on their own. 
 One problem with Klosko’s view is suggested by Simmons’s discussion of 
Nozick.  Simmons argues that the upshot of Nozick’s examples is that any plausible 
account of fair play must make a distinction between participants and bystanders.  But 
Klosko makes no such distinction.  Klosko seems to insist that bystanders do have an 
obligation to do their part in cooperative schemes.  Simmons claims that such a result is 
outrageous.  Bystanders have no duty to contribute to cooperative schemes, even when 
they benefit from them.  But we might defend Klosko on this point.  Simmons’ claim 
about the participant/bystander distinction seems to be informed by Nozick’s examples, 
but, as Klosko points out, Nozick’s examples are weak because they describe trivial 
goods.  Klosko could admit that it is perfectly reasonable to make participation (in some 
sense) a condition of a fair play obligation when the scheme in question and its benefits 
are trivial.  But the goods Klosko has in mind are not trivial.  This may undercut 
Simmons’ argument as much as it does Nozick’s.  For it would be odd to claim that 
participation is a requirement of obligation when a cooperative scheme provides 
indispensable benefits, i.e., goods that a person cannot secure on her own, and cannot live 
without.  If participation is a requirement of obligation in this context, it may be so in 
only a trivial sense (i.e., in the sense that non-participation amounts to death).  Or it may 
                                                 
74   Klosko describes these and other indispensable goods in detail in Chapter 2 of Political Obligations. 
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simply be nonsensical to require (most) people to “participate,” in the sense of voluntarily 
accepting goods that they need in order to live. 
 But the fact that Klosko’s view implies that bystanders have political obligations 
does suggest that it doesn’t meet the particularity requirement.  For example, Klosko 
claims that the government’s provision of goods like public health and environmental 
protection generates a fair play duty for citizens.  But it is clear that these benefits do not 
stop at national borders.  For instance, people in Mexico and Canada, especially in border 
towns, benefit from U.S. government efforts to maintain national security, to produce 
internal social order, and to promote public health measures and environmental protection 
schemes.  If the provision of these goods by the U.S. government generates a fair play 
obligation for U.S. citizens, then it would seem to generate the same obligation to the 
U.S. government for Mexican and Canadian citizens who also receive the benefits.  And 
U.S. citizens who benefited from Mexican or Canadian government efforts at public 
health or environmental protection would have a fair play obligation to those 
governments.  If this is correct, then Klosko’s version of the fair play duty may fail to 
meet the particularity requirement.  It does not explain why U.S. citizens have a 
particular duty to their own government that they do not have to other governments. 
 Klosko might respond to this objection in a couple of ways.  First, he might 
simply deny that the benefits in question actually do extend much beyond the U.S. 
border.  I do not find this plausible for indispensable benefits generally, though it might 
be true with regard to certain goods, such as certain public health measures.  Second, he 
might distinguish those who benefit directly from those who do not.  For instance, he 
could say that U.S. citizens in San Diego benefit directly from public health measures 
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provided by the government, and that Mexican citizens in Tijuana benefit only indirectly.  
Third, he might concede the point the objection makes, and ground political obligation in 
a more limited set of goods, e.g., domestic and national defense.  This might weaken 
political obligation a bit, but then it might escape the objection. 
 Thus, fair play accounts face certain difficulties as explanations of political 
obligation.  The main objection to fair play is the open benefits problem.  It is not clear 
that citizens who receive open benefits have any obligation to repay those who produce 
them by contributing to their cooperative schemes (i.e., Nozick’s objection).  One way of 
getting around this problem may be to make a distinction between those individuals who 
merely receive the benefits and those who accept them (e.g., Simmons’s strategy).  Those 
who make such a distinction, however, run the risk of reducing fair play to consent.  
Simmons seems to find a way past this problem, but in the end he is forced to concede 
that fair play does not meet the generality requirement, because few citizens accept the 
benefits in a way that generates political obligations.  Another possible way of getting 
around the open benefits problem is to distinguish trivial from indispensable benefits 
(e.g., Klosko’s strategy) and ground the duty in mere receipt of indispensable benefits.  
This strategy has two serious problems.  First, some might still insist that we need to 
distinguish mere receipt of goods from acceptance of them.  The fact that some good is 
indispensable does not itself show that mental attitudes towards its provision are morally 
insignificant, as I will explain below in my discussion of gratitude accounts.   Second, the 




Gratitude Accounts of Political Obligation. 
 
 Gratitude accounts ground political obligation in a duty of citizens to repay the 
government for benefits received.75  This is one of the views that Plato considers in the 
Crito.  The Laws ask: 
Are you not grateful to those of us laws which were instituted for this end, for 
requiring your father to give you a cultural and physical education?...  Then since 
you have been born and brought up and educated, can you deny … that you were 
our child and servant, both you and your ancestors?...  We have brought you into 
the world and reared you and educated you, and given you and all your fellow 
citizens a share in all the good things at our disposal.76
On contemporary views, the benefits in question include things like public roads, schools, 
parks, private property, social security, a police force to protect us domestically, an army 
for national defense, and so on.  The fact that the citizens receive these benefits from the 
government binds them to repay the government.  This debt is rooted in a principle of 
gratitude.  Repayment of this debt consists of supporting the government, which includes 
obeying the law. 
 Several objections have been made to gratitude accounts.  One common objection 
points out that gratitude accounts imply that citizens of immoral and unjust governments 
have political obligations to them.77  Even morally bad governments routinely provide 
                                                 
75   Plato has Socrates defend a version of the gratitude account in the Crito.  A. D. M. Walker offers a 
contemporary defense of the view in “Political Obligation and the Argument from Gratitude,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, v. 17 (1988), pp. 191-211. 
76   Plato, Crito, 50d-51d. 
77   See, e.g., Richard Flathman, Political Obligation (Atheneum, 1972), pp. 270-280. 
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some benefits to citizens.  Thus citizens who received benefits from the Nazi government 
or from Saddam Hussein’s government owe those governments a debt of gratitude, which 
is cashed out as political obligation.  But this seems absurd.  Many simply reject gratitude 
accounts for this reason.78  This objection seems to overlook an important point, one 
made earlier in discussion of the general moral reasons approach.  Political obligations 
are not the only morally relevant factors in our deliberations about how we ought to act.  
A citizen can have a political obligation to obey the laws of an immoral government, but 
still have an all-things-considered obligation not to obey, if her other moral obligations 
outweigh her political obligations.  Political obligation is a prima facie duty, not an 
absolute one.  A citizen’s duties to fight injustice and cruelty might outweigh any duty to 
obey an unjust government. 
 Another objection to gratitude accounts claims that the government has a duty to 
provide citizens with benefits, so citizens do not owe the government anything for 
providing them.  Citizens have a right to things like roads and private property and 
security.  The government has a duty to provide these things.  When the government 
provides these things, it is simply fulfilling its obligation to its citizens.  But no one 
incurs a debt of gratitude for receiving benefits owed to them.  So citizens owe the 
government nothing.  This objection has some merit, but it is not clear that duty-fulfilling 
behavior cannot generate a debt of gratitude.  Consider Simmons’ Porsche: 
Suppose that I am driving through the country and come upon an accident victim.  
I am a medical student and know that if he does not reach a hospital in twenty 
                                                 
78   According to Simmons, this argument “is perhaps the most commonly used by those who reject the 
gratitude account.”  See Moral Principles, p. 184. 
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minutes, he will die.  But I also know that the only hospital in twenty miles away 
over rough back roads.  So I drive the victim at sixty miles an hour over rough 
roads in my new Porsche, saving his life and damaging its suspension.  Now, I 
think that there are two things which can truly be said of this case.  First, what I 
did, I had a duty to do; had I ignored the victim, or decided not to risk my 
Porsche, I would have earned the most serious moral blame.  Second, the accident 
victim has an obligation to compensate me for the damage to my car, if it is 
within his means.79
Still, it is equally clear that duty-fulfilling behavior does not always generate a debt of 
gratitude.  Consider:  the accident victim has a duty to compensate Simmons for the 
damage to his Porsche, which he discharges by paying to have the car fixed.  But suppose 
that Simmons’ car already had a few dents in it, before he took the accident victim to the 
hospital.  In discharging his debt of gratitude to Simmons, the accident victim ends up 
benefiting Simmons, by fixing dents that he is not responsible for.  Now, even though 
Simmons has received a benefit from the accident victim, he does not now owe the 
accident victim a debt of gratitude.  In this case, receipt of a benefit does not generate a 
debt of gratitude.  In the end, the strength of this objection to gratitude accounts is not 
clear.  However, discussion of this objection does suggest a more straightforward 
problem with gratitude accounts, grounded in the nature of debt-incurring acts. 
 Gratitude accounts often draw on an analogy between the relationship of a state to 
its citizens and the relationship of parents to their children.  Just as children owe a debt of 
gratitude to their parents, for all the benefits provided during childhood, so too do citizens 
                                                 
79  Simmons, Moral Principles, p. 180. 
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owe a debt of gratitude to the state.  There are many reasons to question the aptness of 
this analogy, but I want to set them aside and focus on something different.  Part of the 
reason we think a debt of gratitude is owed to parents is the fact that parents make special 
sacrifices in order to provide for their children.  Instead of going to Spain, they buy 
diapers and medicine and food.  Instead of buying Porsches, they put money away for 
college.  And so on.  This idea seems to be at work in Simmons’ Porsche example too.  If 
Simmons had been able to transport the accident victim without damaging his car, or 
making any special effort—he might have been going to the hospital anyway to work his 
shift, and the road might have been smooth and clear—it is not clear what debt of 
gratitude the victim might have had, if any.  So a debt of gratitude is owed to a benefactor 
only if the benefactor had to make some special sacrifice in order to provide the benefit.  
This suggests a different problem with gratitude accounts, because the state does not 
make any sacrifices in providing citizens with benefits.  This does not mean that the state 
does not work to benefit citizens—it does.  But this is not the issue.  The work that the 
state does for citizens does not constitute a sacrifice made by the state.  In fact, providing 
for citizens seems to be the state’s raison d’etre.  Why else have a state?  Children owe a 
debt of gratitude to their parents (if they do) in part because their parents might have done 
other things with their resources.  But what would the state do, if it were not providing 
benefits for citizens?  The state does not have other interests that it must give up in order 
to provide for the needs of citizens.  Providing for citizens is the state’s primary interest.  
So the state does not make any sacrifices in providing for citizens, and no debt of 
gratitude is generated by its duty-fulfilling behavior. 
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 Finally, some reject gratitude accounts because it seems unlikely that the state can 
have the kind of attitude toward the transaction that is necessary for the provision of 
benefits to generate a debt of gratitude.  The provision of benefits generates a debt of 
gratitude only when the benefactor provides them (a) voluntarily, (b) intentionally, and 
(c) for the right reasons.80  For example, no debt of gratitude is owed to someone who is 
forced at gunpoint to provide a benefit.  Some debt may be generated by this transaction, 
but it is not a debt of gratitude.  The same is true when someone provides a benefit 
unintentionally.  If I were to leave some change on a restaurant table as a tip, and it 
turned out that one of the coins I left was rare and worth quite a bit of money, the waiter 
might owe me something for providing this benefit, but he would not owe me a debt of 
gratitude.  We are grateful to someone when they go out of their way to benefit us, but in 
both of the examples above, the benefactor did not go out of his way to provide the 
benefit.  Finally, someone who passes out favors just because he hopes to benefit in 
return might be owed something, but he is not owed a debt of gratitude.  When someone 
provides a benefit simply to advance his own cause, he is really just using the person he 
helps as a means to his own ends.  This is a problem for gratitude accounts, because the 
state cannot have any of these mental attitudes towards its transactions with citizens. 
 Since the state is not the kind of entity that can have the appropriate mental 
attitudes towards any transaction between it and citizens, the state’s activity cannot 
generate a debt of gratitude.  In fact, critics say, the state cannot have any mental attitudes 
at all.  One possible response to this would be to identify the state with the individuals 
                                                 
80  See, e.g., Simmons, Moral Principles, p. 171-5, P. F. Strawson, “Freedom and Resentment,” in P. F. 
Strawson, ed., Studies in the Philosophy of Thought and Action (New York:  Oxford University Press, 
1968), pp. 75-6. 
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who comprise it.  However, while this allows us to attribute attitudes to the state through 
individual government agents, it will not solve our problem if we cannot attribute some 
common attitude to all of them.  This seems implausible.  There are undoubtedly some 
government agents who do their jobs with the full, voluntary, intention of benefiting 
citizens, but it is not clear that this is required of them (as, say, a condition of doing their 
jobs well).  Nor is it plausible to suppose that all or even most government agents have 
this attitude.  Many do their jobs simply to enhance their positions, or to bring home a 
paycheck, or to have something to do and somewhere to go during the day.  Now, we 
might speak metaphorically about the state’s attitudes, but, if our politicians are any 
example, it is not clear we should believe that the state provides benefits intentionally, 
voluntarily, and for the right reasons.  Even in good states benefits are often provided as 
payment for future votes.  Sometimes states provide benefits to citizens in order to 
solidify claims to full and good standing in the international community.  So this strategy 
won’t work either.  In the end, there is no obvious way to describe a state, such that we 
could then say that it has the attitudes necessary for the generation of debts of gratitude. 
 So the gratitude approach fails to account for political obligation.  First, the debt 
of gratitude is only generated when the benefactor has the right kind of attitude about the 
benefits provided.  But a state is not the kind of entity that can have any attitudes at all.  
We might anthropomorphize a bit, and suppose that the state does have attitudes about its 
acts, but it is far from clear that the state’s attitudes would be the right kind for generating 
debts of gratitude.  For instance, the state often provides benefits for self-interested 
reasons.  We might try to equate the state’s attitude with the attitudes of the government 
agents who comprise the state, but we will face the same problem.  Second, the debt of 
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gratitude seems to depend on sacrifices made by the benefactor.  We owe our parents a 
debt of gratitude (if we do), in part because they might have done something different 
with the resources they ultimately decided to spend on us.  But the state does not make 
this kind of sacrifice for its citizens.  The state’s raison d’etre just is providing for its 
citizens.  It has no other interests that it must give up in order to take care of us. 
 
A Crossroads for Political Obligation. 
 
 The main traditional accounts of political obligation suffer from a number of 
serious defects.  As a result, there is a growing skepticism about the possibility of a 
compelling account of political obligation ever emerging.81  This has pushed political 
philosophers in three different directions.  One group, undaunted by past failures, seeks to 
develop alternative accounts of political obligation, accounts that avoid the problems that 
plague the traditional accounts.  I will briefly discuss two of these alternative accounts—
Rawls’s natural duty of justice and Dworkin’s associative account—in the next section.  
A third alternative account, developed by Philip Soper, will be discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3.  A second group, now convinced that no citizen ever has a duty to obey the 
laws of her state, simply rejects political obligation and legitimacy altogether, and affirms 
instead philosophical anarchism.  This move depends on something called the 
                                                 
81   In recent years a number of political philosophers have expressed doubt about the possibility of a 
compelling account of political obligation.  See, e.g., Leslie Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford:  
Clarendon Press, 1988); A. John Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ:  
Princeton University Press, 1979) and “The Anarchist Position:  A Reply to Klosko and Senor,” Philosophy 
and Public Affairs, v. 16 (1987); M. B. E. Smith, “Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?”, 
Yale Law Journal, v. 82 (1973), pp. 950-976; and R. P. Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism (New York:  
Harper and Row, 1976). 
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correlativity thesis.  I discuss this position later in this chapter, after I examine some 
alternative accounts of political obligation.  A third group argues that the question of 
political obligation has no implications for the question of political legitimacy.  They 
reject the correlativity thesis.  Thus, the failure of political philosophers to offer any 
compelling account of a citizen’s duty to obey the law says nothing about the 
government’s right to enforce the law.  I end this chapter with a survey of several of these 
theories of legitimacy. 
 
Alternative Accounts of Political Obligation. 
 
 One group of political philosophers is undaunted by past failures and is busy 
developing alternative accounts of political obligation.  One family of alternative 
accounts are the theories that Klosko refers to collectively as reformist consent accounts.  
Reformist consent accounts offer suggestions about how we might alter our political and 
social institutions so as to rescue consent accounts from problems like those discussed 
above.  For example, our political institutions might be altered in ways that would make 
voting into a sign of genuine consent, rather than simply a consent-implying act.  Or we 
might, as Tideman suggests, give citizens a right to secede from the union, with their 
property intact, and insist that those who do not exercise this right thereby consent to be 
governed.82  Another family of alternative approaches is founded on the belief that the 
traditional approaches make a fundamental conceptual error by assuming that political 
                                                 
82   Nicolaus Tideman, “Coercion, Justice, and Democracy,” presented at the Amintaphil Conference on 
Coercion, Justice, and Democracy (St. Louis, MO, November 2006). 
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society might somehow exist without political obligation.  These constitutive or 
conceptual arguments seek to show that political obligation logically must exist because 
“membership” in a polity is simply unintelligible without it.83  Dworkin’s associative 
theory of obligation is an example of this constitutive approach.  In this section I briefly 
discuss a third alternative, Rawls’s natural duty of justice, and then Dworkin’s view. 
 In A Theory of Justice (hereafter TJ), Rawls finally rejects the fair play account of 
political obligation that he defends in his earlier work, and replaces it with an account 
based on what he calls a natural duty of justice.84  Rawls rejects the fair play account 
because he takes it to be voluntarist in nature.85  It requires that individuals freely choose 
to take part in some cooperative scheme, in this case, that they freely accept their (just) 
constitutional order.  But he is ultimately convinced by Hume that there is no plausible 
way to construe the association between (most) citizens and their political system in 
voluntarist terms.86  Each of us is simply born into one political system or another, and 
there is nothing really voluntary about it.  So he is forced to give up on fair play as a 
general account of political obligation.87
 In TJ Rawls argues instead that the duty to obey the law is ultimately rooted in a 
natural duty to support and further just institutions.88  According to Rawls, natural duties 
                                                 
83   One interesting conceptual argument is Horton’s Political Obligation.  The earliest conceptual argument 
may be Margaret MacDonald’s “The Language of Political Theory,” in A. G. N. Flew, ed., Logic and 
Language (Oxford:  Basil Blackwell, 1951). 
84   John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, revised edition (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1999), 
pp. 308-313.  Hereafter TJ. 
85   See Rawls, “Legal Obligation and the Duty of Fair Play.” 
86   TJ, p. 296. 
87   But Rawls does not give up on it altogether.  He maintains, even in TJ, that the fair play account 
explains why some people—those who voluntarily assume certain offices and positions in society—have an 
obligation to obey the law.  But he concedes that fair play simply cannot support any political obligation for 
citizens generally. 
88   See, e.g., TJ, p. 99, 308-313. 
60 
are distinct from obligations.89  Obligations are moral requirements generated through 
voluntary actions.  A promise is one kind of voluntary action that can generate an 
obligation for a person.  If P promises to do X for Q, then P has incurred an obligation to 
do X for Q.  Obligations are narrow in the sense that only the person who makes the 
promise, P, incurs the obligation to do X, and only the person to whom the promise has 
been made, Q, is owed X.  Natural duties are different from obligations.  They are not 
rooted in voluntary actions, but are simply moral requirements all people must follow.  
Further, they are owed to people generally.  Natural duties are owed by all people to all 
people.  One example is a natural duty of mutual aid, a “duty of helping another when he 
is in need or jeopardy, provided that one can do so without excessive risk or loss to 
oneself.”90  Other natural duties include a duty not to harm others, and not to cause 
unnecessary suffering. 
 In TJ, Rawls grounds the duty to obey the law in a natural duty of justice, which 
has two parts: 
This duty requires us to support and to comply with just institutions that exist and 
apply to us.  It also constrains us to further just arrangements not yet established, 
at least when this can be done without too much cost to ourselves.  Thus if the 
basic structure of society is just, or as just as it is reasonable to expect in the 
circumstances, everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme.91
This does not imply that citizens have no duty to obey unjust laws.  The natural duty of 
justice requires that citizens support the basic social structure, the fundamental 
                                                 
89   TJ, pp. 98-99. 
90   TJ, p. 98. 
91   TJ, p. 99. 
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constitutional rules that define a society politically, when the basic structure is just.  The 
basic social structure is more or less the same as a constitution.  It describes a society’s 
basic social and political institutions, including its most fundamental procedures for 
enacting law.  The natural duty of justice basically requires us to support just 
constitutional arrangements.  However, no constitution, not even a just one, is perfect, in 
the sense that it only issues just laws.  Even just constitutions sometimes fail us in this 
way.  When otherwise just constitutional procedures result in an unjust law, the natural 
duty of justice requires citizens to support the constitution by obeying that law, despite 
the fact that it is unjust (within certain limits). 
 There are several problems with Rawls’s natural duty of justice.  One commonly 
noted problem is that it fails the particularity requirement.92  It does not explain why 
citizens have a special relationship to their own government, a particular duty to obey its 
laws, that they do not have with other governments.  According to this account, it seems 
as if people should have a duty to uphold just institutions, wherever they may be.  If 
Mexico and Canada have just constitutions, then U.S. citizens have a duty to support 
those governments by obeying their laws too. 
 Horton has another worry.93  Rawls claims the natural duty applies to political 
institutions that are “just or nearly just.”  But what about institutions that are not nearly 
just?  Do we have no duty to obey the law in such situations?  This is not a worry about 
reasonable disagreement over what justice requires, which Horton recognizes as a serious 
                                                 
92   This objection to Rawls’s natural duty argument is made by, e.g., Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 104-
5, and Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge, Ma.:  Harvard University Press, 1986), p. 193.  Klosko 
discusses this problem as it applies more generally to the family of natural duty views in Political 
Obligations, pp. 107-110. 
93   Horton, Political Obligations, pp. 106-7. 
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problem.  Rather, Horton doubts that it is true that people never or simply cannot have a 
duty to support or comply with unjust institutions.  He admits that some political 
institutions are so unjust that the only decent response is full-fledged opposition.  But, 
Horton says, there is injustice and there is yet worse injustice.  We need not accept 
Hobbes’s general theory to see that it is sometimes reasonable to support unjust 
institutions, when the only available alternatives are worse.  Horton expresses this view 
with caution, because it can easily be exploited in defense of various forms of tyranny.  
But his point has merit nonetheless:  there is no a priori argument that shows that we 
never have an obligation to support unjust institutions. 
 Horton also worries that Rawls’s theory fails because, in his view, it is too 
abstract and ideal to be helpful.  Horton doubts that many states, if any, past or present, 
can be considered even nearly just.  If it is the case today that no state is nearly just, and 
Horton thinks it might be, then no one has an obligation to obey the law.  This would 
make Rawls’s theory a failure.  Horton recognizes the value of ideal theory, and the fact 
that even non-ideal political philosophy cannot be done without some abstraction and 
simplification, but there is always a danger that such abstraction may lead us astray, that 
it will “degenerate into a philosophically idealized abstraction, bearing at best a very 
distant and obscure relationship to the world as we experience it.”  This, he thinks, has 
happened in the case of Rawls’s natural duty of justice.  Interesting though it may be as 
an intellectual exercise, it is not very helpful.  What we need an account of political 
obligation to do is to make sense of people’s relationships to the political societies they 
actually inhabit, not the societies they might inhabit if only they lived in a better world. 
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 Dworkin grounds political obligation in associative or role obligations.94  This is a 
species of conceptual or constitutive argument.  According to Dworkin, “political 
association, like family and friendship and other forms of association more local and 
intimate, is in itself pregnant with obligation.”95  It does not matter that people do not 
choose their political communities.  Horton puts it this way:  
… familial obligations share several features with political obligations, and … the 
family provides a good example of a context in which obligations are experienced 
as genuine and rather open-ended, and are not the result of voluntary undertaking 
….  A polity is, like the family, a relationship into which we are mostly born.96
Political obligations are like associative obligations, special moral requirements attached 
to social roles and positions, whose content is specified by local practices.  For Dworkin, 
“we have a duty to honor our responsibilities under social practices that define groups 
and attach special responsibilities to membership,” as long as certain conditions are met.  
Group members must believe the obligations hold within the group and are not duties 
owed to persons generally, that the obligations are run from each member to every other 
member, and not to the group as a collective, and finally, that the obligations emerge out 
of a concern for the equal well-being of all group members.  These obligations do not 
need independent or external justification.  Justification takes the form of showing that 
the obligations in question are constitutive of the community.  Nor is it necessary that 
people generally actually feel and think this way.  Dworkin’s theory of law is 
interpretive.  In trying to understand the law and its requirements, e.g., to resolve 
                                                 
94   Dworkin develops his account of obligation and legitimacy in Law’s Empire, pp. 190-206. 
95   Dworkin, Law’s Empire, p. 206. 
96   Horton, Political Obligation, pp. 146, 150. 
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ambiguities in the law, we try to interpret what has happened in our legal system in the 
past in the best way possible given our present moral self-understanding.  This helps us to 
understand what we ought to do right now and aim for in the future.  In doing this sort of 
interpretation of law and political communities, we should suppose that people have the 
right feelings and thoughts because these are the “practices that people with the right 
level of concern would adopt.” 
 Dworkin’s view avoids the problem with particularity requirement that Rawls’s 
view faced.  However, one common complaint raised against conceptual views is that 
they simply posit that membership in political society is a social or political fact about 
people that requires no explanation or defense.97  But it is precisely this that is one of the 
most contentious issues in traditional debates about political obligation.  There is some 
merit to this complaint.  In any case, even if we grant that people are in communities that 
they quite literally constitute through their shared feelings and attitudes, still we might 
ask whether the feelings and attitudes they have imply any responsibilities that rise to the 
level of a moral obligation to obey the community’s laws.  This depends, in part, on how 
strong we take political obligation to be.  If it is a weak prima facie duty, then the feelings 
and attitudes of community members may be sufficient to generate it.  If it is a stronger 




The Correlativity Thesis and Philosophical Anarchism. 
                                                 
97   See e.g. Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations,” Ethics, v. 106 (1996), pp. 254-5. 
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 The correlativity thesis holds that a government has a right to enforce the law 
against citizens only if citizens have a duty to obey the laws of that government, and vice 
versa.98  This is what Anscombe means when she says that “obedience/disobedience are 
the primary correlates of authority.”99  According to the correlativity thesis, there is a 
strict correlation between the right to enforce the law and the duty to obey it.  One cannot 
exist without the other.  This thesis is a key component in one kind of argument for 
philosophical anarchism.  This argument holds that the failure of political obligation, 
when coupled with the correlativity thesis, implies that no state has a right to enforce its 
laws.  Since there is good reason to doubt that a compelling account of political 
obligation is possible, we lose one end of the correlativity thesis bi-conditional.  If 
citizens do not have a duty to obey the government’s laws, then the government does not 
have a right to enforce them.  This is philosophical anarchism. 
 Philosophical anarchism does not imply that disobedience or revolution are 
justified, or even that citizens do not have good reason to obey the law.  Quite the 
contrary.  There are reasons to obey the law, even when the government has no right to 
enforce it.  For example, prudential self-interest and the obvious moral value of social 
order and institutions like private property give all citizens reason to obey.  What 
philosophical anarchism holds is that citizens have no special duty to obey the laws of 
their own country, just because they are the laws of their own country, and that no 
government has a right, strictly speaking, to enforce its laws. 
                                                 
98   For discussion of the correlativity thesis, see, e.g., William Edmundson, Three Anarchical Fallacies, 
especially Chapter 2. 
99   Anscombe, “On the Source of the Authority of the State,” Ratio, v. 20, 1978, p. 6. 
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 The correlativity thesis argument for philosophical anarchism is different from 
other arguments for anarchism.  The correlativity argument ultimately grounds anarchism 
in skepticism about the possibility of political obligation.  Wolff’s anarchism is 
different.100  Wolff argues that the state is simply inconsistent with the primary human 
obligation to be autonomous.  The state is defined by authority, or the right to rule.  A 
human being cannot submit to the state’s authority in any way that is consistent with her 
obligation to be autonomous, to rule herself.  Since the state is incompatible with the 
primary human obligation, the state cannot be legitimate.  Simmons defends yet another 
kind of anarchism.101  He believes that a state could be legitimate, if (nearly) all citizens 
consented to be ruled by the state.  However, since no state in the world today can claim 
that its citizens have given this consent, no state today can be considered legitimate.  He 
does not argue that it is impossible for a state to be legitimate, but only that no currently 
existing state is legitimate. 
 Many now reject the correlativity thesis.102  In contemporary political philosophy, 
this rejection can be traced back to Robert F. Ladenson’s “In Defense of a Hobbesian 
Conception of Law.”103  Ladenson claims that political legitimacy—the right to rule, or 
what he calls government authority—does not imply or depend on a duty to obey among 
citizens.104  This is so because legitimacy is not a “claim-right,” but a “justification-
                                                 
100   Robert Paul Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism, second ed., (New York:  Harper and Row, 1976). 
101   See, e.g., Simmons, Moral Principles, pp. 192, 194-5. 
102   Those who reject the correlativity thesis include, e.g., Allen Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy and 
Democracy,”  Ethics, v. 112 (2002), pp. 689-719; Rolf Sartorius, “Political Authority and Political 
Obligation,” Virginia Law Review, v. 67 (1981), pp. 3-17; and A. John Simmons, “Voluntarism and 
Political Associations,” Virginia Law Review, v. 67 (1981), pp. 19-37. 
103   Robert F. Ladenson, “In Defense of a Hobbesian Conception of Law,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, 
v. 9 (1980), pp. 134-159.  Ladenson develops the account of claim- and justification-rights he uses in the 
Hobbes paper in his earlier “Two Kinds of Rights,” Journal of Value Inquiry, v. 13 (1979), pp. 161-172. 
104   Ladenson, “In Defense,” p. 137-9. 
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right.”  When a person asserts a claim-right, she makes a strong moral demand for 
something or against someone.  This implies that others are morally required to behave in 
certain ways.  In short, claim-rights are correlated with duties for others.  This kind of 
right depends on the existence of some institutional background sufficient for handling 
such claims, e.g., sets of rules and procedures, political offices, military/police, and so on.  
One example of a claim right is the right to basic subsistence, in the form of food, water, 
and shelter.  This right is a demand for something, and it requires others to behave in 
certain ways. 
 Justification-rights are different:  “when one asserts a justification-right in a 
particular situation, one does not press a claim against others but rather responds to 
demands for justification of one’s behavior.”105  Justification-rights do not require an 
institutional background, nor do they imply duties for others.  Asserting a justification-
right amounts to claiming that an act is justified or otherwise all right.  For example, 
justification-rights are invoked when a person wants to justify an otherwise immoral or 
illegal act, such as self-defense.  According to Ladenson, the right to harm another person 
in order to protect one’s self, or one’s family, is not a claim-right—a demand for 
something or against somebody—but a justification-right—an insistence that the act is 
justified, even if it appears immoral or unjust.  In other situations, invoking a 
justification-right “amounts to contending that what one did was all right.”  Here 
Ladenson cites Judith Thompson’s “famous violinist” example.106  In this example, a 
person must allow his kidneys to be connected to a famous violinist, in order to keep the 
                                                 
105   Ibid., p. 138. 
106   Judith Jarvis Thompson, “A Defense of Abortion,” Philosophy and Public Affairs, v. 1 (1971), pp. 47-
66. 
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violinist alive.  A person’s right to disconnect from the famous violinist is a justification-
right.  You are not asking for the provision of some good, or insisting that someone else 
do something for you; you are simply asserting that it is ok for you to disconnect yourself 
from the violinist. 
  Ladenson claims that the government’s authority in the broadest sense is 
constituted by both justification- and claim-rights.  The government’s right to use 
coercive force in the name of law is a justification-right.  When there are sufficient moral 
reasons for the government to use coercive force against citizens, the government is 
justified in using its power.  Exactly what counts as sufficient reason is an open question, 
one that philosophers have not yet answered.  But this does not mean that the government 
has blanket permission to do whatever it wants.  There are limits and exceptions to the 
government’s legitimate power.  Again, philosophers have yet to determine just what 
these limits are.  The government also has a right not to be usurped.  This is a claim-right, 
a strong moral demand that citizens allow the government to perform the functions of 
government, and not to take these matters into their own hands (e.g., as a lynch mob 
might seek to carry out a death sentence on their own). 
 But this combination of justification- and claim-right does not imply that citizens 
have a duty of allegiance to the government, or a duty of obedience to the law as such.  
Strictly speaking, the government’s right to enforce the law is a justification-right, and so 
it implies no such correlative duties.  This does not mean that there is no duty to obey the 
law; it just means that the source of any such duty, if such a duty exists, is not the 
government’s right to rule.  The right to enforce the law and the duty to obey the law are 
distinct. 
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 Some think this distinction is not sound.  For instance, Finnis wonders why 
“arguments capable of justifying a claim to moral authority to make and enforce the law 
would not equally (or by addition of only uncontroversial premises) justify the claim that 
there is a generic moral obligation to obey the law.”107  Soper wonders the same thing.108  
I believe that Simmons answers this challenge well.109  Ladenson goes too far when he 
claims that a justification right is merely a liberty right that implies no correlative duties.  
A justification right does imply some duties, but these duties do not rise to the level of a 
duty to obey.  For example, Simmons says, if I attack a would-be mugger in self-defense, 
other bystanders should not interfere with me, nor should the mugger resist my efforts to 
save myself.  Thus, my justification-right to self-defense does imply some duties for 
bystanders and for the person I use my coercive power against, i.e., the mugger.  
Similarly, the government’s justification-right to enforce the law is correlated with a duty 
of citizens not to interfere with the government’s legitimate use of its coercive power, or 
to resist this power when it is applied against them.  Thus, citizens have some duties 
correlated with the government’s justification-right.  However, these duties do not 
amount to an obligation to obey the government or the law as such.  The question we are 
trying to answer, as Simmons correctly sees it, is this:  “under what conditions is a 
government morally justified in exercising the customary functions of government?”110  
Whatever these necessary conditions are, the right to command and be obeyed is not one 
                                                 
107   John Finnis, “The Authority of Law in the Predicament of Contemporary Social Theory,” Notre Dame 
Journal of Law, Ethics, and Public Policy, v. 1 (1984), p. 115, 116n.4. 
108   Philip Soper, The Ethics of Deference:  Learning from Law’s Morals (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2002), p. 54n.5, 55n.7. 
109   Simmons, “Voluntarism and Political Associations,” p. 24. 
110   Simmons, “Voluntarism and Political Associations,” p. 25. 
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of them.  The minimal conditions for justified or legitimate government do not include 
the right to command and be obeyed, despite what Anscombe or Wolff might insist. 
 Strictly speaking, then, the correlativity thesis is false.  Political legitimacy does 
not imply political obligation, and vice versa.  The government’s right to enforce the law 
against citizens does not imply that citizens have a duty to obey the law, or the 
government, or depend on citizens having such a duty of obedience.  But this does not 
mean that citizens have no duties to a legitimate government.  Minimally, citizens have 
duties not to usurp the legitimate powers of government, and not to interfere with the 
government’s exercise of its coercive power against citizens.  These political duties 
amount to prima facie duties to acquiesce to, or to defer to, the government, when it 
legitimately exercises its power against citizens.  To distinguish these duties from 
political obligation, I will refer to them as “political deference” or the “duty to defer.”111  
Political legitimacy is not correlated with political obligation; it is correlated with 





The Problem of Political Legitimacy. 
 
                                                 
111   I borrow the term “deference” from Soper, who argues that the duties correlated with political 
legitimacy amount to a duty to defer to the government.  However, unlike Soper, I do not believe that this 
duty is the same thing as political obligation. 
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 Since the correlativity thesis is false, we do not need to show that that citizens 
have a duty to obey the government or the law as such, in order to show that the 
government has a right to enforce the law against citizens.  Instead, an account of 
legitimacy must do two things.112  First, it must explain the conditions under which some 
government has sufficient justification to use its coercive power against its citizens to 
enforce its laws.  Second, it must explain why citizens under these conditions have sound 
reason to defer to, or to acquiesce to, the government when it seeks to exercise its 
legitimate power.113  The problem of political legitimacy is not new, but it becomes 
foundational in political philosophy beginning with the modern era, when the idea of a 
divinely mandated or naturally given political order is rejected and we start to see persons 
as naturally free and equal, and each as possessed of natural authority over him or 
herself.114  Political power makes people unequal—some people get to tell other people 
how to live—and inevitably involves restricting the freedom of some individuals, so the 
legitimacy of political power is prima facie problematic.  From Hobbes to the present 
day, we have been trying to understand how, if at all, political power can be made 
consistent with the freedom and equality of persons.  Some have concluded that this 
effort is futile, that there is no way to resolve this problem.115  Others reject this skeptical 
view.116
                                                 
112   See, e.g., Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy.” 
113   I will leave open for now the question of just how strong the duty to defer may be.  Whether we are 
talking about an obligation or simply a reason to defer will depend on how each theorist understands the 
state’s legitimacy rights and the normative direction this right provides for citizens. 
114   Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan appeared around 1641. 
115   See, e.g., philosophical anarchists like Green, The Authority of the State, Simmons, Justification and 
Legitimacy, and Wolff, In Defense of Anarchism.  Simmons thinks consent could legitimate political 
authority, but argues that no government currently enjoys the consent of its governed. 
116   See, e.g. Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy,” Dworkin, Law’s Empire, Rawls, PL, and Waldron, Law 
and Disagreement. 
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 The problem of political legitimacy is not new, but it is not well understood by 
political philosophers.  Work in this area is nowhere near as developed as is work on 
political obligation or justice.  There are a couple of reasons for this.  First, though 
modern philosophers like Hobbes were interested in legitimacy, contemporary 
philosophy has largely ignored the issue.  It has spent its time working primarily on 
justice.  This is not time wasted, of course, but it is past time for work on legitimacy to 
catch up, especially since it is now quite common to claim that it is reasonable for 
citizens to disagree about what justice requires.  And, in any case, legitimacy and justice 
are not identical issues.  It is not clear to most that what is just can be legitimately 
enforced against all, simply because it is just.  This requires argument.  A second 
impediment to work on political legitimacy has been a general, albeit uncritical, 
acceptance of the correlativity thesis.  Before Ladenson’s paper twenty years ago, few 
seemed to think it possible to separate legitimacy from political obligation.  Since the 
failure of political obligation was regarded as complete well before that time by many 
political theorists, few thought there was any point in talking about legitimacy.  Until 
some compelling account of obligation could be offered, many felt this strand of political 
thought had reached a dead end.  The recent rejection of the correlativity thesis has freed 
work on legitimacy.  However, this work is still in its infancy today. 
 Not surprisingly, there is a lot of confusion in the literature on legitimacy.  For 
instance, in one recent article noted political philosopher William Rehg claims that to say 
a law is legitimate is to say that it deserves to be obeyed by citizens.117  This is exactly 
                                                 
117   William Rehg, “Legitimacy and Deliberation in Epistemic Conceptions of Democracy:  Between 
Habermas and Estlund,” The Modern Schoolman, v. 74 (1997), pp. 355-374. 
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wrong.  It confuses the fundamental issues of political obligation and legitimacy.  More 
confusion is revealed in a recent exchange between Richard J. Arneson and Christopher 
G. Griffin, published as a debate in the Journal of Political Philosophy.118  Here I am less 
interested in the merits of their respective positions, and more interested in the basic 
confusion their debate reveals.  Arneson argues that legitimacy (coercive power of 
government) requires democracy.  He defends the claim with an instrumental “best 
results” account.  On his view, democracy legitimates the coercive power of the 
government, because it is reasonable to think that over time this scheme promotes 
morally superior results to any other feasible alternative.  Griffin rejects Arneson’s appeal 
to instrumentalism.  He argues that democracy is intrinsically just, because the practice 
treats people appropriately, in this case by publicly expressing and affirming the equal 
political status of all persons.  Justice requires such public affirmation of equal basic 
social status.  This is a perfect example of the confusion that mars the current literature 
on legitimacy.  Arneson and Griffin are talking about fundamentally different normative 
political ideas, legitimacy and justice respectively, and how each is related to democracy.  
Since Arneson and Griffin are talking about distinct normative issues, it is clear that their 
debate tells us little about either.  It is never clear exactly what is at issue, nor is it clear 
how each thinks the arguments he deploys should be taken by the other.  For what it’s 
worth, and despite the fact that the authors think they disagree with one another, one 
could coherently (though perhaps not comfortably) argue that Arneson is right about the 
link between legitimacy and democracy, and that Griffin is right about the link between 
                                                 
118   See Arneson, “Defending the Purely Instrumental Account of Democratic Legitimacy,” Journal of 
Political Philosophy, v. 11 (2003), pp. 122-132, and Griffin, “Democracy as a Non-Instrumentally Just 
Procedure,” Journal of Political Philosophy, v. 11 (2003), pp. 111-122. 
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justice and democracy.  There are other examples of similar confusions.  Political 
philosophers need to spend more time on legitimacy. 
 
Approaches to Legitimacy. 
 
 Approaches to the question of legitimacy can be divided into two broad camps:  
descriptive and normative.  Many follow in the tradition of Max Weber and offer 
descriptive sociological accounts of legitimacy.119  From this social scientific perspective, 
legitimacy is reduced to whatever the citizens of some society happen to believe 
legitimacy to be.  If a people believes its government to be legitimate, for whatever 
reasons, then it is legitimate.  The emphasis in this sociological project is on explaining 
why people obey authority, and why regimes persist, and not on whether or not particular 
regimes should continue to wield authority.  One charge leveled against this approach is 
that it simply overlooks the important questions about legitimacy.120  Another charge 
made is that this narrow focus on attitudes fails to recognize what history has taught us 
again and again—people easily come to feel obligated to those who wield power over 
them, whether that power is deserved and rightfully used or not.121   
 The normative political approach, inspired by Hobbes’s Leviathan, Locke’s 
Second Treatise of Government, and Rousseau’s Social Contract, sees legitimacy as a 
                                                 
119   See e.g. Weber, Essays in Sociology (London:  Routledge Publishers, 1991).  Charles Taylor offers a 
contemporary version of a Weberian attitudinal approach in “Legitimation Crisis?” in Philosophy and the 
Human Sciences:  Philosophical Papers 2 (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1985), pp. 248-288.  
David Beetham discusses the descriptive sociological approach and argues for a modified normative 
sociological model in The Legitimation of Power (London:  Macmillan Education, 1991). 
120   See, e.g., Beetham, The Legitimation of Power. 
121   See, e.g., Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” p. 749. 
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normative notion, justifiable in terms of normative considerations.  On this view, the fact 
that people believe their government to be legitimate and are willing to acquiesce to its 
demands does not determine whether or not the government in question actually deserves 
to be considered legitimate.  This does not imply that belief in the legitimacy of authority 
could have no moral relevance.  But normative theories of legitimacy ultimately have a 
critical purpose—“to establish a standard against which individual rulers or regimes can 
be assessed, and, where need be, found wanting.”122  This critical standard involves more 
than just descriptive facts.  Within the normative political camp sit a number of different 
approaches to legitimacy. 
 One useful way of distinguishing normative approaches to legitimacy is by 
grouping them according to the relative weight or value they give (a) to the capacity for 
judgment of individual citizens, and (b) to some understanding of the interests of 
citizens.123  At one end of the spectrum are respect for judgment views, views that give 
great weight to the choices citizens make, in real or idealized situations, and less weight 
to other interests.  From this perspective, political authority and relations are legitimate 
only if they are consistent with genuine respect for the capacity for judgment of 
individuals seen as free and equal.  Respect for judgment views are rooted in Hobbes, 
Locke, and Kant, and find expression today in several places, most influentially in 
consent theories124 and the work of John Rawls.125  The contemporary project here is to 
                                                 
122   Beetham, The Legitimation of Power. 
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124   See Harry Beran, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation (New York:  Croom Helm, 1987) for a 
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125   See, e.g., Rawls, PL and IPRR. 
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see whether free and equal citizens do affirm, or would all have reason to affirm (in some 
real or idealized forum), or would at least have no reason to reject, the essentials of 
democratic society.  This project suffers from a host of serious problems.  Some argue 
that it simply cannot accommodate the breadth and depth of reasonable disagreement.126  
There is simply nothing that even remotely resembles the kind of unanimity envisioned in 
these projects, nor is there reason to expect any such consensus to develop.  If consensus 
is necessary, this is a serious problem.  However, not all shared reason views are 
consensus views.  For instance, the shared reason views of Kant, Soper, and Rawls do not 
depend on consensus.  Others argue that the shared reason has an illicit secular slant, in 
that it inappropriately rules out comprehensive moral, philosophical, and religious 
commitments, and sneaks secular commitments in by the back door.  This objection is 
most frequently advanced by those attempting to preserve room for appeal to religious 
belief in democratic public discourse,127 but it could be raised by others as well, e.g., 
those whose serious moral commitments to preserving nature are grounded in reasons not 
generally shared by other citizens.128
 At the other end of the spectrum are views that give great weight to the interests 
of citizens, and less weight to their capacity for judgment, to make decisions.  From this 
                                                 
126   See, e.g., Christiano, “Waldron on Law and Disagreement,” Law and Philosophy, v. 19 (2000), pp. 
513-543, and Reidy, “Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement.” 
127   See, e.g., R. Audi and N. Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square (New York:  Rowman and 
Littlefield Publishers, 1996), Kent Greenawalt, Private Consciences and Public Reasons (New York:  
Oxford University Press, 1995), and Jeffrey Stout, Democracy and Tradition (Princeton:  Princeton 
University Press, 2004). 
128   Some argue that “inaccessible” reasons, those not shared by (most) reasonable citizens, should be 
excluded from public discourse.  Inaccessible reasons could include all kinds of moral and philosophical 
commitments, not just religious ones.  So, for example, theories in environmental ethics that seek to extend 
the boundaries of our normal categories of moral analysis to include animals might be allowed, while 
theories that offer non-traditional or radical (and hence inaccessible) reasons for including animals might 
be ruled out. 
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perspective, political authority and relations are legitimate only if they are consistent with 
a genuine respect for the real or basic interests of each citizen (which may include an 
interest in making judgments and having them respected by others).  This general 
approach focuses on the interest each citizen has in belonging to a political society that 
advances her interests, whatever her interests might be.  This approach draws on ideas 
from the earlier utilitarian (e.g., Bentham and Mill) and constitutional republican (e.g., 
Rousseau) traditions and finds expression today in a number of approaches to democratic 
legitimacy.  The basic idea is that government action is legitimate only insofar as the 
government acts to promote the common interests or good of its members.  One problem 
with such approaches is understanding just what the common good or interest is when 
members see themselves as free equals possessing a wide range of conflicting interests, 
some of which they might value above membership in political society.  There are a 
range of alternative positions, and all suffer from defects. 
 In the next few sections I will briefly discuss different respect for judgment and 
respect for interest views of political legitimacy.   
 
Respect for Judgment Views of Legitimacy. 
 
 Some theories of legitimacy give pride of place to respect for the judgments of 
individuals.  Two important families of views in this camp are consent accounts and 
shared reason accounts.  There are several consent accounts of legitimacy, mirroring the 
variety of consent accounts of political obligation.  The idea is roughly that a government 
is legitimate only if citizens have consented to be ruled by it.  One compelling approach 
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to consent is the Lockean approach, represented in contemporary political philosophy by 
A. John Simmons.  There are also a variety of shared reason approaches to legitimacy.129  
The idea here is roughly that government is legitimate only if it is reasonable from the 
perspective of every individual.  Exactly what counts as “reasonable from the perspective 
of every individual” is an open question.  It is fleshed out in different ways by different 
political theorists. 
 
Consent Accounts of Legitimacy. 
 
 There are many kinds of consent theories.130  In a number of works, A. John 
Simmons has developed a modern Lockean “actual consent” account of legitimacy.131  
Roughly, Simmons argues that a state’s legitimacy rights, held against specific subjects 
bound by state-imposed duties, arise only from some morally significant relationship 
between the state and its subjects.  For the Lockean, the morally significant relationship is 
one of consent.  Before any person consents to be ruled, she lives in a state of natural 
freedom from political association.  According to Simmons, she need not join political 
society at any time.132  States earn legitimacy by virtue of the unanimous consent of 
members to transfer certain rights to a central authority.  Governments are legitimate only 
if they have been entrusted by the people with the exercise of those rights.  What is most 
                                                 
129   A good survey of shared reason approaches is Fred D’Agostino, Free Public Reason:  Making It Up As 
We Go (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1996). 
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131   Simmons, Justification and Legitimacy. 
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important here, to Simmons, is that actual consent theories recognize that “how we have 
lived and chosen, confused and unwise and unreflective though we may have been, has 
undeniable moral significance; and our actual political histories and choice thus seem 
deeply relevant to the evaluation of those political institutions under which we live.”133  It 
is this actual, lived sense of respect for individual judgment that Simmons takes to be 
vital to any discussion of legitimacy.  This is, he argues, the only way to really respect 
individual judgments.  And since this is what we must do, any proper claim to legitimacy 
must be built on this ground. 
 There are several problems with this approach.  First, as many have pointed out, 
consent accounts of legitimacy are very demanding.  Simmons concludes, as do many 
other consent theorists, that no state in the world today can be considered legitimate, 
because no state can reasonably claim that (nearly) all citizens have consented to be 
ruled.134  But this seems like an absurd conclusion to many.  Surely we want to be able to 
say that some governments are legitimate.  Perhaps, then, we should reexamine the basic 
presuppositions of consent accounts, rather than reject the idea of legitimacy altogether.  
One presupposition of consent theories that often gets questioned is the idea of the state 
of nature.  Rawls, for instance, rejects the idea that individuals persons are born free from 
political associations, and enter into them only voluntarily.  He holds instead that political 
membership is a social fact—we are simply born into some political society.  Thus, 
instead of rejecting the idea of legitimacy, some prefer to reject basic assumptions made 
by consent theorists. 
                                                 
133   Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” p. 763. 
134   See, e.g., Simmons, Moral Principles, p. 196:  “I am, in fact, quite prepared to accept the conclusion 
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Of course, consent theorists say that they do not actually reject legitimacy.  They 
hold that a state could be legitimate, even if none actually are.  But it is not clear what 
purpose is served by talking about a goal no state can approach.  If no state is legitimate, 
the idea of legitimacy seems to have no value.  Simmons recognizes this problem, but 
insists that legitimacy remains an important evaluative tool, even though all states are 
illegitimate.135  An ideal of legitimacy could serve as a goal toward which governments 
might strive, or give us a way of establishing a scale of better or worse governments.  
Finally, some criticisms Simmons levels against Weberian attitudinal accounts seem 
equally challenging to his own view.136  He says, for instance, that we should reject 
attitudinal accounts, because attitudes can be so easily manipulated.  But it seems that this 
also applies to his own actual consent account.  The attitudes that might lead one to 
consent to be ruled are surely not free from manipulation either.  And he says that some 
states may be legitimate, even when they do not receive attitudinal support, especially in 
cases where people are stupid, immoral, deceived, manipulated, and so on.  But it seems 
that this charge could be leveled against actual consent theories as well.  If stupid, 
immoral or deceived people do not consent to be governed, why should this count against 
the legitimacy of the state? 
 
Shared Reason Views of Legitimacy. 
 
                                                 
135   Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” p. 769, footnote 68. 
136   Simmons, “Justification and Legitimacy,” pp. 749-50. 
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 The idea behind shared reason views is roughly that government power is 
legitimate if it is exercised pursuant to and in accord with rules, e.g., constitutional 
essentials, that are reasonable from every individual’s perspective.  What it means to say 
that some rules are “reasonable from every individual’s perspective” is an open question.  
Several issues distinguish different shared reason views, but here I will describe just two.  
One has to do with the appropriate perspective from which individuals assess political 
rules.  The other has to do with whether shared reason requires consensus. 
 The first issue has to do with the appropriate perspective from which individuals 
should assess political rules.  On one end of the spectrum are views that take people as 
they are, with their own actual and particular beliefs, desires and motives.  This empirical 
perspective roots shared reason in actual individual’s actual perspectives. On such views, 
political rules are reasonable only if each person concludes that she supports them, 
according to her own understanding of the issues she regards as relevant, and her own 
standards of reasoning.  This view respects individual’s actual beliefs and ways of 
reasoning, not those individuals would have if they were better informed, or better 
reasoners.  At the other end of the spectrum are normatively loaded views.  These views 
take people as they could be, if they were better informed, or better reasoners, and ask 
what they would judge reasonable, from some privileged, normatively significant 
perspective.  The question is not what actual people would affirm, given their actual 
beliefs and modes of reasoning, but what they would affirm, if they had normatively 
appropriate beliefs and modes of reasoning. 
 The empirical view has certain virtues, but it also has serious defects.  It respects 
each individual’s capacity for judgment by giving pride of place to actually held beliefs 
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and standards of reasoning.  It makes no demand that individuals conform to beliefs or 
standards that others regard as better or otherwise more appropriate for the situation.  
Unfortunately, people often believe and desire what they shouldn’t.  Given this, it is 
reasonable to worry that people might conclude that some governments are legitimate 
when they do not deserve this status, and that other governments are illegitimate when 
they ought to be considered legitimate. 
 This problem is less likely to occur on the normative end of the spectrum.  
However, the normative views suffer from other defects.  It is not obvious what the 
proper normative perspective ought to be.  There are good faith disagreements over what 
we ought to believe and desire.  And even if people could agree that some normative 
perspective is the proper one, we should expect good faith disagreements over what 
might be accepted from that perspective.  And there are even good faith disagreements 
over the demands of reason itself.  If we could find an ideal perspective that is grounded 
in norms generally shared by all, it might serve as an appropriate base for reasoning about 
public political matters.  But reasonable disagreements over what norms are appropriate, 
and over how we ought to reason from any particular normative perspective, pose a 
serious threat to this possibility. 
 The Rawlsian view I defend sits somewhere between these poles.  Rawls holds 
that the legitimacy of state action in a liberal democracy depends on a sincere 
commitment of citizens to certain shared but abstract political values.  Two things stand 
out.  First, Rawls excludes citizens who reject democracy.  The legitimacy of state action 
in a liberal democracy is ultimately rooted in the shared commitments of citizens not 
opposed to liberal democracy.  Second, he holds that there are reasons actually held by 
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citizens that we can appeal to.  However, he thinks that some of these reasons are very 
abstract, and that others are only implicit in public political discourse and need to be 
drawn out.  Further, he does not deny that citizens might have self-interested reasons or 
moral, religious, or philosophical reasons for affirming democracy, but he privileges 
reasons drawn from the pool of political values for the purposes of legitimacy.  
Nevertheless, he thinks there are normative reasons actually shared by all citizens 
committed to liberal democracy. 
 The second issue has to do with whether shared reason requires consensus.  This 
issue was introduced in the Preface.  At one end of the spectrum, shared reason requires 
that we find terms of association that no reasonable person could reasonably reject.  This 
is a weak position, philosophically speaking, because it is too demanding to be 
reasonable.  The only terms of association that meet this requirement are too general or 
abstract to determine any particular constitutional or institutional order for any real 
polity.  Values shared in this sense underdetermine any particular constitutional or 
institutional structure, even in the realm of ideal theory.  At the other end of the spectrum, 
shared reason requires only that we believe that the terms of association we offer to 
others are cogent or otherwise sufficiently grounded in reason, and that the terms could 
be affirmed by all, from some suitable and shared point of view.  (The nature of this 
shared perspective is an open question.)  The main worry about this is that it is not 
actually shared reason.  We can get around this worry, though, if we see shared reason as 
a commitment to a kind of respect for persons.  Minimally this view of shared reason 
respects individuals by requiring something similar to what Reidy refers to as reciprocity 
in advantage and reciprocity in justification.  Reciprocity in advantage means roughly 
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that terms of association must respect the basic interests of all to some degree.  It is not 
reasonable to believe people could affirm terms of association that fail to respect their 
basic interests altogether.  Thus, shared reason views require that the interests of all must 
be considered when designing political institutions.  Reciprocity in justification means 
roughly that terms of association should be based on reasons that are publicly available to 
all.  This means that individuals must seek reasons that are part of their culture’s tradition 
of moral and political thought.  Some theorists, like Soper, have a relatively open or 
broad understanding of what it means to say that reasons are publicly available, while 
others, like Rawls, have a more strict understanding. 
 
Respect for Interest Views of Legitimacy. 
 
 Another family of approaches to legitimacy bases it on some conception of the 
common good or the common interests of individuals.  The different members of this 
family of approaches can be distinguished by how they understand the content of the 
common good, or how they think we determine what the common good is.  All of these 
views take respect for judgment to be important.  That is, they all recognize that one 
important interest individuals have is the ability to make decisions and to have those 
judgments recognized by others.  But unlike advocates of respect for judgment views, 
advocates of common good approaches do not see respect for judgment as the 
fundamental value in settling questions of legitimacy.  They place the emphasis 
elsewhere in their political conception of persons as free and equal.  Aggregative and 
deliberative approaches to democracy represent two kinds of respect for interest views.  
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They share the idea that the government’s coercive political power is legitimate when it is 
exercised in accord with democratic outcomes that express the popular will, that is, when 
such power serves the common good as it is expressed in these ways.137   They disagree 
about how we find the popular will.  Other kinds of respect for interest views dispense 
with the idea of the popular will, or give it a less central place, and aim more directly at 
fundamental or basic interests shared by individuals.  One such view is Richard 
Arneson’s best results account.  Allen Buchanan grounds another such view in what he 
calls the robust natural duty of justice. 
 
Respect for Interests and the Popular Will:  Aggregative and Deliberative Accounts. 
 
 On the aggregative approach, the common good is just what we get when we tally 
up people’s votes with respect to their own interests.  The common good is understood as 
nothing more than a simple aggregation of individual goods.  Each individual citizen is 
taken to understand his own good best, and this knowledge is aggregated through 
democratic institutions.  One common criticism of this approach is that aggregative 
arrangements, in themselves, “lack the “moral resources” required to generate and sustain 
legitimate collective solutions to politically contentious issues.”138  One worry that gives 
rise to this complaint is that electoral outcomes are vulnerable to distortion, since they are 
susceptible to a wide variety of influences, including arbitrary social, cultural and 
economic asymmetries.  Social choice is a branch of rational choice theory concerned 
                                                 
137   See, e.g., J. Knight and J. Johnson, “Aggregation and Deliberation:  On the Possibility of Democratic 
Legitimacy,” Political Theory, v. 22 (1994), p. 283. 
138   Knight and Johnson, “Aggregation and Deliberation,” p. 278. 
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with aggregating individual interests into social outcomes.139  According to some, social 
choice theory shows two main problems with voting:  instability and ambiguity.140  
Voting is said to be unstable because all aggregation mechanisms can generate cyclical or 
intransitive social orderings.141  It is said to be ambiguous, because electoral outcomes 
are, at least in part, artifacts of the process by which votes are counted.  Here the problem 
is not that all outcomes are subject to manipulation, but that some may be, and that we 
have no reliable means for determining when this happens.  All things considered, the 
aggregative approach seems faced with possibly insurmountable difficulties. 
 On the deliberative approach, the common good is what people arrive at after 
some appropriate deliberative process.142  Advocates of this approach claim that 
deliberation transforms the substance of individual preferences, which serves to minimize 
conflict and, in the ideal case, produces consensus among participants.  This 
transformation is said to occur in a number of ways, e.g., by exposing objectionable 
preferences or inducing reflection on the grounds for holding otherwise unobjectionable 
preferences.  The main problem with this approach is that it hardly seems realistic to 
expect any consensus in preferences or values in the large, modern, and diverse 
                                                 
139   See, e.g., William Riker, Liberalism Against Populism (Prospect Heights, Il.:  Waveland Press, 1982). 
140   For discussion see, e.g., Knight and Johnson, “Aggregation and Deliberation,” and Riker, Liberalism 
Against Populism. 
141   Suppose voter A ranks her preferences X > Y > Z, voter B ranks her preferences Y > Z > X, and voter 
C ranks hers Z > X > Y.  In this case, there is a majority for X (voters A and C), a majority for Y (voters A 
and B), and a majority for Z (voters B and C).  This outcome is known as a voting cycle.  It is troubling 
because it violates the principle of transitivity, which is generally taken to be an essential feature of 
rationality. 
142   For discussion see, e.g., Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, Deliberation Day (New Haven, Ct.:  Yale 
University Press, 2004), and J. Cohen, “Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy,” in A. Hamlin and P. 
Pettit, eds., The Good Polity (New York:  Basil Blackwell, 1989), pp. 17-34. 
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democratic societies under discussion.  In fact, it seems clear that deliberation can and 
sometimes does sharpen disagreement, rather than resolving it.143
 Neither of these views seems promising.  The main problem they share is that of 
offering some compelling account of how we ought to determine the popular will.  It 
seems clear that each view faces very serious problems, and it is not obvious how, if at 
all, these problems might be overcome.    
 
Best Results Accounts of Legitimacy. 
 
 Another respect for interest view is what Richard Arneson calls a “best results 
account.”  According to Arneson, democratic governments can legitimately enforce their 
laws because democracy produces better results for citizens over time than any available 
alternative form of government.  A government only has the right to use its coercive 
power to direct individual’s lives when the exercise of this power works out well for all 
concerned parties.  Democracy alone is legitimate, because it works out best for all 
concerned; any other available form of government would work out less well overall than 
democracy.  For Arneson, legitimacy amounts to a kind of stewardship:  a form of 
government is legitimate if it more reliably fulfills the fundamental rights of individuals 
than other forms of government.  Other best results accounts offer different 
understandings of what it is reasonable to expect from democracy.  For instance, Ian 
                                                 
143   Some deliberative accounts do not seek consensus.  See, e.g., Amy Guttman and Dennis Thompson, 
Why Deliberative Democracy? (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2004).  Guttman and 
Thompson reject the idea that deliberation can produce consensus, and argue instead that deliberation has 
other valuable purposes, including giving all views a fair hearing, encouraging public-spiritedness, 
promoting mutually respectful decision-making processes, and rooting out errors and mistakes (pp. 10-13). 
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Shapiro offers a best results account in The State of Democratic Theory.  One notable 
feature of his account is his fairly dim assessment of what “best results” it is reasonable 
for us to expect in modern democracies.  I will discuss his view in detail in Chapter 3. 
 There are two main problems with best results accounts in general, both rooted in  
reasonable disagreement.  I will illustrate this briefly using Arneson’s best-results 
account.  Arneson argues that democracy works out best for all concerned because it 
maximally fulfills fundamental rights.  One sort of disagreement is over what we mean 
by democracy.  There are many different political institutions and decision procedures 
that can be regarded as democratic.  Exactly which democratic institutions would produce 
the best results in terms of, say, individual rights, is not clear.  In fact, it is likely that 
people will disagree about this, even if we get them to agree that rights are the 
appropriate metric to use.  But other problems attach to the idea that rights are the best 
way to measure political institutions.  First, even if we agree that rights are the 
appropriate metric for assessing political institutions, people reasonably disagree about 
what our rights are, and even what our most fundamental rights are.144  Thus it is not 
clear that any uncontroversial assessment of democracy in terms of fundamental rights is 
even possible.  Second, others argue that rights are simply the wrong metric to apply 
when assessing political institutions.  That is, there is reasonable disagreement over just 
what terms are appropriate for such assessment.  For example, contemporary utilitarians 
would argue that we ought to appeal to some notion of utility, rather than rights, when 
                                                 
144   Waldron, Law and Disagreement.  
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assessing political institutions.145  And some communitarians would argue that we ought 
to give some notion of the common good more weight in such assessments, and 
individual rights correspondingly less weight.146  The point is that even if we agree that 
political institutions ought to be assessed in terms of best results, it is not obvious what 
results we ought to consider “best.”  Without some general metric that (nearly) all 
citizens affirm, it is likely that all assessments will be controversial, i.e., that political 
institutions reasonably regarded as legitimate by some citizens, because they are thought 
to produce the best results, will reasonably be regarded as illegitimate by others, because 
they are thought to be suboptimal in terms of results, when some different metric is 
applied. 
 
Buchanan’s Natural Duty of Justice. 
 
 Allen Buchanan offers a respect for interest account of legitimacy that grounds it 
in what he calls the robust natural duty of justice.147  On his view, a government is 
legitimate if and only if it (a) does a credible job of protecting the most basic rights of 
individuals, (b) provides this protection in ways (e.g., policies, procedures, actions) that 
themselves respect basic rights, and (c) is not a usurper (i.e., has not come to power by 
wrongly deposing the legitimate government).  These conditions are rooted in what he 
                                                 
145   Two contemporary defenses of utilitarianism as the proper metric for evaluating political institutions 
are Robert Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1995), 
and James Bailey, Utilitarianism, Institutions, and Justice (New York:  Oxford University Press, 1997). 
146   For one good discussion of this aspect of communitarian political thought, see Will Kymlicka, 
Contemporary Political Philosophy:  An Introduction (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2002), Chapter 
6. 
147   Allen Buchanan, “Political Legitimacy.” 
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calls the “robust natural duty of justice,” a limited obligation each of us has to help 
ensure that all persons have access to institutions that protect their basic rights.  This duty 
is implied by the fact that we regard all persons as entitled to equal concern and respect.  
This is obvious, Buchanan says, because we cannot plausibly hold that all persons are 
entitled to equal concern and respect and then deny that each of us has an obligation to do 
something to ensure that the basic rights of all persons are protected. 
Buchanan’s robust natural duty of justice is not an account of political obligation.  
Buchanan holds that only consent could ground political obligation, and he thinks that all 
consent accounts fail.  But Buchanan rejects the correlativity thesis, so the fact that 
citizens have no duty to obey the law does not imply that government cannot be 
legitimate, that it cannot enforce the law against citizens.  Here the natural duty of justice 
plays its role.  It is the ultimate ground of Buchanan’s theory of legitimacy.  
This robust natural duty of justice figures into political legitimacy in two primary 
ways.  First, it gives citizens weighty reasons to comply with governments that satisfy the 
three conditions of legitimacy.  Second, it provides a powerful normative justification for 
government to wield coercive political power against citizens, especially if (as Buchanan 
argues) individuals have no right not to be coerced into satisfying their duty of justice.  
Where democracy is not possible, it is sufficient for a government to satisfy the three 
legitimacy conditions.  But where democracy is possible, legitimacy requires that leaders 
and laws be chosen democratically.  This is so because it gives citizens an equal say in 
determining who wields political power, and in determining the content of the what laws 





 I do not share the general skeptical outlook of many regarding political obligation.  
I believe that it is possible to establish at least a weak prima facie duty to obey the law.  
In this I rely on Philip Soper, whose account of political obligation I discuss in depth in 
Chapter 3.  Nevertheless, I reject the correlativity thesis.  It is false.  But this does not 
mean that there can be no relationship between political obligation and legitimacy.  I 
argue in Chapter 4 that Soper’s theory of political obligation forms the core of Rawls’s 
theory of legitimacy.  This is a big promise, and I hope to make good on it in Chapters 3 
and 4.  In Chapter 2, though, I will discuss two respect for interest approaches to law, 
obligation, and legitimacy.  I have two main reasons for doing this.  First, these theories 
are correct when they say that democracy protects and promotes certain important 
interests shared by all, even if they are mistaken to think that this alone can ground 
political obligation or legitimacy.  Here democracy will be defended against some fairly 
serious charges.  Second, I want to examine the ways that respect for interest views try to 
respect the freedom and equality of citizens without appeal to any notion of shared 
reason.  In the end, I reject respect for interest approaches because they do not fully 
respect one of the most vital uses of our capacity for judgment:  our capacity to determine 
for ourselves exactly what our basic interests are. 
 
CHAPTER 2 
SHAPIRO AND WALDRON 
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 No liberal democratic society can constitute itself as a body politic without some 
exercise of force in the face of good faith dissent and disagreement.  We simply disagree 
about too much, even from the shared moral point of view of democratic citizen.  We 
disagree about religion and morality and philosophy, and we disagree about how to 
resolve disagreements between people who disagree about such things.  We disagree 
about politics.  We disagree about what it means to be a citizen, about how to specify our 
most fundamental rights, and about how to organize our most fundamental political 
institutions.  And even when we agree on certain political issues, for instance, that all 
citizens are free and equal, politically speaking, we disagree about just what this commits 
us to.  What this means for us, as citizens who constitute and work to continually sustain 
and improve our democratic polity, is that in the case of nearly every political dispute, the 
will of some must rule all.  Each side to a political dispute can only present its case, and 
then (after some appropriate decision procedure is invoked or engaged) one side wins and 
the other side loses.  In this sense, the continual constitution of a democratic body politic 
is always at the same time an act of political power and acquiescence. 
 This exercise of power in the face of good faith dissent is not merely a practical 
problem, but is also a theoretical problem.  Political theory cannot be done without some 
abstraction and simplification.  This is true of both ideal and non-ideal theory.  But 
whatever else we might wish to simplify for the sake of political theory, we must not 
pretend that good faith disagreement will soon fade away.  To do this is to distort our 
self-understanding and to turn democratic theory into something wildly utopian.  Modern 
democratic society is characterized by good faith disagreement.  We must not ignore this.  
This fact encompasses all citizens, including political philosophers.  What this means for 
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political philosophers as philosophers is that they cannot even hope to say what political 
justice ultimately requires in a democracy, even under ideal conditions.  What justice 
requires can only be worked out by actual citizens through real-time political processes.  
What political philosophers can do is mark out the conditions under which citizens have 
reason to respect the outcomes of these real-time political processes, even—and perhaps 
especially—those outcomes they find deeply morally troubling in some way. 
 A central historical reason for our faith in democratic politics, and for its claim on 
our allegiance, has been the Enlightenment conviction that public deliberation and 
rational inquiry will lead citizens to converge on some rational and robust conception of 
justice and the common good.  But we have to give up on the idea that reason will lead us 
to some rational and shared moral vision.  Reason is plural, fragmentary, and incomplete.  
It leads people in different directions, and so is inadequate to the task set for it during the 
Enlightenment.  Unless we want to give up our faith in democracy too, we need some 
other explanation or account of it.  This is a central task of post-Enlightenment political 
philosophy.  Does democracy deserve our allegiance?  Can democracy legitimately 
authorize the exercise of coercive state power? 
 Some argue now that a mere modus vivendi is the most we can expect from our 
post-Enlightenment situation.  Good faith disagreement infects politics all the way down, 
since no political decision procedure is immune to the burdens of judgment, so every 
political decision can (and likely will) be seen as an illegitimate or unjust exercise of pure 
political power.  Proponents of this view think the best we can hope for is that the 
different factions that wield the greatest political power will see a tolerable peace as 
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preferable to a war for supremacy.  In essence, our post-modern condition has returned us 
to our pre-modern one.  A modus vivendi is the best we can achieve. 
Shapiro, Waldron, Soper and Rawls think we can hope for more.  Each develops 
an account of democratic law and political authority that is normative and not merely 
prudential, but that also takes seriously the depth of good faith disagreement.  What each 
aims to do is mark out conditions under which all citizens would have sound normative 
reason, and not mere prudential reason, to respect the outcomes of real-time democratic 
political processes.  Shapiro and Waldron are discussed in this chapter.  Soper and Rawls 
are discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively. 
 Shapiro defends a normative conception of democracy rooted in principles of 
non-domination and “affected interest.”  He argues roughly that democracy deserves our 
respect because it is the best way (among the available alternatives) to manage power 
relations between citizens who disagree about the good but who cannot move away from 
one another.  When Shapiro calls it our “best” option, what he means is that democracy is 
the least worst form of government open to us.  It does not work well, if our goal is 
realizing some robust understanding of justice or the common good.  But, then, no other 
form of government does this well either.  What distinguishes democracy from the 
alternatives is its capacity to minimize domination in a society.  Democracy has this 
capacity when it requires politically powerful individuals and groups to compete for the 
votes of the individuals whose basic interests are most likely to be affected by any 
particular political decision.  This is a respect for interests approach to political obligation 
and legitimacy.  (Shapiro seems to assume that the correlativity thesis is true.)  
Democratic law can be rightfully enforced by the government, and citizens have a duty to 
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obey the law, because democratic decision procedures do a better job of securing non-
domination than available political alternatives. 
 Waldron offers a normative conception of democracy rooted in the idea that 
democratic law embodies important social achievements.  On his view, although citizens 
recognize that they disagree about justice and the common good, they also recognize the 
need for concerted action to produce important social goods, such as the conditions 
necessary for a market economy, a system of health care, environmental protection, and 
so on.  Waldron refers to this situation as the Circumstances of Politics.  Law enacted in 
the Circumstances of Politics deserves respect as the embodiment of the achievement of a 
common plan of action in the face of disagreement over what we should do about our 
common problems.  Waldron argues that majoritarian democratic decision procedures 
have special virtues that play an important role in generating the law’s normative force.  
Waldron’s view is a weak shared reason view.  His version of reciprocity in advantage 
focuses on social goods created through democratic activity, and each person’s interest in 
being respected in certain ways by the political process of voting.  His version of 
reciprocity in justification is mentioned, but it’s never really explained. 
 One of my aims in this dissertation is to discover the limits of reasonable hope for 
a liberal democratic society, to discover if it is at all possible to realize or achieve 
important elements of our liberal democratic ideals, once we acknowledge the fact that 
political power, even in democracies, must be exercised in face of reasonable 
disagreement and dissent.  While both of the normative accounts discussed in this chapter 
are morally preferable to the prudential modus vivendi view, I will argue (in the last 
chapter) that they fall well short of key liberal ideals.  In my view these liberal ideals are 
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plausible, to some extent at least, so the respect for interest views discussed here fall a bit 
short of our reasonable goals.  Rawls’s view is morally preferable to Shapiro’s and 
Waldron’s because it is more faithful, in spirit if not in practice, to the liberal ideal of 
shared reason.  However, Rawls’s view may turn out to be unworkable.  If Rawls’s vision 
cannot ultimately be sustained, and the best we can hope for is represented by views like 
Shapiro’s, we may be forced to conclude that there is little hope of realizing many of our 
liberal democratic ideals. 
 
Ian Shapiro and The State of Democratic Theory. 
 
In The State of Democratic Theory, Ian Shapiro defends a normative conception 
of democracy founded on principles of non-domination and affected interest.148  He 
argues that a democratic society’s political institutions ought to be structured in ways that 
ensure that the basic interests of all members are protected from the politically powerful.  
The best institutional framework for achieving this goal of non-domination is a form of 
competitive democracy, which protects citizens by having political agents (e.g., officials 
and parties) compete for their votes.  Here Shapiro draws on the work of Joseph 
Schumpeter.  Exactly what we ought to do to protect the interests of citizens is something 
of an open question, because solutions to particular problems depend on many variable 
conditions, including just what interest or interests might be at stake, how basic they are, 
how they are threatened, and a variety of local conditions or contingencies, including, 
                                                 
148   Ian Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory (Princeton, NJ:  Princeton University Press, 2003).  
Hereafter State. 
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e.g., local history, economy, geography and so on.  Thus, what needs to be done in 
Shapiro’s native South Africa might be a bit different from what needs to be done in an 
established democracy like the United States. 
At the heart of Shapiro’s approach, though, is what he calls the “principle of 
affected interest.”  Institutional reforms are positive to the extent that they make 
democracy more responsive to those citizens whose interests are most likely to be 
affected, or whose interests are most strongly affected, by any particular decision, 
especially when the interests at stake are essential or fundamental interests. Sometimes 
this principle requires only that everyone whose interests might be affected by a decision 
gets to vote.  At other times, when it seems like voting cannot adequately protect 
fundamental interests, the principle requires that we have experts redesign political and 
social institutions in ways that reduce or eliminate threats to fundamental interests.149  
Nevertheless, democratic decision procedures can still sometimes foster domination.  
When this happens, Shapiro argues that a limited form of judicial review is appropriate. 
Shapiro’s principle of affected interest is not a conception of justice, nor does it 
presuppose or entail one.  It is a much thinner respect for interest view than, say, 
Buchanan’s robust natural duty of justice view.  Buchanan seems to think we can answer 
the question of what justice requires with some certainty, and in a fairly robust and 
determinate way.  Shapiro doubts that this is so.  There is no reason to think any robust 
and determinate conception of justice will be affirmed by democratic citizens generally.  
                                                 
149   For example, when (say) mining industry practices threaten the fundamental interests of mine workers 
and need to be revised, it may not help at all to put a slate of proposed revisions before the mine workers 
and to let them choose.  In cases like this, merely being allowed to vote seems inadequate to protect 
fundamental interests.  It is better (safer, more efficient) to ask experts—those who command some 
relevant specialized “insider’s” knowledge—to solve the problem. 
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This does not give due respect to good faith disagreements.  Of course, politically 
powerful individuals can seek to use their power to promote their own conceptions of 
justice, but this is not what Buchanan seems to imagine.  Further, Buchanan seems to 
think that democracy can do a more or less good job of fostering some conception of 
justice.  Again, Shapiro doubts that this is so.  On his view, democratic decision making 
is controlled by politically powerful individuals.  Democracy does not allow citizens 
generally to express or institute some conception of justice.  All democracy provides for 
citizens is a means for replacing those politically powerful agents who threaten our 




It is natural to ask, at the very start, if democracy is necessary at all, given 
Shapiro’s stated aim of protecting the basic interests of persons.  For unless a person has 
a basic interest in democratic participation, which Shapiro does not assert, it is not 
obvious that democracy is the only way, or even the best way, to protect basic 
interests.150  If basic interests are normatively fundamental, and democracy’s value is 
merely instrumental, then it is an open question whether any society ought to have 
democratic institutions.151  Why not some form of guardianship instead?152  It might be 
                                                 
150   Although Shapiro does not argue that democratic participation has intrinsic value, others do.  See, e.g., 
the respective contributions of Joshua Cohen, Thomas Christiano, and David Estlund to Philosophy and 
Democracy:  An Anthology, ed., T. Christiano (New York:  Oxford University Press, 2003). 
151   Many political theorists argue that democracy’s value is merely instrumental.  See, e.g., the 
contributions of Richard Arneson, Ronald Dworkin, and Jon Elster to Philosophy and Democracy. 
152   For a good general discussion of guardianship, see Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics (New 
Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1989), especially Chapter 4, pp. 52-65. 
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the case that ordinary people simply cannot articulate and defend their own basic interests 
as well as, say, a group of philosopher-kings could, and thus that the aim of protecting 
basic interests is best served by putting society in the hands of a small group of persons 
specially qualified to govern (by virtue of, e.g., their high intelligence, or profound virtue, 
or both).  It does no good to insist that people have a basic interest in justice, and that 
justice in turn requires democracy, because the relationship between justice and 
democracy (if any exists) is not at all clear.153  In any case, people might simply prefer, 
all things considered, to have qualified guardians handle most, if not all, collective action 
problems.  Now, whether or not one finds guardianship a compelling alternative to 
democracy is not the issue.  The point is just that once democracy’s value is seen as 
merely instrumental, it becomes an open question whether democracy is the best means 
for achieving whatever ends are sought.  Thus, one might think Shapiro simply errs in 
asserting a need for democracy in the name of basic interests.  At the very least, doesn’t 
he owe us a defense of democracy? 
Shapiro does not approach this question directly, but there is a response in his 
work.  He acknowledges that democracy has for some time had a bad name among 
certain political theorists, especially the rational choice camp that follows in the tradition 
of Kenneth Arrow, and that some seek to justify alternative forms of government (or non-
government, in the case of anarchists).  But despite this theoretical skepticism, Shapiro 
says, “the democratic idea is close to nonnegotiable in today’s world.”154  Democracy is 
more or less a given for the vast majority of people in the world—many already have it, 
                                                 
153   A good selection of essays on the sometimes antagonistic relationship between justice and democracy 
can be found in Justice and Democracy:  Essays for Brian Barry, eds., K. Dowding, R. Goodin, and C. 
Pateman (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 2004). 
154   State, p. 1. 
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and those who do not have it hope to.  There are, of course, parts of the world that are 
ruled by dictators, but even these rulers tend not to reject democracy outright.  Dictators 
generally argue instead that their societies, while not fully democratic, are transitioning 
toward democracy or are actually more democratic than they appear.  Thus even 
authoritarian rulers understand the importance of democracy.  There is, of course, good 
reason to doubt the sincerity of many such claims.  Still, there was a surprising and 
dramatic increase in the number of democracies in the world between 1980 and 2002.  
According to the United Nations, eighty-one countries moved from some form of 
authoritarian government to democracy during this twenty-two year span.  In thirty-three 
of these countries, military dictatorships were replaced by civilian governments.  Thus, 
despite democracy’s supposed defects as a form of government, and despite the many 
doubts and worries raised by political theorists, it is clear to Shapiro that democracy has 
“legitimacy in the world.”155
But democracy’s nonnegotiable status does not imply that people agree about 
what democracy ought to be.  To the contrary, different people have different ideas about 
what democracy can and should be.  And in every democracy, some people will feel that 
their society is not working as it should.  But Shapiro thinks problems like these only 
serve to strengthen his point.  Insofar as these are worries over what democracy should 
be, or objections that target malfunctions or corruptions of democracy, democracy’s 
nonnegotiable status is affirmed.  Within democratic systems, he says, no one doubts that 
people are free to despise their democratically elected leaders.  However, neither does 
anyone doubt that the elected government has the right to be the government. 
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And so we get to a key element of Shapiro’s method and purpose.  Democracy 
has “legitimacy in the world,” but people disagree about what it should be.  This is where 
Shapiro enters the discussion.  His aim is not to defend democracy, but to improve or 
perfect it.  He assesses the state of democratic theory, not with an eye toward justifying it, 
but with an eye toward making it better.  He complains that too many theorists act as if 
we can start over, as if we can begin anew.  But, he says,  
Despite the presuppositions behind much academic literature, human beings do 
not generally design institutions ex nihilo; they redesign existing institutions 
along the lines suggested by such metaphors as rebuilding a ship at sea.156
Thus, Shapiro intends to rebuild democracy.  Democracy is the decision-making system 
we, U.S. citizens, have inherited.  It is already the decision-making system of many 
peoples around the world.  And where democracy is not already in place, people 
generally aspire to it.  This understanding of the status democracy already has in the 
world shapes Shapiro’s overall approach in The State of Democratic Theory. 
Shapiro identifies two common metrics for assessing democracy.  One is 
normative.  This literature assesses normative justifications of democracy as a form of 
government.  The other is explanatory.  It assesses accounts of the dynamics of 
democratic institutions and practices.  One of Shapiro’s problems with current democratic 
theory is the fact that these two literatures have developed in relative isolation from one 
another.  But speculation about what ought to be, when not informed by relevant 
information about what is possible, often has little real-world value.  And explanatory 
theory, when divorced from significant normative concerns, often becomes “banal” and 
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“method-driven.”  So Shapiro intends to take “an integrative tack, focusing on what we 
should expect of democracy, and on how those expectations might best be realized in 
practice.”157
For example, rational choice theorists have long argued that democracy is an 
irrational decision procedure, because it can lead to arbitrary and irrational outcomes.158  
Suppose (for the sake of argument) that three voters—I, II, and III—are faced with three 
policy choices—A, B, and C.  If voter I ranks her choices A > B > C, and voter II ranks 
her choices C > A > B, and voter III ranks her choices B > C > A, then there is a majority 
for A over B (voters I and II), a majority for B over C (voters I and III), and a majority 
for C over A (voters II and III).  This is known as a voting cycle, and it presents 
proponents of democratic decision making with certain problems.  First, since a voting 
cycle violates the principle of transitivity, which is considered a basic feature of 
rationality, the rationality of democracy as a decision procedure can be questioned.  
Second, it opens up the possibility that whoever is in control of the order of voting can 
manipulate the outcome, if they know the preferences of voters.  Third, even if there is no 
conscious manipulation of the order of voting, still, it seems, the outcome must be 
arbitrary, insofar as outcomes seem to have more to do with the order of voting than with 
actual voter preferences. 
As a result, some argue that we should hem in democratic decision making (e.g., 
legislative action) with courts and multiple veto points.  Since voting is irrational and 
subject to manipulation, it represents a potential threat to individual rights and welfare.  
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This threat can be reduced through the institution of counter-majoritarian practices, 
practices that reduce or restrict legislative activity. 
At least, this is what rational choice theory says about democratic decision 
making.  Fortunately for us, empirical research on democratic decision making does not 
support such dim conclusions.159    A couple of recent studies suggest that voting cycles 
are actually quite rare.  Other observers note that legislatures do not seem to show the 
arbitrariness, irrationality, and instability that rational choice theory predicts. These and 
similar empirical findings are surprising, and have led some to reevaluate the proper role 
of rational choice theory in political theory.160  None of this shows that rational choice 
theory cannot contribute to democratic theory.  What this does show is the need to draw 
together, to integrate, normative theory and empirical, explanatory research. 
Despite all of this, one might still reasonably worry that Shapiro has not yet 
addressed the general concern, namely, whether democracy is necessary at all if our goal 
is to protect the basic interests of persons.  I do not share this worry, though it is not 
without some merit.  Shapiro doesn’t answer this particular challenge.  In this respect, 
however, Shapiro’s work is not unlike Rawls’s or Dworkin’s.  Rawls takes the 
democratic practice we have inherited as a starting point and asks, not whether we ought 
to have it—we do—but whether we can make it morally compelling or attractive in terms 
of our own best moral self-understanding.  The goal of democratic theory, then, is to 
redeem what history has bequeathed to us.  If, in the end, we cannot redeem it—if we 
simply cannot make our best understanding of our democratic practice fit with our own 
                                                 
159   For an overview see Daniel Farber and Philip Frickey, Law and Public Choice:  A Critical Introduction 
(Chicago:  University of Chicago Press, 1991). 
160   See, e.g., Donald Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory:  A Critique of 
Applications in Political Science (New Haven, CT:  Yale University Press, 1994). 
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best moral understanding of who we are, both as individuals and as a people—then the 
question of what form of government we ought to have, if any, would take on a special 
urgency, one that would put it solidly at the center of political theory.  But we have not 
yet reached that point.  So I agree with Shapiro, Rawls, Dunn, and others in this camp. 
 
Domination and the Common Good. 
 
 Shapiro argues that democracy deserves our allegiance, not because it is a reliable 
means of expressing or institutionalizing the general will, but because it is “the best 
available system for managing power relations among people who disagree about the 
nature of the common good, among many other things, but who nonetheless are bound to 
live together.”161  The main problem with viewing democracy as a means to producing 
the common good, says Shapiro, is just that there is no common good.  At least, there is 
no common good in any robust sense.  People’s interests simply conflict.  There is no 
reason to think public democratic deliberation can reduce such conflicts.162  In fact, 
deliberation may do exactly the opposite, by highlighting and sharpening disagreement, 
or by revealing to us the fact that some disagreements are simply irresolvable.  We can, 
of course, simply aggregate people’s expressed interests, but such calculations can hardly 
be taken as expressions of the general will or the common good.163  Why not?  To 
Shapiro the main problem is that people’s expressed preferences may have been shaped 
or influenced by politically powerful agents.  Different citizens control vastly different 
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amounts of political and economic power.  Some citizens have enough of both to shape 
political agendas and maybe even to influence the development of others’ sense of their 
own interests.  Other citizens have very little power of either sort.  So before we can 
aggregate people’s expressed interests in any meaningful way, we need to make sure the 
relevant citizens are not dominated.164  Fortunately, minimizing domination is something 
that democracy can do. 
 Shapiro offers non-domination as a “stripped down” version of the common good. 
The common good is just every individual’s interest in avoiding domination.165  This thin 
understanding of it is preferable to the versions offered by the aggregative and 
deliberative theorists, Shapiro says, because it does not have to contend with the 
collective rationality problems facing the others, and it is more sensitive to the reality of 
power.  Further, this limited understanding of the common good is one that democratic 
government can achieve. 
 On Shapiro’s view, democracy is valuable because it represents our best chance 
of reducing domination in society.  But we should not expect too much from democracy, 
even when it is working properly.  Shapiro follows Winston Churchill in this regard:  
democracy is “the worst form of government except all those other forms that have been 
tried from time to time.”166  What Shapiro means when he says that democracy is the best 
way to manage power relations is that democracy provides at least the possibility of 
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diminishing or curtailing domination in any given society.  This possibility is what draws 
people to it.  But while democracy has this “constitutive commitment” to non-
domination, there is no guarantee that democracy will reduce, even less eradicate, 
domination in any or all of its forms.  There are no perfect decision procedures, and, even 
if there were, in real democratic societies many factors influence the contexts in which 
democratic decision-making takes place.  The current distribution of wealth and political 
power are facts we must contend with, not facts we can wish away.  Despite all of this, 
democracy still represents our best hope for reducing domination. 
 Ilya Somin complains that Shapiro’s theory of domination is vague, but we can 
get some idea of what he means from the way he contrasts his account of domination 
with Max Weber’s.167  Weber defined domination as “the probability that a command 
with a specific content will be obeyed by a given group of persons.”168  Thus, Shapiro 
says, for Weber “the existence of domination turns only on the actual presence of one 
person successfully issuing orders to others.”169  Shapiro sees domination differently.  He 
holds, roughly, that domination requires duress, i.e., that the dominated person acted as 
he did because some sort of threat had been made against his continued well-being.  This 
understanding of domination is both wider and narrower than Weber’s.  It is wider, 
because it does not require the actual presence of agents who issue explicit orders.  While 
Shapiro does not go so far as someone like Foucault, who claims that domination does 
not require human agency at all, Shapiro does think domination can occur in a number of 
subtle and indirect ways.  Domination can occur when a person or group can shape 
                                                 
167   Ilya Somin, “Book Review:  The State of Democratic Theory,” The Cato Journal, v. 23 (2004), pp. 
475-479. 
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agendas, or constrain options, or influence preferences and desires, in ways that affect 
people’s interests.  For example, domination occurs when group A secures the support of 
group B, largely because group A controls resources that are essential to group B’s basic 
interests.  This is domination, even if no identifiable member of A issues explicit 
commands to any member of B.  It may simply be the case that A makes its desires well-
known, and that B understands that A will be displeased with any group that acts to 
thwart A’s aims. 
 Shapiro’s insistence that domination results only from the illegitimate use of 
power is what makes his account narrower than Weber’s.  Power relations and hierarchy 
are common features of human life and interaction.  Compliance is compelled in many 
human social institutions, including armies, companies, schools, and families, just to 
name a few.  But requiring people to do things is not the same as dominating them.  For 
instance, there is nothing wrong with using sanctions (grades) to compel students to do 
their homework.  There is, however, something wrong with using the gradebook to secure 
money or sexual favors.  Since hierarchy can easily facilitate domination, Shapiro says 
we have good reason to always view hierarchical relations with suspicion.  We should 
take care to reform hierarchical social institutions in ways that reduce the likelihood of 
domination.  But hierarchy is not itself a form of domination. 
 Then when are people subject to domination as Shapiro understands it?  When 
their basic interests are threatened by others.  Shapiro does not explicate our basic 
interests in any robust way, but he says that “we can think of people’s basic interests by 
reference to the obvious essentials that they need to develop into and survive as 
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independent agents in the world as it is likely to exist for their lifetimes.”170  He says his 
view is similar to the “resourcist” views of John Rawls, Ronald Dworkin, and Amartya 
Sen.171  These different theorists each affirm a list of basic goods, the possession of 
which would make possible the pursuit of any one of many different conceptions of the 
good life.  Anyone who can threaten a person’s basic interests can exercise a great deal of 
power over her.  This presents a serious threat of domination.  For instance, an employer 
who can fire an employee when there is no unemployment compensation has the 
opportunity to dominate the employee. 
  
Controlling Government Power—Constraints and Incentives. 
 
Governments wield an enormous amount of coercive power.  One main function 
of government is the deployment and maintenance of this coercive power for the good of 
citizens.  This is not the only function of government, but it is one of its most important 
ones.  For Shapiro, the good of democratic government is just that it represents our best 
chance at minimizing domination.  The question that arises now is how to control the 
exercise of state power so as to ensure (to the extent that we can) that the government 
limits and does not facilitate domination. 
 Two general institutional strategies for controlling power are constraints and 
incentives.  Constraints are institutional roadblocks designed to make government action 
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difficult, or walls designed to keep government out.  For example, multiple veto points 
are constraints meant to slow or reduce government action.  The separation of powers is a 
constraint of this sort.  The different branches of government are charged with resisting 
the overreaching of the other branches.  Other constraints are private spheres defended by 
counter-majoritarian institutions such as the Supreme Court, the constitution, and so on.  
Incentives, on the other hand, are institutional features designed to give government 
reason to find solutions to problems that in some way satisfy everyone.  There is an 
element of this in the separation of powers, insofar as this separation gives each branch 
incentive to seek solutions to problems that will not be rejected by the other branches.  
The authors of The Federalist argued that the best system would be comprised of both 
constraints and incentives.  Unfortunately, Shapiro points out, there are serious problems 
with constraints, and relatively little work in the literature on incentives.  This leaves us 
in a bad spot.  The great virtue of Schumpeter’s democratic theory, according to Shapiro, 
is that it is primarily an incentive-based account of democratic government. 
 According to Shapiro, constraints on government action are fraught with serious 
problems.  Two of the main problems that constraints are meant to solve are the 
possibility of irrational and/or manipulated collective action.  Multiple veto points are 
supposed to reduce this threat by making it harder for the government to do anything at 
all, thereby limiting government.  The main problems with this, according to Shapiro, are 
that it is something of a false dilemma, and that it privileges the status quo.  Proponents 
of multiple veto points tend to describe our choice as one between (a) more collective 
action and (b) less collective action.  This is misleading.  Even minimal government 
would be a massive collective undertaking, involving at least social institutions designed 
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to protect basic interests from both domestic and international threats, and to keep track 
of things like private property and to enforce contracts.  That is, even minimal 
government would be very expensive and demand a lot from citizens.  Thus, Shapiro 
says, we will have a massive collective action scheme, one way or the other.  The real 
question is what do we want from our collective action?  Our real choice is this:  do we 
want (a) government institutions that protect everyone from domination, or (b) 
government institutions that protect the status quo?172  Choosing multiple veto points is 
the same as choosing b.  This does not mean that veto points cannot help us.  They can, 
but only when used judiciously.  What is wrong is to employ them willy-nilly, as a 
general strategy for managing irrational or manipulative uses of governmental power in a 
democracy. 
 Other constraints are meant to identify and protect private spheres of human life 
through institutions such as the Supreme Court, a constitution, and so on.  However, these 
constraints have just as many problems as veto points.  One problem with this strategy, 
according to Shapiro, is that such institutions are themselves often majoritarian 
institutions.  The Supreme Court contains nine members who deliberate and then vote.  
This means that the Supreme Court may suffer from exactly the same pathologies that 
plague democratic decision making.  Again, though, Shapiro does not argue that there is 
never a time for this kind of constraint.  They can be helpful.  But it is a mistake to see 
constraints as general strategies for controlling the problems associated with collective 
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rationality.  They are not a cure-all, but must instead be carefully and thoughtfully 
applied only in situations where they can do some good. 
 Thus, while constraints may help us reduce some of our collective choice 
problems, they are not an ideal solution, and should not be used indiscriminately.  They 
can sometimes protect us from the possibility of irrational or manipulated collective 
action, but if they are not used carefully, they can contribute as much to the problem as to 
the solution.  This is why it is important that we also have incentives.  The great promise 




 Shapiro’s model of competitive democracy draws heavily on the account Joseph 
Schumpeter develops in Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy.173  The core of 
Schumpeter’s view is the idea that government power can be controlled by making it the 
prize in regular and competitive elections.  Political agents must win control of the 
government by garnering more votes from citizens than competitors do.  The winner gets 
control of the government for some specified period of time.  When that time is up, then 
political power is put up for grabs again.  For example, the U.S. holds a presidential 
election every four years.  Power is controlled in such a system by making political actors 
compete for the hearts and minds of citizens every few years. 
 Schumpeter makes an analogy between political and economic competition.  He 
says that we can think of voters as consumers, political parties and candidates as 
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companies, votes as profits, and government policies as political goods and services.  
When parties are seen as companies competing for the votes of citizens, Shapiro says, 
“leaders can be seen as disciplined by the demands of competition.”174  Competition is 
thus valuable for two reasons.  First, leaders are disciplined by the threat of losing power.  
Second, leaders have incentive to be more responsive than their competitors to the needs 
of voters. 
 Some criticize Schumpeter’s view on the grounds that it really rewards those with 
the most resources.175  In theory, the ideal of one-person-one-vote is supposed to negate 
this.  But in the U.S., for instance, politicians must compete first for campaign 
contributions, before it is even possible for them to compete for votes.  Perhaps, Shapiro 
says, voters would support strong confiscatory taxation of estates worth over ten million 
dollars, but no party proposes this.  Why not?  Shapiro’s view is that politicians are 
probably afraid of the effect increasing taxes on the wealthy would have on their 
campaign coffers.  He admits that empirical studies of such claims are inconclusive, but 
“it seems reasonable to suppose that the proposals politicians offer are heavily shaped by 
the agendas of campaign contributors; why else would they contribute?”176  When this is 
added to the fact that most political systems have few major parties, what we end up with 
is oligopolistic competition. 
 Some criticize Schumpeter’s view on the grounds that the high rate at which 
incumbents are reelected suggests that electoral competition does not do much to 
                                                 
174   State, p. 58. 
175   State, p. 59. 
176   State, p. 60. 
113 
discipline politicians.177  But, Shapiro asks in response, compared to what?  Electoral 
competition may provide only modest incentives when measured against some ideal 
standard, but that ideal standards prevails nowhere.  In the real world, even the modest 
discipline imposed by electoral competition would be a great benefit to the many who 
live under leaders who are not disciplined at all. 
 Shapiro acknowledges the force of the criticisms, but he is not discouraged by 
them.  These criticisms do not attack the idea of competitive democracy per se, but 
instead point to imperfections in currently existing competitive systems.  These can be 
remedied.  Reforms can be made that reduce the power of campaign contributors and that 
allow more parties to be competitive.  And in any case, Shapiro does not wish to limit the 
disciplining force of his version of competitive democracy to the incentives found in 
Schumpeter’s account.  It is likely that constraints will have to be added to discipline 
politicians in any real world case.  For example, we might want to force political decision 
making into the open, and enact terms limits to fight incumbency. 
 Shapiro buttresses his account of competitive democracy with a limited form of 
judicial review.178  He has two main reasons for this.  First, we need some way of settling 
disputes between political agents and parties that is acknowledged by them to be more or 
less independent and legitimate.  As Shapiro puts it, “the players of a game are not well 
situated to act as their own umpires.”179  Here institutions like the Supreme Court have a 
legitimate role to play in a democracy.  Second, no decision procedure is perfect.  Even a 
democratic system that is fully competitive in Shapiro’s sense will sometimes enact 
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legislation that dominates individuals.  When this happens, judicial review is appropriate.  
However, Shapiro does not think any court should create law itself, in effect usurping one 
of the legitimate functions of the legislature.  This just hampers democracy.  Rather, 
when such a court judges that some legislation dominates individuals, the court should 
simply repeal the law and tell the legislature to try again.  What the courts should do is 
protect and promote every individual’s ability to participate in the democratic process.  
This it does by limiting domination.  When the court tries to do more than this, it actually 
interferes with a citizen’s ability to participate. 
 
Problems for Shapiro. 
 
 Shapiro is never clear about whether he is offering an account of legitimacy or 
political obligation.  He says that “we should recognize its [democracy’s] claim to our 
allegiance,” but this is vague.180  I suspect he holds some version of the correlativity 
thesis, and thus thinks the problems of legitimacy and political obligation are one and the 
same problem.  But as we saw in Chapter 1, the correlativity thesis (strictly speaking) is 
false.  I will not pursue this issue further, however, because it does not make a difference 
to my analysis of Shapiro’s account.  The problems I will discuss in the next sections 
apply to his view in either case. 
 The first problem I will discuss is the vagueness of Shapiro’s idea of basic 
interests.  At least one commentator finds his view “too vague to be useful.”181  I do not 
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think this is a serious problem for Shapiro, but it is similar to a more serious problem.  
The more serious problem is that people can and do disagree in good faith over just what 
our basic interests are.  This is a broad problem that affects all respect for interest views.  
These problems—the vagueness and disagreement problems—raise issues internal to 
Shapiro’s view.  Internal problems have to with the coherence or feasibility of a view.  If 
they are serious, they raise questions about the plausibility of a view, insofar as they 
suggest it would be hard or impossible to realize or instantiate the view in a real society. 
 A third problem I will discuss is rooted in the kinds of reasons Shapiro’s 
democratic officials have for wielding power, and the kinds of reasons citizens have for 
obeying or acquiescing.  Shapiro places no restrictions on the sorts of reasons 
government officials can appropriately appeal to in exercising their power.  This may be 
a problem. 
 Two other problems I want to discuss are external ones.  External problems 
assume that we can implement Shapiro’s view, but raise worries having to do with the 
implications or long-term consequences of such implementation.  One external problem 
has to do with just how competition shapes or disciplines politicians.  Competition does 
not guarantee an ever-increasing search for good among politicians.  All that it guarantees 
is that citizens have the ability to choose the least of the evils they face.  This is 
something, but it may not be much.  Another external problem for Shapiro’s view is that 
it seems to be consistent with benign neglect.  Shapiro’s competitive democracy allows 
powerful political agents to ignore almost all of the judgments or views of weaker 
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agents.182  Citizens remain sovereign, in the sense that they choose which powerful 
agents take control of our political institutions, but citizens otherwise have no meaningful 
role in ruling themselves.  We have to ask if this is an attractive understanding of 
democracy, of government by the people, for the people, given our democratic values and 
our moral self-understanding.  The last problem I will consider is related to the problem 
of benign neglect.  Rawls was very concerned about how political institutions might 
shape or influence the character of citizens raised in different societies.  One reason for 
this is that Rawls sees one of the proper roles of political philosophy to be giving citizens 
reasonable hope for or faith in their society.  Another reason has to do with stability.  
Political institutions deemed unattractive by citizens will not be voluntarily maintained 
by citizens.  For reasons like these it is not clear that Shapiro’s democracy provides the 
kind of utopian vision that we can expect citizens to freely and willingly endorse. 
 
“Basic interests” are too vague to be useful. 
 
 Ilya Somin complains that Shapiro’s theory of non-domination is too vague to be 
useful.183  In her estimation, this is the most serious shortcoming of his work.  Shapiro 
makes a brief attempt to define non-domination in terms of basic interests, which he 
describes as “the obvious essentials that [people] need to develop into and survive as 
independent agents in the world as it is likely to exist for their lifetimes.”184  
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Unfortunately, Somin points out, there is extensive disagreement over just what these 
essentials are, and Shapiro never makes any real effort to develop and defend an account 
of them.  He does provide one example as an illustration:  the employer who can fire an 
employee in a world where there is no unemployment compensation can threaten an 
employee’s basic interests.  Somin does not find this example compelling.  Its value is far 
from obvious, she says, and it involves all sorts of unexpressed assumptions about, e.g., 
labor markets, alternative employers, and so on.  And although Shapiro says he need not 
attempt to resolve these issues right away, Somin insists that “some degree of resolution 
is essential if we are to understand what Shapiro’s theory entails and what its institutional 
implications are for democracy.”185
 While much of what Somin says is true, I do not think this is a serious problem 
for  Shapiro.  Shapiro says that his view is one of a family of “resourcist” views.  He 
includes Rawls, Dworkin and Sen in this group, because each offers a list of basic goods, 
the possession of which would make possible the pursuit of any one of a number of 
different conceptions of the good.186  Presumably, then, Shapiro’s list of essentials would 
be similar to these others, if he were to flesh it out. 
 I think that Shapiro’s goal is broader or bigger than Somin gives him credit for.  
That is, I think Somin’s criticism is unfair in a way.  Shapiro is not really worried about 
exactly what the essentials are, but is instead trying to show how some set of essentials 
(however defined) might serve as a sound normative foundation and practical guideline 
for democratic reform.  His goal is really just to set out the broad terms of his novel 
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approach to democratic theory.  Someone will eventually have to develop and defend a 
list of basic interests, and explain their implications for democratic theory and practice, as 
part of the long-term evaluation of Shapiro’s proposal.  But Shapiro’s goal in The State of 
Democratic Theory is just to get this view off the ground, so he can be excused for 
glossing over some of the details. 
 
Good Faith Disagreement over Basic Interests. 
 
 A more serious problem for Shapiro is the fact that citizens can and do disagree in 
good faith over just what our basic interests are.187  In fact, good faith disagreement is a 
problem for all respect for interest views.  On respect for interest views, the moral 
underpinning of political authority (whether we are talking about legitimacy or political 
obligation) is the fact that some political arrangement or action protects or secures some 
normatively significant basic interest(s) of citizens.188  In the case of legitimacy, this fact 
is said to give the government normative justification to enforce laws, and to give citizens 
sound normative reason to acquiesce to the government’s demands.  In the case of 
political obligation, this fact is said to obligate citizens to obey the government or its 
laws.  The fundamental problem with all respect for interest views is the fact that citizens 
can and do disagree in good faith over when their basic interests are being met or 
threatened. 
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fundamental rights.  See his Law and Disagreement, Chapter 10, where he argues that philosophers “have 
reason—grounded in professional humility—to be more than usually hesitant about the enactment of any 
canonical list of rights, particularly if the aim is to put that canon beyond the scope of ordinary political 
debate and revision” (p. 212). 
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119 
 In Shapiro’s case, the basic interest in question is our interest in avoiding 
domination.  For him, the moral underpinning of democratic political authority is the fact 
that democracy represents our best chance at securing for all citizens the essentials they 
need to develop into and survive as independent agents in the world.  But what exactly 
are these essentials?  Somin points out that citizens disagree about this, but she misreads 
the significance of this fact.  The problem is not that we cannot develop lists of such 
essentials, but that citizens will always disagree about what it means to have their basic 
interests threatened, or what it means to be dominated. 
 One might defend Shapiro by pointing out that he does not claim that democracy 
eradicates domination, but only that it will do a better job of minimizing domination than 
other available forms of government.  It is reasonable to disagree about exactly how 
much democracy can reduce domination, and exactly when it does reduce it, but it is not 
reasonable to claim that democracy is not the best form of government for reducing 
domination overall.  This response does not solve the problem.  First, Shapiro never 
actually compares democracy with other available forms of government.  He never 
indicates what these other forms might be, or makes any effort to demonstrate their 
inferiority to democracy.  Second, and more importantly, this response seems to overlook 
Shapiro’s claim that what he is after is a way of morally grounding institutional reform, 
and not a way of defending democracy as such.  On his view, democracy already has 
legitimacy in the world.  The justificatory claim is not the one that he wants to defend.  
What he seeks is an account of democracy’s constitutive elements that shows it in its best 
light (even if that light is fairly dim) and that allows us to make meaningful institutional 
reforms.  This is where the problem of reasonable disagreement crops up. 
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 Shapiro claims that institutional reforms are positive to the extent that they make 
government more responsive to the citizens whose basic interests are at stake in any 
given situation.  But what are these basic interests?  People reasonably disagree about 
what these are.  Some citizens think women have a basic interest in abortion, and some 
disagree.  So is legislation prohibiting women from getting abortions a threat to their 
basic interests or not?  Some citizens think homosexuals have a basic interest in marriage, 
and others disagree.  So is legislation prohibiting gay marriage a threat to the basic 
interests of gays or not?  Some citizens think we have a basic interest in keeping guns for 
protection, and some disagree.  So does gun control legislation threaten basic interests or 
not?  And so on at the level of actual policy. 
 One might respond that this objection misses the point.  What institutional reform 
needs to protect is the right to democratic participation, to a say in what policies will be 
enacted.  This possible response has several problems.  First, Shapiro’s stated 
understanding of our basic interests seems to be broader than this.  He identifies basic 
interests with the essentials people need to survive as independent agents.  This requires 
more than democratic participation.  Second, citizens disagree in good faith over what it 
means to make government more responsive.  There are many good faith disagreements 
over what kind of democratic institutions we ought to have, even if we understand the 
purpose of democracy to be limited to non-domination.189  For instance, should we have 
winner take all democracy, or some form of proportional representation?  Is it better to 
                                                 
189   For an introduction to the breadth and depth of reasonable disagreement over democratic institutions, 
see R. A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, Thomas Christiano, ed., Philosophy and Democracy (New 
York:  Oxford University Press, 2003), and R. A. Dahl, I. Shapiro, and J. A. Cheibub, eds., The Democracy 
Sourcebook (Cambridge, Ma.:  MIT Press, 2003).  
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have a parliamentary or a presidential system?  Citizens will disagree in good faith about 
how to answer such questions. 
 The point of this is that there is no obvious way to answer the question of just 
which democratic institutions best serve the common good, even when the common good 
is understood thinly as a each person’s common interest in avoiding domination.  People 
can and do disagree over what even something as thin as this might require. 
 
No Restrictions on Reasons. 
 
 Shapiro does not place any restrictions on the kinds of reasons that government 
officials may reasonably appeal to when making decisions regarding law.  What matters 
is that basic interests of citizens are met, and that they have the potential means to 
remove public officials from office when they judge that others might better protect them.  
But it does not matter to Shapiro why officials make the decisions they do.  For example, 
Shapiro seems to allow public officials to shape public policy in ways intended solely to 
promote their perceived self-interest, just so long as this activity does not threaten the 
basic interests of citizens.  This is troubling.  For example, if this is a theory of 
legitimacy, the idea seems to be roughly that democratic officials have sufficient 
normative justification to enforce the law, just as long as the law does not threaten the 
basic interests of citizens.  It does not matter if this is why officials enforce the law, nor 
does it matter that they may have intentionally shaped the law to maximally promote their 
own self-interest.  And citizens have sound reason to acquiesce, just because their 
political system meets their basic interests better than alternatives, but regardless of 
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exactly why their public officials make the demands they do on citizens, or whether or 
not the law is intended to benefit them in some way.  This is a problem, because under 
these conditions, citizens can reasonably regard government action as directed only at 
official self-interest.  Officials need not be concerned with the basic interests of citizens, 
just so long as their personal political agendas are more amenable to the basic interests of 
citizens than their competitors.  Competitive elections will drive out powerful political 
agents who show too little regard for the interests of citizens, but it does not guarantee 
that those interests will be seen as a priority by officials, or serve even as a reason for 
acting.  Nevertheless, competitive elections may ensure that the basic interests of citizens 
are met, even if they are met accidentally or peripherally. 
 
The Lesser of Two Evils. 
 
 Shapiro argues that competitive democracy makes politicians more responsive to 
voters because politicians depend on voters to win access to political power.  It would be 
a mistake, though, to think that this means that competition will lead to ever-increasing 
improvements in the social goods offered to voters by politicians.  The analogy to 
economic competition might suggest that some political version of Adam Smith’s 
invisible hand will force bad politicians out and lead good politicians to offer more and 
more to voters.  But this will not work any better in politics than it does in markets. 
Whether or not such improvements are offered depends on who chooses to run for office, 
and what they offer to citizens.  Shapiro and Schumpeter’s analogy may deserve greater 
scrutiny.  In Shapiro’s democracy, all a politician needs to do to win is offer more than 
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her competitors.  This may not be very much.  What this suggests is that Shapiro’s market 
analogy deserves further scrutiny.  Still, electoral competition does guarantee citizens the 
potential means to choose the least of the evils they face.  This should count for 
something. 
 
The Problem of Benign Neglect. 
 
 Power friendly views of democracy may be susceptible to the problem of benign 
neglect.  When the right to exercise power and the duty to obey or acquiesce are divorced 
from consensus, it becomes possible for the minority to become bound to the will of the 
majority, even when the majority ignore the judgments of the minority.  In this case, the 
citizens are sovereign in name only.  They practice self-rule only to the extent that they 
get to choose the least objectionable option offered to them.  Citizens get to choose which 
powerful agents will control their government, but they otherwise have no meaningful 
role to play in the myriad governmental decisions that will shape much of their lives.  
And it is entirely possible that some segment of society will always lose, and never have 
even the minimal say in how things are organized that you get from choosing political 
officials.  This is a problem, because democracy has a constitutive commitment to 
meaningful participation. 
 Shapiro’s proposed competitive democracy may be particularly susceptible to the 
problem of benign neglect.  Shapiro holds that democracy deserves our allegiance 
because it represents our best chance at minimizing domination.  This is a very weak 
understanding of democracy’s constitutive commitments.  It seems to allow citizens to be 
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pushed to the margins of society, just so long as their essential interests are not 
threatened.  Or, rather, it holds that a citizen is not marginalized, as long as her basic 
interests are met. 
 For instance, it is not hard to imagine the Christian right coming together in an 
effort to control U.S. politics.  We can imagine them making many of their political 
decisions solely on the basis of their Christian convictions, regardless of the fact that 
others disagree with them in good faith over the nature of the good life for human beings, 
and over the proper role of religious convictions in democratic politics.  We can imagine 
further that opponents of the Christian right are marginalized and have no effective or 
real role to play in their politics.  Now, my point here is not that it is wrong to base voting 
or other political activity on religious convictions (though this issue will come up later).  
My point is rather that this provides an example of what I mean by benign neglect.  The 
Christian right might have no reason and no interest in considering the views of non-
Christians when making political decisions that affect everyone.  This would not 
necessarily mean that the fundamental interests of non-Christians would be in danger.  





Is Shapiro’s Democracy a Stable and Realistic Utopia? 
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 Rawls was very concerned about the ways that the fundamental social and 
political institutions in a society might shape or influence the character of citizens raised 
under them.  One reason for his concern has to do with his understanding of the proper 
role of political philosophy.  One of its most important functions is to give citizens a 
reasonable hope for their society, and thus to give them reason to participate in good 
faith.  Another reason has to do with stability.  Political institutions deemed unattractive 
by citizens—as immoral, unfair, unjust, or what have you—will not be voluntarily 
maintained by citizens.  Such institutions will be unstable and may fall, unless they are 
propped up by force.  Neither option is attractive, so we should aim to avoid this 
problem.  But it is not clear that Shapiro’s view provides the kind of utopian vision that 
we can reasonably expect citizens to freely and willingly endorse. 
 It is hard to imagine citizens having much faith in Shapiro’s democracy.  It is not 
an attractive vision of democratic politics, and is certainly not the kind of political society 
likely to inspire anything in citizens but apathy, cynicism, and hopelessness.  It falls well 
short of many of the ideals citizens voice regarding democratic politics, and seems 
instead to be exactly the kind of political society that many citizens claim to reject.  To 
the extent that it seems unfair, or unjust, or immoral to citizens, we have reason to 
wonder if it could and would be voluntarily affirmed and maintained by citizens. 
 This is, of course, mere speculation.  How citizens might be shaped by Shapiro’s 
democracy is ultimately an empirical question that only time can answer.  The same is 
true of the question of whether or not citizens might come to voluntarily affirm and 
maintain it.  But this sort of speculation is one way of testing an account of democratic 
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politics.  We can make some educated guesses about Shapiro’s democratic citizens might 
eventually become, and I think we might have reason to worry. 
 
Summary of Key Points. 
 
 Shapiro correctly judges that our worries about democracy’s alleged irrationality 
may be overblown.  It can protect important basic interests of democratic citizens, and in 
this limited sense can promote the common good.  Further, hierarchical relationships are 
not necessarily immoral or unjust.  This seems obvious, but it has long been a bone of 
contention in political philosophy.  But under the conditions of modernity, it is a mistake 
to think that politics can work without exercises of power under conditions of good faith 
disagreement and dissent. 
 Unfortunately, the widespread belief among democratic citizens that non-
domination is the best they can hope for from their political order may not be sufficient to 
sustain a reasonable hope for their future or the future of their society.  It may end up 
encouraging only cynicism and apathy, and not conscientious and thoughtful 
participation.  The problem of benign neglect, which may plague all power friendly 
views, seems especially troubling for Shapiro’s democracy.  We will have to see if other 




Jeremy Waldron and Majority Rule. 
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 Citizens in modern democracies disagree not only about the nature of the good for 
human beings, but also about political issues such as what justice requires.  Citizens 
disagree about how to order fundamental but abstract political rights like liberty and 
equality, and even citizens who agree on how to order these abstract values are likely to 
disagree over just what particular rights follow from them.  In Law and Disagreement and 
The Dignity of Legislation, Jeremy Waldron argues that decisions reached by majority 
rule deserve a certain kind of respect from all citizens, even from those who reasonably 
disagree with the outcome on the grounds that it is unjust in some way.190  Majority rule 
is often denigrated by legal theorists, many of whom feel that it amounts to little more 
than a mindless counting of heads.  This hardly seems like a reasoned way of resolving 
disagreements over matters of principle and complex social policy.  Surely something as 
important as law ought to result from reasoned debate and reflect some rational 
consensus as to what ought to be done.  Waldron argues that this is a mistake.  Rational 
consensus is not possible.  However, this does not mean that majoritarianism is nothing 
more than the least worst option.  Majoritarianism deserves more respect than it gets, 
because law produced in this fashion represents a significant social achievement—action 
in concert in the face of deep disagreement.  This is the ultimate basis of legal authority 
for Waldron.  But majoritarianism has other virtues as well.  It has the “technical” virtue 
of not assuming controversial normative positions, it respects disagreements about justice 
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and the common good, and it embodies a principle of respect for each person in the 
process by which laws are made. 
 Waldron’s view is a weak shared reason view.  It requires both reciprocity in 
advantage and reciprocity in justification.  Reciprocity in advantage in satisfied by the 
appeal to our common interest in important social goods achieved through law, and to 
each person’s interest in having a political system that respects her as a voter.  Waldron 
also appeals to reciprocity in justification, because he holds that the law’s normativity 
also requires that citizens participate in good faith.  This means citizens must base their 
votes on their considered and sincere views about justice or the common good, and not 
solely on their sense of their own narrow self-interest.  Unfortunately, Waldron never 
explains just what this requires of citizens.  This is a significant oversight.  Soper and 
Rawls, discussed in Chapters 3 and 4 respectively, do offer accounts of what it means to 
responsibly engage in public political activity.  In this way their views represent 
important correctives or extensions of views like Waldron’s. 
 
Waldron’s Method and Purpose. 
 
 One of Waldron’s aims is to correct an imbalance he finds in political theory 
today.191  The same political theorists who denigrate majoritarianism and legislation write 
in rosy terms about the courts and judicial review as sources of law.  Majority rule has 
been marginalized by political theorists.  Empirical research on legislation reveals the 
practice to involve deal-making, pandering, pork-barreling, Arrovian cycling, and a host 
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of other activities that suggest to many that it is anything but principled political decision 
making.  As a result, many question the law’s claimed authority.  But some are now 
beginning to defend legislation against such criticisms.  For example, there is a growing 
body of evidence that suggests that legislatures generally do not act in the irrational or 
manipulated ways that Condorcet and Arrow predict.  Nevertheless, many are still 
skeptical about the possibility of virtuous civic deliberation in legislatures.  Legislation is 
often treated as a last-ditch means of producing law, to be tolerated only until a more 
refined and reasoned method becomes available.  Until then, we have institutions like 
judicial review to protect us from our legislators.  In fact, though, while a great deal has 
been said about how judicial review ought to get done, relatively little has been said 
about whether or not it is justified.  Political theorists tend to move quickly from their 
dim accounts of the failure of legislation to their rosy accounts of how the courts can save 
us.  But Waldron wonders why we think the courts are any less messy than legislatures.  
The collective rationality problems that plague legislatures apply equally to courts as 
deliberative bodies.  This, then, is the imbalance Waldron wants to correct.  He wants to 
develop a rosy picture of majoritarianism and legislation as sources of law. 
 The many books and articles that disparage the legislative process work to 
undermine the claimed authority of law produced by legislatures.  Waldron works against 
this trend, by developing an admittedly rosy normative account of legislation and law that 
links the law’s claimed authority to the legislative process.  He admits that this may seem 
naïve, but this does not mean that he is satisfied with the conditions of the enactment of 
law today.  To the contrary, he feels we have good reason to be cautious about the law’s 
claimed authority in our current situation.  But “unless we propose to treat the authority 
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claimed for legislation as pure superstition, eventually that claim requires philosophical 
explication.”192  This explication is what Waldron attempts to provide.  In any case, even 
if one judges that the conditions of the enactment of law today invalidate the law’s 
claimed authority, there is still value in describing the conditions under which law would 
have genuine authority.  We need to know what we should measure the current context of 
law-making against. 
 Waldron spends a good deal of time performing a detailed normative analysis of 
important structural features of legislatures.  Three important features are textuality, 
intention, and voting.  The issue of textuality has to do with the fact that laws are written 
down, that a statute is in actuality an enacted form of words.  The issue of intent has to do 
with just how we are to understand what a legislature meant to do when it enacted some 
particular form of words and not another.  Both of these issues are complicated by the 
fact that legislatures are composed of individuals who have and represent diverse points 
of view. 
 The third issue is voting.  Voting has a bad name:  “It seems so mindless—
counting heads and letting a single vote at the margin decide, when what is at stake is 
some great issue of principle or some complex matter of policy.”193  But Waldron thinks 
voting deserves a better hearing.  In his defense of voting, Waldron switches his attention 
from legislatures and representative democracy to direct democracy.  In a representative 
democracy, citizens (usually) vote only for representatives, and their representatives vote 
on laws and policies.  This adds a layer of complexity that Waldron wishes to avoid in his 
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project.  His normative analysis thus focuses on direct democracy, in which citizens vote 
directly on issues that affect them and their society.  He confesses that this is one of the 
main failings of his argument in Law and Disagreement, but it cannot be helped.  His 
purpose is to sketch out the broad outline of a new and better understanding of 
democratic law and authority, and for this purpose theorizing direct democracy is 
sufficient, even if not ideal. 
 My analysis will focus on Waldron’s account of voting.  His normative analysis 
of the other features of legislatures is important, but his understanding of democratic law 
and authority are most directly linked to his arguments about the kind of achievement 
majority decision making represents, and the way majority rule respects citizens. 
  
The Achievement of Law in the Circumstances of Politics. 
 
 One of the main demands that the law makes is that citizens comply with it.  
However, the law makes other demands too.  One of these is a demand for recognition or 
a certain kind of respect.  In Waldron’s words, the law demands “that we not immediately 
disparage it” as an enactment, or simply try to get around it.  This does not mean that 
respect for the law forbids us from seeking to overturn or repeal it.  It has more to do with 
the attitude people have toward the initial enactment.  What the law demands is this: 
It is a demand for a certain kind of recognition, and, as I said, respect—that this, 
for the time being, is what the community has come up with and that it should not 
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be ignored or disparaged simply because some of us propose, when we can, to 
repeal it.194
The law makes this demand even of people who think the law is a mistake.  This demand 
for respect is not predicated on the moral worth or the correctness of the law’s content, 
but on something else.  For Waldron, this something else has to do with the special 
virtues of voting and majority decision making.  He puts it this way: 
The dignity of legislation, the ground of its authority, and its claim to be respected 
by us, has to do with the sort of achievement it is.  Our respect for legislation is in 
part the tribute we should pay to the achievement of concerted, cooperative, 
coordinated, or collective action in the circumstances of modern life.195
The circumstances of modern life Waldron refers to he calls the Circumstances of 
Politics. 
 Two conditions characterize the Circumstances of Politics.196  The first condition 
is disagreement among citizens over what laws and policies are best in terms of justice 
and the common good.  The second condition is the felt need among the citizens for 
large-scale coordinated action.  Most of us understand that many important goods can 
only be achieved through the concerted and coordinated efforts of large numbers of 
individuals.  Protecting the environment, operating a health care system, maintaining the 
conditions necessary for the operation of a market economy, and so on, all require that 
large numbers of citizens act in concert by following a variety of rules, practices and 
procedures.  These goods will disappear if citizens do not act together.  For this reason, 
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many of us think we should act and organize things together.  This sort of coordinated 
activity is not easy to achieve, especially when individuals realize that large-scale 
coordination often requires the sacrifice of individual projects.  Thus, when citizens come 
together and actually enact a law, despite their disagreements about exactly what should 
be done, it is a big achievement.  Law commands respect as one kind of embodiment of 
that achievement.197
 Waldron draws out his understanding of the Circumstances of Politics by 
comparing three kinds of coordinated action problem (CAP).198  Two kinds of CAP are 
Prisoners’ Dilemmas (PD) and pure Coordination Problems (CP).  Since most are 
familiar with the PD, I won’t rehearse the details of the thought experiment here.  The 
point of the PD is that sometimes the rational strategy—judged from the perspective of 
individual self-interest—actually prevents individuals from reaching the outcome 
preferred by all.  The CP is exemplified by the driving example.  In the driving example, 
motorists can drive on either the right or the left side of the road.  The best pay-off is 
achieved when all motorists choose to drive on the same side of the road, but it doesn’t 
matter which side of the road they choose.  Each chooser prefers either of two 
coordinated outcomes to non-coordination, but choosers have no real preference for one 
coordinated outcome over the other.  All that matters is that they coordinate their activity 
by choosing to do the same thing. 
 Law can contribute to the solutions of both PD’s and CP’s.  In the case of PD’s, 
law can provide an incentive/sanction that discourages choosers from giving in to the 
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temptation represented by the difference in value between S and Q.  In the case of CP’s, 
law can mark either doing X or doing Y as salient for choosers, thereby making 
coordinated activity more likely.  But neither the PD nor the CP capture the 
Circumstances of Politics.  For this we need a Partial Conflict coordination problem (PC). 
 The PC best represents Waldron’s understanding of law and the Circumstances of 
Politics.199  In the PC, each chooser prefers either of two coordinated outcomes to non-
coordination, but they differ over which coordinated outcome they prefer.  One example 
of a PC is the “Battle of the Sexes:”  “he prefers to go to a boxing match, she prefers to 
the ballet; but most of all they want to go out together rather than each to his or her 
favourite entertainment alone.”200  Waldron does not claim that law solves PC’s, and that 
this is why we should respect it.  Of course, law can contribute to the solution of PC’s, by 
attaching sanctions to the options in ways the reduce the difference in value between P 
and Q.  But this is not what grounds the law’s claim to respect.  Before sanctions can be 
attached to any outcomes, “the society must have decided which of the coordinative 
outcomes to select as the one to be bolstered by sanctions in this way.”201  Any group 
decision of this sort is an important social achievement, and “it is by embodying that 
achievement that law commands our respect.”202
 Raz argues that pure CP’s (e.g., the driving example) tell us little about legal 
authority, because many legal rules simply don’t resemble these problems.  For instance, 
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“laws like the prohibition of rape and murder differ from laws which coordinate the 
efforts of large groups.”203  Waldron admits this, and also that it would be a mistake to 
force laws of all kinds into one group.  But he discusses one of Raz’s examples, to 
demonstrate how PC’s might be more useful than Raz imagines. 
 In his discussion of rape law, Raz argues correctly that our reasons for refraining 
from rape should have nothing to do with respect for law, and everything to do with 
respect for persons.  And our reasons have little to do with collective action:  rape is 
wrong, even if it is a common practice.  So, Raz concludes, analysis of rape law in terms 
of collective action problems looks like a non-starter.  But Waldron points out that the 
issue is more complicated than Raz realizes.  For when we consider the controversial 
aspects of rape law, we can see that many legal issues do resemble PC’s.  Many aspects 
of rape law are controversial, such as statutory rape, marital rape, homosexual rape, the 
possibility of inferred consent, the bases on which consent might be inferred, mistakes 
about consent, and so on.  Reasonable people will disagree on such issues.  Nevertheless, 
we may all share an interest in a common scheme of rape law that deals with these 
matters.  Each of us may prefer some rape law, even rape law we oppose, if the option is 
no rape law, or rape law that is limited only to uncontroversial and simple matters.  
Waldron’s point is that when we move from simple prohibitions (e.g., rape is wrong) to 
the complex sets of rules and procedures that are law (e.g., contemporary rape law), it 
appears that law is more like a PC than Raz understands. 
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 I think Waldron makes a good point here, but I still think this is a problem  for 
him.  I am not convinced that Waldron’s account is general enough to account for respect 
for law as such.  If not, his account may be inadequate and we will have to consider 
whether a partial account of respect for law can help us.  But for now I just want to get 
his view on the table, so I will set aside further discussion of this issue until later in this 
chapter.  My point now is to emphasize the nature of the claim law makes for respect.  
When people are able to produce law in the circumstances of politics, they have achieved 
something important.  The law deserves respect because it embodies this social 
achievement.  But so far Waldron has said little about majoritarianism.  There are a 
number of ways that laws might be produced under the circumstances of politics.  Does 
law produced through majoritarianism have any special claim on us?  Yes it does, 
Waldron argues, because of certain special features of majoritarianism. 
 
The Virtues of Majoritarianism. 
 
 Laws produced through majoritarian decision procedures deserve respect from 
citizens because they embody a significant social achievement in the circumstances of 
politics.  But majoritarianism has other virtues as well.  First, it has the “technical” virtue 
of not assuming controversial moral positions.  Second, it respects individual citizens by 
taking seriously the disagreements that divide them.  Third, it embodies a principle of 




The Virtue of “Technicality.”204
 
 In the Circumstances of Politics, it is important that a group’s decision procedure 
be a neutral, technical device.  Suppose we feel we have good reason to act together, but 
we disagree about what we should do.  Suppose too that we face a rapidly approaching 
deadline—that if we don’t act now, we will surely lose the good we might have gained 
from some (from any) concerted action.  In this situation, we might settle on a common 
course of action by tossing a coin.  But would a decision reached by a coin toss deserve 
any respect?  It would, insofar as a coin toss is neutral between our choices.  That is, a 
coin toss can be seen by all not to assume any substantive values that might bias it toward 
one or the other of the options that we might pursue as a group.  A bit of 
anthropomorphism may help to make this clear:  the tossed coin appeals to no substantive 
values when making its choice—it simply chooses one or another of the options before it.  
The coin’s special virtue is that it really is a neutral agent.  Waldron argues that 
majoritarianism has this same virtue.  He is not claiming, though, that majoritarianism is 
a better decision procedure than others because it alone has this virtue.  Many arbitrary 
decision procedures share it.  What Waldron does here is cut off an objection to 
majoritarianism, namely, the objection that it is morally suspect because it amounts to a 
“mere” headcount or a coin-toss. 
 Some complain about this neutral or technical aspect of voting.  To many, voting 
is a poor decision procedure just because it appears to be arbitrary.  If voting is really just 
counting heads, then it is not a reasoned decision procedure.  Well, so what?  We must 
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take care when creating law, because the dangers of oppression and injustice are serious 
and real.  Creating law through a reasoned process seems to be important, because of the 
high stakes of questions of policy, morality, and justice.  But voting—if it is really just 
counting heads—does not seem to the kind of careful and reasoned process that justice 
requires.  It seems a lot like flipping a coin.  Surely the authority of law requires more 
than this.  Why take law seriously when it is enacted in such an arbitrary way?  The 
problem with reasoned decision procedures is that they tend to invoke controversial 
values. 
 Suppose, Waldron says, that some of us face a Partial Conflict (PC) decision-
problem regarding a matter M.  We agree that the common policies under consideration 
(X and Y) are each preferable to no policy, but we disagree about which policy to enact.  
Some of us think it is better to follow X, and some of us think it is better to follow Y.  
Each policy X and Y requires individuals to play an independent but necessary part in the 
common scheme.  No one has good reason to think that one of us is a better judge of M 
than any of the others.  We have to find a way of choosing a common policy that all of us 
can participate in, despite our disagreements about what to do.  We know that this won’t 
work:  “each does whatever he thinks it is important to do about M.”  We need a way to 
identify one of the policies as “ours” that does not depend on any criterion such as “what 
it is important to do about M,” because disagreement over this issue is why we face a 
decision problem in the first place.  So the way we identify a policy as ours must be 
arbitrary in relation to our different understandings of “what it is important to do about 
M.”  Majority voting satisfies this requirement.  Each of us can see that (say) Y is the 
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policy favored by the majority, regardless of how we individually feel about Y as a 
response to M. 
 
Respect for Disagreement. 
 
 Another virtue Waldron sees in majoritarian decision making is the way it 
respects disagreements about justice and the common good.205  Majoritarianism “does not 
require anyone’s view to be played down or hushed up because of the fancied importance 
of consensus.”206  Majoritarianism does not pretend there is consensus when there really 
is not.  It does not pretend that opposing views do not exist.  And more importantly, it 
does not treat opposing views “as beneath notice in respectable deliberation by assuming 
that it is ignorant or prejudiced or self-interested or based on insufficient contemplation 
of moral reality.”207  Waldron sees this as a dangerous temptation.  It is right to think that 
truth about justice and the common good are important.  But it is mistake to think that 
consensus is the natural expression of our search for truth, and dangerous to think that 
some special explanation—defects of character or mind—are needed to excuse our 
failure to reach consensus. 
 Waldron argues that it is wrong to think that consensus is the natural expression 
of our search for truth.  In defending his claim he draws on Rawls’s burdens of judgment.  
These burdens are “the many hazards involved in the correct (and conscientious) exercise 
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of our powers of reason and judgment in the ordinary course of political life.” 208  
Roughly put, Rawls’s claim is that citizens trying to answer questions that involve 
abstract value judgments and complex empirical issues will inevitably reach different 
conclusions.  Given the imperfect and limited nature of our common human reason, and 
peoples’ different experiences and social positions, it is just not reasonable to expect even 
conscientious persons who possess full powers of rationality to reach the same conclusion 
on many important questions about human life.  Waldron argues that the burdens of 
judgment apply not only to disagreements over the nature of the good for human beings, 
but also to disagreement over justice and the common good.  Thus, it is simply 
unreasonable to expect citizens to reach a consensus on political questions.  
Majoritarianism takes seriously the burdens of judgment and their implications for human 
political activity. 
 Thus, Waldron argues, we ought to reject the “dangerous temptation” to see our 
inability to reach consensus on important questions as a failure somehow rooted in the 
ignorance or selfishness of our fellow citizens.  In fact, Waldron claims that most citizens 
do act conscientiously, that is, from their own considered and impartial understandings of 
justice and the common good.209  We tend to doubt this when people disagree with us, but 
Waldron says that our reasons for this doubt are often “quite disreputable.”  This does not 
mean that citizens never fail to act conscientiously.  Still, it is better overall—less 
disrespectful—to acknowledge that disagreement is often quite reasonable. 
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 None of this implies that we must reject the search for a singular truth.  Waldron 
is not arguing for a kind of relativism.  Rather, “respect has to do with how we treat each 
other’s beliefs about justice in circumstances where none of them is self-certifying, and 
not how we treat the truth about justice itself.”210  And he is not talking about fallibility, 
though no one ought to ignore the possibility that they may be wrong about justice.  
Rather, each of us must understand that ours is not the only mind working on our 
problems, and that it is not unexpected or unreasonable for citizens to disagree about how 
to solve them. 
 
Respect for Individuals. 
 
 Majoritarianism respects individuals by giving each a full and equal say in 
collective decision-making.211  Waldron illustrates this point by comparing 
majoritarianism to the coin toss and the Hobbesian sovereign as decision-methods. 
 The coin toss has virtues that make it a respectable method for making collective 
decisions under certain conditions, but it does not respect citizens in the way the 
majoritarianism does.  Unlike majoritarianism, the coin toss does not give “positive 
decisional weight” to the fact that a given individual holds a view.  Waldron’s view here 
is more or less the same as Ackerman’s idea of “minimal decisiveness.”212  Ackerman 
illustrates this idea in terms of tie-breaking: 
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If, say, there are 99 people in the Assembly, then majority-rule gives me a 
decisive voice when the rest of you are split 49-49; and the same is true of your 
decision as well.  When confronted with the prospect of a tied vote, the 
majoritarian does not appeal to some unresponsive decision-procedure, but 
instead recognizes each citizen’s right to have his considered judgment determine 
the social outcome.213
The problem with the coin toss, says Ackerman, is that it does not give each citizen’s 
view minimal decisiveness.  Waldron agrees:  majoritarianism’s special value over the 
coin toss is that it holds that “in the case of each individual, the fact that that individual 
favours option X is a reason for the group to pursue option X.”  One individual’s 
judgment does not constitute a conclusive reason for the group to act, of course, because 
there is disagreement, but it counts in favor of the group’s doing X.  This is one important 
way that majoritarianism respects each person. 
 Consideration of the Hobbesian method reveals another way that majoritarianism 
respects individuals.  The Hobbesian method gives great weight to the fact that one 
individual holds a certain view, and relatively little weight to the fact that others hold 
different views.  But it is not the case that the Hobbesian ignores disagreement.  Rather, 
the way the Hobbesian handles disagreement is to put one person—the sovereign—in 
charge of everyone else.  Majoritarianism is preferable to the Hobbesian method because 
it “involves a commitment to give equal weight to each person’s view in the process by 
which one view is selected as the group’s.”214  In fact, Waldron says, majoritarianism 
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gives each person’s view the greatest weight possible without giving any person’s view 
more weight than any other’s. 
 Thus, majoritarianism respects each individual in the process of selecting the 
group’s view on some issue.  In contrast to the coin toss, majoritarianism makes each 
person’s view minimally decisive, by making sure that each person’s view counts as a 
reason for the group to pursue some course of action.  And in contrast to the Hobbesian 
method, majoritarianism makes each person’s view maximally decisive, by giving it the 
greatest weight possible consistent with the equal weighting of other persons’ views. 
 
Summing Up Respect for Law. 
 
 To sum up, law produced through majoritarian decision procedures deserves our 
respect for several reasons.  First, law produced this way embodies an important social 
achievement in the Circumstances of Politics.  Second, majoritarianism has the technical 
virtue of not assuming controversial moral positions.  It is a neutral decision procedure.  
Third, majoritarianism respects disagreements between citizens.  It does not try to quiet 
anyone in the name of some (implausible) ideal of consensus.  Fourth, the majoritarian 
process respects the contribution of each individual, by giving each person’s view both 






The Authority of Law. 
 
 Although Waldron feels that he has shown why law produced through 
majoritarian decision procedures deserves the respect of all citizens, he admits that he has 
yet to account for “the sense of constraint associated with authority.”215  Waldron is not 
very clear here, but I think he is referring to the fact that law binds citizens.  Waldron 
seems to be saying that it is one thing to show that law has genuine normative force, and 
another thing to show why we ought to feel bound to enforce and obey the law.  
Majoritarianism has virtues that make it a respectable source of law.  This is why law 
does not lose its claim to normativity just because it is enacted through majority decision.  
For example, rape law does not lose its claim to being genuine law just because it is 
enacted through a statistical and mechanical “head count.”  But this does not explain how 
the law binds us.  The law requires us to act in certain ways.  This constraining sense of 
the authority of legislation is missing from his account of majoritarianism.  This is not a 
flaw in his account, he says; it is just that the source of the law’s normativity is a bit 
different from the source of its binding force.  The constraining sense of law’s authority  
must come primarily from our sense of the moral urgency and importance of the 
problems that it is necessary for us to address—the things that (morally) need to 
be done and must be done by us, in our millions, together, if they are to be done at 
all.216
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The source of the law’s binding force is our shared sense of the moral importance of the 
social issues that require concerted action. 
 
The Authority of Law and the Moral Attitude. 
 
 Waldron assumes in his account that citizens generally base their votes on their 
considered and impartial opinions about justice and the common good.217  He does not 
spend a lot of time on this, but it is an important part of the authority of legislation as he 
understands it.  Citizens must vote responsibly if the law is to have genuine authority.  If 
citizens vote solely out of self-interest, the authority of legislation comes into question.    
But Waldron doesn’t worry much about this, because he thinks that, as an empirical 
matter, people generally do vote for the right kinds of reasons.  In any case, he has also 
stated that his work is an effort at ideal theory.  His goal is to draw a rosy picture of 
majoritarianism, in order to show how and why it might be a normatively respectable 
source of law.  He is trying to show how it could be the case that law produced through 
majoritarian institutions is dignified.  Still, it is reasonable to think that some citizens will 
always vote out of self-interest.  And it is reasonable to think that even responsible 
citizens will sometimes slip up, disregarding their considered and impartial opinions, and 
voting out of self-interest.  So one issue we need to consider is the possibility of a mixed 
situation, in which some citizens base their votes on their views on justice, and others on 
self-interest.  Waldron anticipates this possibility, and says that if it happens, “we must 
                                                 
217   Waldron, Law and Disagreement, pp. 14-5. 
146 
face the fact that we have a mixed and indeterminate situation so far as legitimacy and 
authority are concerned.”218
   In effect, Waldron acknowledges the problem and then puts it off for another day.  
This is not a problem, really, since Waldron admits that this work is ideal.  Nevertheless, 
there are a host of questions raised by the possibility of a “mixed and indeterminate” 
situation, and I want to list a few of them here. 
 
(a) Is there some minimum percentage of voters that must be reached before 
legislation can be said to have any authority at all?  If so, what is this threshold?  
Must at least half of all citizens vote responsibly, i.e., on their considered and 
impartial convictions about justice and the common good?  I think the figure 
should be higher than one percent, but that one-hundred percent is too much to 
expect.  So what number between these is appropriate?  Are all choices arbitrary?  
Is a simple majority sufficient? 
 
(b) If a politician wins an election largely as a result of irresponsible voting among 
her supporters, does this pollute her authority?  Does it mean that every time she 
votes (in Congress), her vote is suspect, even if she votes according to her own 
considered opinions about justice? 
 
(c) Would it be better to think of legislation as having authority just to the degree that 
citizens voted responsibly?  In other words, should we think of policies as more or 
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less authoritative, depending on just what percentage of citizens voted 
responsibly? 
 
(d) What are citizens supposed to make of legislation whose authority is “mixed and 
indeterminate”?  How is it supposed to factor into their calculations about how to 
act? 
 
(e) What if citizens disagree about what counts as responsible voting?  For example, 
what if one citizen’s understanding of justice appears to be absurd or 
unreasonable to another citizen?  What if one citizen’s understanding of justice is 
based on moral and metaphysical beliefs not shared by most other citizens?  What 
is citizens disagree in good faith over whether some particular vote was cast from 
self-interest alone? 
 
Despite these problems, I believe that Waldron is right to link citizens’ attitudes 
toward the law to the law’s normative force.  I will explain why in the next two chapters.  
Many of these questions I mentioned above will come up again when I discuss Soper’s 
and Rawls’s accounts of law and authority.  Since my ultimate goal is to defend a 
Rawlsian approach to law, I will put off answering these questions for the time being.  In 
my discussion of Rawls, I will consider the questions that seem to raise the biggest 
challenges for the Rawlsian view.  Here my intention is only to get some of them on the 
table, as a way of pointing out unresolved issues that such an approach must consider.  I 
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do not know if there are good answers to these questions.  If not, the link between 
attitudes toward law and the law’s authority may come into question. 
 
Is Waldron’s Account of Law Too Limited? 
 
 Waldron’s account of the law may be too limited in scope, because it only applies 
to situations relevantly similar to the Partial Conflict (PC) collective action problem.  
Waldron’s account of the law’s authority is rooted in his Circumstances of Politics.  He 
makes an analogy between the Circumstances of Politics and a PC problem.  In a PC 
situation, choosers prefer concerted action to no concerted action, but they disagree over 
which possible common course of action they should follow.  One example is the Battle 
of the Sexes—he prefers the boxing match, she prefers the ballet, but both prefer a night 
together over a night apart.  He would rather accompany her to the ballet than go to the 
boxing match alone, and she would rather accompany him to the boxing match, rather 
than go to the ballet alone.  Waldron illustrates this in the legal context by discussing the 
way rape law might profitably be seen as a PC situation.  However, many voting 
situations do not resemble the PC problem at all. 
 The situation I have in mind is one where the different proposals under 
consideration are mutually exclusive or cancel each other out.  For example, votes over 
proposed laws that would prohibit or allow gay marriage do not seem to be PC situations 
at all.  In the gay marriage case, for instance, one side would prefer a law restricting gay 
marriages, and the other side would prefer that this law not be enacted.  One side hopes to 
enact a proposed law, and the other side would rather leave the matter unresolved.  This 
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makes the gay marriage situation seem different than a PC situation.  The same may be 
said of the abortion debate, and perhaps many other debates. 
 Waldron could respond in two ways.  First, he might say, as he does in the case of 
rape law, that the issue of gay marriage should be viewed in the broader context of 
marriage law.  All citizens would rather have some marriage law than none, even though 
there are some controversial issues that all acknowledge as problem areas.  From this 
perspective, he might say, gay marriage law is a PC situation.  But I do not find this 
response compelling.  There is no reason to think that are choices are (a) some gay 
marriage law or (b) no marriage law.  This seems to be something of a false dilemma. 
 Second, Waldron might admit that gay marriage law is not a PC situation, but 
deny that it is representative of a large class of laws.  He could just insist that gay 
marriage law is one of a handful of exceptions to his general account.  He might hold that 
issues like gay marriage and abortion are exceptions, rather than the rule. 
 
Does Waldron’s Majoritarianism Escape The Burdens of Judgment? 
 
 According to Christiano, Waldron grounds his majoritarianism in the fact of 
disagreement and the moral demand for respect for judgment.  But, Christiano argues, 
this strategy is self-defeating.219  Disagreement over political matters extends to 
disagreement over the proper authority of collective decision procedures themselves.  For 
example, Christiano points out, people disagree about the basic principle of equal respect 
for judgment.  Some argue that people’s judgments are not worthy of respect, and others 
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that they are not worthy of equal respect.  Some people who agree that people’s 
judgments deserve equal respect disagree about what this requires of us.  Some think it 
requires majority rule or consensus, while others think it requires plural voting. 
 One response to Christiano’s objection is to appeal to higher order procedures.  
For example, we might try to design a fair constitutional convention, and hold that some 
lower order decision procedure is legitimate because it was chosen according to the 
higher order decision procedure.  But as Christiano points out, there are two problems 
with this.  First, it seems to lead to an infinite regress.  Why think there won’t be 
disagreement over the nature of the higher order procedure too?  Since we cannot agree 
on a lower order decision procedure, there is no reason to think we can agree on a higher 
order procedure.  Appealing to some even higher order procedure just pushes the problem 
back.  Second, if the regress did stop somewhere, there is every chance that the process 
might not issue a majoritarian decision procedure at all.  Suppose, Christiano says, the 
regress stops at the third order.  We have somehow agreed on a procedure for 
determining what our second order procedure ought to be.  At this point, Christiano says, 
it is a contingent fact whether those who must choose will decide on a majoritarian 
decision procedure at all.  The lowest order decision procedure might not turn out to be 
majoritarian at all, even if the higher order procedures are. 
 A second response to Christiano’s argument is to simply insist on majoritarian 
decision procedures and ignore disagreement.  Christiano claims that proponents of this 
view think that “disagreement about the best procedures ought not to be taken seriously 
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when choosing majority rule.”220  But, he asks, why not?  He sees no relevant difference 
between disagreements over substantive matters and disagreements over procedures.  The 
insult done to dissenters when substantive views are forced on them appears to be no 
different from the insult done to them when procedures are forced on them. 
 Christiano is not entirely fair here to Waldron.  Waldron does not argue that 
fairness or equal respect for persons requires majority-decision.221  He argues instead that 
majority decision is not only an important technical device, but also a respectful one.  He 
admits, for instance, that there are perfectly plausible arguments in favor of plural voting.  
Fairness need not require us to regard the view of a wise and intelligent person as having 
the same weight as the view of someone ignorant and thoughtless; in fact, fairness might 
require the opposite.  Proven or acknowledged differences in wisdom or intelligence 
could justify plural voting of some sort.  But Waldron worries about whether any such 
criteria of wisdom or intelligence could be justified in the circumstances of politics, since 
citizens are likely to disagree over what counts as wisdom or intelligence, or even 
whether high marks in either of these merits greater voting power. 
 Waldron illustrates his view by turning something Charles Beitz said on its head.  
Beitz said that an inference from equal respect to majority decision would “reflect an 
implausibly narrow understanding of the more basic principle [i.e., equal respect], from 
which substantive concerns regarding the content of political outcomes … have been 
excluded.”222  Waldron admits that Beitz is right about this.  When people talk about 
equal respect they usually do mean to refer to both the way the decisions are reached and 
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the substantive impact that outcomes may have on individuals.  From this point of view, 
it is not clear that equal respect requires majority-decision, because it can lead to 
outcomes that do not equally respect persons.  However, Waldron says, this broad notion 
of respect won’t help us in the circumstances of politics, because citizens disagree in 
good faith about what counts as a disrespectful outcome.  This is why we need a decision 
procedure.  Adding substance to a decision procedure merely privileges one controversial 
view at the expense of others.  So, Waldron insists, “in the circumstances of politics, all 
one can work with is the ‘implausibly narrow understanding’ of equal respect.”  Majority 
decision is the only procedure consistent with equal respect in this “necessarily 
impoverished sense.” 
 My sense is that the root of the disagreement between Waldron and Christiano is 
whether or not there is some default position or starting point that is ontologically or 
morally simple and beyond disagreement.  I think Waldron takes majoritarianism—one-
person-one-vote—to be a default or fundamental (ontologically and morally simple) 
starting point, such that moves away from this point require justification.  Christiano, on 
the other hand, thinks that majoritarianism is as much in need of justification as any other 
voting scheme.  But suppose, for the sake of argument, that Christiano could give a 
justification of majoritarianism?  Would Waldron object?  I think that Waldron might 
object, on the grounds that no such defense of majoritarianism could be immune to the 
burdens of judgment.  All such arguments would be subject to good faith disagreements.  
In any event, I find Waldron’s view more compelling than Christiano’s, but I am not sure 
it is unreasonable to disagree with me. 
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 There is something simple and compelling about the idea that each one of us—
each individual unit—has the right to determine how his or her life should go, and so also 
a right to an equal say in how our common life should go.  In this sense, majoritarianism 
just seems naturally fundamental.  It doesn’t seem necessary in a way to have to defend 
the claim that each person deserves an equal vote.  However, the claim that some 
people’s votes ought to count for more than other people’s votes does seem to require 
defense.  For reasons like this, it seems to me that majoritarianism is the default position.  
Still, I am not sure that anyone who disagrees with me is thereby unreasonable. 
 
Summary of Key Points. 
 
Majoritarian voting does not deserve the scorn it often receives.  Its many virtues 
show that it is a respectable source of law.  Whether majoritarianism is immune to the 
burdens of judgment is open question.  My own sense is that it represents a primitive or 
default position and that we cannot in good faith reject it, but I am not strongly 
committed to this.  In any case, the creation of law in the Circumstances of Politics 
represents a significant social achievement.  For these reasons, democratically produced 
law deserves some significant measure of respect. 
But, as Waldron admits, his account is insufficient as it stands.  It is also 
important for citizens to base their votes on their considered beliefs about justice and the 
common good, and not solely on their sense of their own narrow self-interest.  This effort 
to vote responsibly is one component of the law’s authority.  Unfortunately, Waldron 
never explains the difference between responsible and irresponsible voting.  This is a 
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significant missing piece.  In essence, he does not explain reciprocity in justification.  
Soper and Rawls do offer accounts of responsible voting and other public political 























HART AND SOPER 
 
 This chapter describes the development of a line of thought that Rawls takes up as 
a core element of his theory of legitimacy.  It comes from the works of H. L. A. Hart and 
Philip Soper.  Hart offers an influential account of the law and its normative force.  Soper 
modifies Hart’s view in certain ways and develops a shared reason account of political 
obligation.  Rawls turns Soper’s account of political obligation into a shared reason 
account of political legitimacy.  In this chapter I discuss Hart and Soper.  I discuss Rawls 
in Chapter 4. 
The law claims to give those subject to it at least prima facie reasons for behaving 
in certain ways and not in others.  Theories of legal validity attempt to define exactly 
what is to count as a law, strictly speaking.  There are two aspects to this problem.  First, 
we need to know what distinguishes law from similar phenomena such as religion, 
morality, or convention.  Second, we need to know how to distinguish actual or genuine 
laws from proposed or potential laws that somehow fail to become law.  Theories of legal 
obligation attempt to account for the normative aspect of law. 
 Legal obligation is not necessarily the same thing as political obligation or 
legitimacy.  An account of legal obligation seeks to explain what makes law the kind of 
command that merits the respect of citizens.  Accounts of political obligation and 
legitimacy seek to explain why citizens have a duty to obey the law and when the state 
has a right to enforce it.  Though it seems clear that there might be some significant 
relationship between legal obligation and political obligation and legitimacy, this 
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relationship is not well understood by either legal or political theorists.  This chapter 
considers one important effort to make sense of this relationship. 
 John Austin, an early legal positivist, sought to define law so as to distinguish it 
from similar social phenomena (such as morality) and to clearly demarcate the 
boundaries of a science of law.223  He defines law roughly as those commands backed by 
threats that are issued by a sovereign who is habitually obeyed by most people in the 
society.  For Austin, the law is essentially coercive.  Insofar as his approach equates 
might and right, people are now rightly skeptical of it.224  Nevertheless, in its day, it was 
an influential theory of legal obligation.  Both Hart and Soper compare their theories to 
Austin’s. 
 In The Concept of Law, Hart rejects Austin’s account and seeks to replace it with 
a better one.225  He offers a descriptive, positivist theory of legal validity and legal 
obligation.  A key element of his account of legal obligation is the attitude of government 
officials toward the law-making process.  Roughly, Hart argues that the law-making 
process must be rule-governed.  Officials must take the rules that constitute the legislative 
process to be shared and enforceable standards of behavior.  This distinguishes law from 
the arbitrary exercise of power and sets the ground for his account of legal obligation. 
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 In A Theory of Law, Philip Soper uses some of Hart’s premises to develop 
accounts of legal and political obligation.226  Soper rejects Hart’s positivism and his 
descriptive approach to legal theory, but accepts the idea that officials must have a certain 
shared attitude toward the law.  He worries about Hart’s non-moral understanding of the 
official attitude, however, and argues instead that this attitude must be explicitly moral, if 
the law is to be the kind of thing that might merit the respect of citizens.  Only in this way 
can work on legal obligation move in a meaningful direction.  One virtue of this 
approach, he argues, is that it gives us a way to solve the problem of political obligation.  
By connecting legal and political theory in this way, Soper hopes to rescue them both 
from what he perceives as a period of stagnation and irrelevance. 
 Rawls accepts the broad strokes of Soper’s accounts of legal and political 
obligation.  One key difference is that where Soper talks about legal and political 
obligation, Rawls talks about political legitimacy.  Rawls’s intent in making this 
conceptual shift is not entirely clear, but it introduces new issues to the discussion.  In 
any case, Soper’s theory is generic and flexible enough to apply to many (if not all) 
societies with legal systems.  In several of his works, Rawls applies Soper’s generic 
account to specific types of societies.  In The Law of Peoples, for instance, he applies it 
to what he calls “decent” societies.  These are non-democratic and non-liberal 
constitutional republics, similar to the political societies described by Cicero, 
Machiavelli, and Rousseau.  In his work on liberal democratic societies—the setting for 
his liberal principle of legitimacy—Rawls applies Soper’s theories to the context of 
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democratic political culture, where all reasonable citizens regard one another as the free 
and equal co-authors of their law. 
 This chapter describes and critically assesses the works of Hart and Soper that 
most influenced Rawls.  The next chapter critically assesses Rawls’s theory of 
legitimacy.  All three accounts represent viable approaches to key issues in legal and 
political philosophy today.  Thus, while this chapter is primarily a prelude to the next, the 
ideas of Hart and Soper deserve consideration on their own.  Since both Hart and Soper 
compare their theories to Austin’s command theory, it is helpful to begin this chapter by 
briefly describing Austin’s account.  This sets the stage for more complete discussion of 
Hart and Soper. 
 
Austin’s Command Theory of Law. 
 
 Austin’s command theory holds that laws are general orders, backed by threats of 
sanction.227  The orders are issued by an independent sovereign, a person or group of 
persons who generally take orders from no one.  They may also be issued by 
representatives of the sovereign.  In general, commands from the sovereign are laws 
when most subjects comply with them, and they believe that punishment is likely to 
follow disobedience.  On this view, the law is essentially coercive.  It gives people reason 
to act because people want to avoid punishment. 
 One problem with this command theory is that it seems to distort as many kinds 
of legal rules as it explains.  It appears to fit criminal law fairly well.  This area of law is 
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comprised of commands forbidding certain types of behavior, and sanctions to be meted 
out to those who disobey.  But Austin’s command theory does not fit many other kinds of 
law.  For instance, some laws tell people how to make wills and contracts.  These acts 
create new rights and obligations between parties.  When people violate one of these 
power-conferring laws, no one is punished.  Instead, their efforts produce nothing.  No 
will or contract is created when power-conferring laws are violated.  Some argue that this 
“nullity” represents a sanction, but this seems to misrepresent what happens.  A nullity is 
not a sanction the government imposes upon rule violators.  In such cases, the 
government simply denies that the efforts of the parties have produced a valid will or 
contract. 
 A deeper problem is revealed by Hart’s criticism of Austin’s idea of legal 
obligation.  Hart claims that coercion alone cannot produce obligations.  When a gunman 
threatens a person—“your money or your life?”—the person may suffer great harm if he 
does not comply with the gunman’s request.  He has sound reason to do what the gunman 
wants.  In fact, we might even say it would be foolish or dangerous to disobey the 
gunman, and thus that this person is actually obliged to do what the gunman wants.  But 
it would not be right to say that the person has an obligation to obey.  While it would be 
unreasonable to resist the gunman in this case, there is no reason to think the victim owes 
the gunman anything, or that the gunman’s claim is morally sound.  Might does not make 
right.  The deeper problem with Austin’s theory of legal obligation is that the sovereign is 
the gunman “writ large.”  The sovereign can oblige subjects to comply with her 
commands, by threatening to harm them if they do not comply, but her threats can never 
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obligate them to obey her.  Since laws create obligations, commands from Austin’s 
sovereign are not laws.  Austin’s theory fails to distinguish governments from gunmen. 
 
H. L. A. Hart and The Concept of Law.228
 
 In The Concept of Law (hereafter Concept), Hart attempts to develop a 
philosophically sound account of the essential features of law.  Chief among his aims are 
accounting for legal validity and legal obligation.  The question of legal validity has to do 
with identifying the laws of a legal system.  A theory of legal validity describes criteria 
for distinguishing genuine laws from other kinds of rules, and from rules incorrectly 
claimed to be laws.  The question of legal obligation has to do with law’s claimed 
authority.  A theory of legal obligation explains how the law binds subjects, or generates 
obligations.  It is about how law produces reasons for subjects to act in certain ways. 
 Hart’s method is descriptive.229  We can describe rule-governed social practices, 
like law, from both “internal” and “external” perspectives.  The internal perspective is the 
point of view of a participant, someone who is part of the group and affirms its rules.  
The external perspective is the point of view of an outside observer, someone who is not 
part of the society and does not affirm the rules.  Methodologically speaking, Hart’s legal 
project is a particular kind of external account:  he argues that a sound external 
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description of the internal perspective can answer many philosophically important 
questions about law.  He accounts for the important features of law by describing the 
different external behaviors and internal mental attitudes of group members immersed in 
law as a rule-governed social practice.  Thus he accounts for legal obligation by 
describing the law’s rule-governed internal aspect, and he solves the problem of legal 
validity by describing a certain kind of legal rule, the rule of recognition, which he claims 
is common to all legal systems. 
 Hart is a positivist, so he makes no attempt to morally justify the legal structures 
he identifies.  While the law is often influenced by a society’s beliefs about morality and 
justice, its validity and normativity need not be a function of either.  The law is ultimately 
a matter of social convention. 
 
Rules and Obligations. 
 
 In Concept, Hart holds that legal obligation is ultimately a matter of social 
convention or practice.  His account of social rules has come to be known as the “practice 
theory.”  A practice rule exists when four conditions are met:  (a) members of a group 
generally conform to some behavioral standard; (b) they see deviation from the standard 
as a lapse or offense that merits criticism and correction; (c) criticism of deviation is 
generally regarded as appropriate; and (d) at least some have an internal attitude toward 
the standard, using it as a guide and a tool in evaluating their own behavior and the 
162 
behavior of others.230  At least one commentator doubts that Hart intended this account to 
be a complete theory of rules, rather than simply a test for the existence of rules.231  A test 
for the existence of something need not say much of the nature of that thing:  Geiger 
counters detect radiation but tell us little about it.232  Hart may have meant to do nothing 
more than distinguish rule-governed behavior from habit or coincidence. 
 The distinction between rule-governed behavior and social habits and coincidence 
is important to Hart’s account.  When we say that a group follows a rule, we mean more 
than most group members behave in a certain way.  Social habits also cause convergence.  
What distinguishes rule-governed behavior from social habits are the ways people 
respond to deviations from established behavioral patterns.  Suppose Dan goes to a 
church that has a rule against wearing hats during the service, and no rule about where 
people must sit.  Dan never wears his hat during church, and he always sits in the front 
left pew.  Suppose now that Dan forgets to take his hat off one Sunday.  Since there is a 
rule against this behavior, other church members will see Dan’s behavior as a lapse that 
merits criticism and ought to be corrected.  They will regard his behavior as Something 
One Should Not Do.  Someone may give him a look, or point to his head, in an effort to 
get him to change his behavior.  At the extreme, someone might interrupt the service and 
insist that he remove his hat, or challenge him to explain his unruly and offensive 
behavior.  Both Dan and his critics will regard such efforts as reasonable or justified.  
Many church members will correct Dan unreflectively, without considering the nature of 
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what they are doing, but some will correct him because they see his behavior as a 
violation of a standard of behavior that applies in the church setting.  Some will have 
internalized the standard and use it to guide the community.  These kinds of responses 
and attitudes toward patterns of behavior and deviations often indicate the presence of a 
rule. 
 Now suppose Dan sits in the front right pew one Sunday.  It is not unusual for 
people to become accustomed to sitting in certain seats in social settings like church, so 
other church members may regard this as odd, or surprising.  However, since there is no 
rule requiring Dan to sit anywhere in particular, no one will regard his behavior as an 
offense or lapse in judgment.  If someone did try to force him to move to the front left 
pew, others would regard this effort as unjustified, in the absence of some further 
explanation.  These differing internal attitudes toward behavioral patterns, and deviations 
from them, are what separate coincidence and social habit from rule-governed social 
practices. 
 Whether Hart’s practice theory successfully distinguishes rule-governed behavior 
from coincidence and habit is an open question.  A common objection to the practice 
theory is that it does not distinguish rules from generally applicable reasons.233  Many 
examples are thought to show this point.  One common example has to do with chess.  In 
chess, there are several standard openings.  These are standard sets of initial moves, 
commonly regarded by serious players as the best or proper way to begin the game.  
Those who know chess well can sometimes tell which opening a player has chosen by 
                                                 
233   See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (Princeton:  Princeton University Press, 1990), pp. 
55-6. 
164 
observing which piece he moves first, and where he moves it.  These openings are not 
required by the rules of chess, but serious players generally use them, and those who do 
not tend to get criticized for it.  This criticism is regarded as appropriate and justified, at 
least by serious players, and at least some see the standard openings as the way chess 
ought to be played:  “if you’re going to play chess, this is how you should do it.”  Of 
course, chess can be played like checkers, with each player simply attacking the others’ 
pieces willy-nilly, until only one king is left standing.  But to chess aficionados, this is 
like watching a chimp bang on a piano, or watching elephants paint.  Chess, at its best, 
pits intellect against intellect in a complex game of strategy and misdirection.  Many 
think this chess example (and others like it) shows that the practice theory incorrectly 
characterizes generally applicable reasons (e.g., standard chess openings) as rules.  They 
have a point.  Still, some doubt that these counterexamples prove decisive.234  For 
instance, while the rules of chess say nothing about the standard openings, it is possible 
that there are rules of teaching chess.  In any case, in the Postscript (published 30 years 
after Concept) Hart concedes that the practice theory is inadequate as a general account 
of rules.  Nevertheless, he maintains that it successfully accounts for key elements of 
legal systems.235
 Rule-governed behavior is different from merely patterned behavior.  A special 
kind of social rule is what Hart calls a “rule of obligation.”  On Hart’s account, all social 
rules give subjects reasons for action—this is just what it means to have a rule—but only 
some impose obligations.  Rules of obligation are distinguished from weaker rules by 
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three features:  (a) they are vigorously enforced by group members; (b) they are thought 
to promote essential or prized features of social life; and (c) they are recognized as rules 
that often require sacrifices from individuals.236
 The main characteristic separating rules of obligation from ordinary social rules is 
the strength and insistence of the social pressure members exert against rule violators and 
those who threaten to break the rule.237  A rule imposes an obligation when group 
members take the rule very seriously and enforce it with a great deal of social pressure.  
Hart admits that the line separating ordinary rules from rules of obligation is a bit 
fuzzy—all rules are enforced with social pressure; how much is needed to make an 
ordinary rule into a rule of obligation?—but this does not obscure the fact that some rules 
are more vigorously enforced than others.  Rules enforced with great determination and 
strong social pressure clearly impose obligations. 
 Hart adds two features to this characterization of rules of obligation.238  First, 
rules of obligation are thought to protect or promote essential or “highly prized” features 
of social life.  These include rules that restrict the use of violence, or that require honesty 
and the keeping of promises.  For example, since child-rearing is essential to social life, 
there are rules of obligation that define certain duties parents have to their children.  No 
particular rule is essential in this case, but the common fundamental needs of children 
give some content and place some limits on what can be done.  Children need certain 
kinds of nurturing and basic care in order to develop and grow into healthy adults.  The 
nature of parental obligations varies cross-culturally, but this does not mean that anything 
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goes.  Minimally children need to be given the tools they will need to reproduce their 
society, and to be successful members of it.  In our own society, parents are typically 
given some latitude in determining how they will raise their children.  However, this does 
not mean that just any parental behavior is permitted.  For example, parents who leave 
their young children alone while they run off to Las Vegas for the weekend deserve at 
least social censure and probably legal censure as well. 
 Second, people generally recognize that rules of obligation often require conduct 
that conflicts with the particular self-regarding desires of the agent.  This is why 
obligations are generally thought to require sacrifices from people.  (You simply cannot 
leave your young children alone while you run off to Vegas!) 
 Hart anticipates one objection to his analysis of rules of obligation:  if the primary 
characteristic of these rules is strong social pressure to conform, why insist that the 
internal attitude is so important to understanding obligation?  It just seems superfluous.  
Hart’s view is just the opposite.  He says that if we do not see the significance of the 
internal attitude, “we cannot properly understand the whole distinctive style of human 
thought, speech, and action which is involved in the existence of rules and which 
constitutes the normative structure of society.”239  The distinction between the “external” 
and “internal” aspect of rules is essential to any understanding of law or even of human 
society. 
 Here Hart contrasts two kinds of external comments an outside observer can make 
about a society.  She can assert that group members accept certain rules, and in this way 
describe their internal attitude, without herself affirming the rules.  Or she can simply 
                                                 
239   Hart, Concept, p. 88. 
167 
record regularities in the external behavior of group members.  Hart calls this the extreme 
external point of view.240  The outside observer can learn quite a bit about a society from 
this extreme position.  She could correlate deviations with sanctions and develop a fairly 
robust ability to predict the kinds of reactions different behaviors will provoke.  She 
could learn enough to get along fairly well with those she observes.  But she will miss out 
on a key dimension of social life.  The extreme external perspective never reveals how 
group members view their own patterns of behavior.  In this way it fails to account for 
why people behave as they do.  It overlooks the way rules function in society.  Austin’s 
command theory is an extreme external account.  It is based solely on the external aspect 
of law—observable patterns of behavior as responses to perceived threats of sanction—
and misses completely the internal aspect of law (or any other system of rules). 
 
The Legal System and Validity. 
 
 Hart holds that the core of every legal system is a union of primary and secondary 
rules.241   Some primary rules simply tell people what they must or must not do.  They 
include rules against theft and the free use of violence.  Other primary rules confer 
powers on subjects, enabling them to create new rights and duties.  These primary power-
conferring rules make it possible, for instance, for people to get married, or to make wills 
and contracts.  Secondary rules are about primary rules, and there are three kinds:  the 
rule of recognition, rules of change, and rules of adjudication. 
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 The rule of recognition specifies the characteristics that identify the rules of a 
group.  Every legal system must have an authoritative way of resolving questions about 
the existence of other legal rules, a conclusive way of identifying the rules that belong to 
a group.  The rule of recognition defines these criteria.  In doing so, it serves as the 
ultimate rule for identifying the “valid” laws of a legal system.  Valid laws are just those 
that meet all the requirements of the rule of recognition.  In the U.S., the rule of 
recognition is a complex mix of the Constitution and the three branches of government.  
Laws are produced in a couple of ways.  The legislature enacts some laws.  Some law is 
created when judges decide hard cases.  The ultimate rule of recognition in the U.S. is the 
Supreme Court’s power of judicial review.  The Court now has the authority to 
conclusively decide whether any proposed law is Constitutional, and thus whether it is 
one of the laws of the U.S. or not.  Laws judged unconstitutional are not U.S. laws and 
have no legal authority.  What makes judicial review the ultimate rule of recognition is 
not that it is written down somewhere, but rather that public officials generally accept this 
as the Court’s appropriate role. 
 Rules of change specify procedures for introducing new primary rules, and for 
modifying or eliminating old ones.  The rules that create and define the legislature’s 
power to create or repeal laws are rules of change.  They explain who has the power to 
make laws, the procedure for implementing that power, and its scope or reach.  They are 
often closely associated with the rule of recognition. 
 Rules of adjudication specify procedures for determining whether primary rules 
have been violated on any particular occasion.  They define who has the power to make 
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such determinations, the procedures that must be followed in making them, and the 
jurisdiction covered by various judicial officials. 
 A legal system exists when two conditions are met.  First, valid laws must be 
generally obeyed by citizens and officials.  In many cases citizens will see valid laws as 
common standards of behavior and sources of obligation, but this is not necessary.  If 
citizens and officials generally obey the valid laws, for whatever personal reasons each 
may have, the first condition is met.  Second, the secondary rules must be accepted as 
common public standards of behavior by officials.  In particular there must be shared 
official acceptance of the rule of recognition.  Officials must take the secondary rules to 
be rules of obligation that apply to all them in their public roles as officials.  It is not 
necessary for private citizens to have this attitude toward the secondary rules. 
 
Law and Morality. 
 
 Hart holds that the law need not be a function of morality.  Some genuine legal 
systems are completely separate from what are generally recognized as moral codes.  But 
the belief that there is some necessary relationship between law and morality is not 
entirely wrong.  Every legal system has two moral elements:  the formal aspect of justice 
and minimum natural law content.  While these conditions are part of every legal system, 
they are not sufficient to guarantee the morality of any legal system. 
 Every human legal system contains the formal aspect of justice.  Justice claims 
have two parts:  (a) the formal principle that like cases be treated alike, and (b) criteria 
used to determine when cases are alike.  The first feature appears in all cases of justice 
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claims, but it offers no guidance until the second feature is filled out.  The claim that a 
law is unjust often means that the first feature is missing, i.e., that the law treats people 
unfairly, because it does not treat like cases alike.  This same formal principle of 
justice—that like cases should be treated alike—is also a key feature of all rule-governed 
social practices.  Treating like cases alike is just part of what it means to follow rules.  
Rules identify sets of conditions that people ought to respond to with particular more-or-
less well-defined patterns of behavior.  When people treat like cases differently, it is hard 
to see their behavior as rule-governed.  This applies to legal systems, since they are rule-
governed social institutions.  Thus, a legal system must treat like cases alike, or else it 
risks losing its claim to being rule-governed.  Thus every legal system necessarily shares 
with justice claims this formal principle.  In this way, every legal system contains an 
element of morality. 
 Every enduring human legal system also has laws containing the “minimum 
content” of natural law.242  In order to survive, every human society must have certain 
minimal standards of behavior.  Simple reflection on human nature, the purpose of 
society, the natural environment, and so on, makes this evident.  For instance, social life 
requires restrictions on the free use of violence.  Such rules are necessary because human 
beings are vulnerable to attacks by others.  If there were no rules restricting the free use 
of violence, there would be little point in having any rules at all.  Every legal system must 
recognize such standards.  Hart calls these universally recognized standards the minimum 
content of natural law.  But while this minimum content is necessary for the continued 
existence of human society, and thus must be recognized by all legal systems, it is not a 
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necessary characteristic of law as such.  The minimum content is necessary because of 
the kinds of beings we are, but human nature is a contingent fact.  If human beings were 
different than they are now, e.g., less vulnerable, the minimum content would be 
different, or might not exist at all.  Laws restricting the free use of violence are universal 
only because human beings are vulnerable in certain ways, not because the concept of 
law requires any specific moral content.  The continued existence of human society 
requires this content, not the concept of law. 
 Since Hart admits that these two elements of morality can be found in every legal 
system, why does he deny the claim that law is founded on morality in some way?  
Because these two moral elements do not guarantee the morality of any society or its law.  
A society need not extend the minimum natural law content to all, nor need it treat all 
individual persons as “free equals.”  In a caste society, for instance, people in different 
castes may be thought of as naturally superior or inferior to others, and so to have more 
or less moral value, rights or permissions than others.  Formal justice requires that 
members of one caste be treated in similar ways, but it does not require that all castes be 
treated the same.  And the minimum natural law content needs to be extended to most of 
the castes, but it need not be extended to all castes.  In slave societies, masters may be 
morally sensitive to each other, while at the same time treating slaves as objects.  Law 
generally follows conventional morality, so where this morality allows discrimination, 
the law will too.  Hart identifies the Nazi regime and South Africa during Apartheid as 
contemporary examples of societies that have genuine legal systems, in part because they 
meet the conditions of formal justice and the minimum content of natural law, but that are 
nevertheless immoral and unjust regimes. 
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Potential Problems for Hart’s Theory of Law. 
 
 Hart’s philosophical account of the law has two main aims.  The first is 
explaining legal validity.  The second is accounting for the law’s normativity.  A great 
deal of critical work has targeted both of these projects.  Since I am not primarily 
concerned with the validity question, I will set this issue aside.  In the next few sections I 
will consider three objections to Hart’s account of legal normativity.  First, some object 
that Hart’s notion of legal obligation is obscure.  If legal obligation is not moral or 
prudential in nature, then what exactly is it?  Some see no middle ground.  Second, some 
object to Hart’s account because it implies legal duties to immoral and unjust 
governments.  Could one really have a legal obligation to the Nazi regime?  Third, some 
think Hart fails to distinguish law from force.  If this is true, Hart’s account of legal 
obligation fails, because he claims force cannot generate obligations. 
 
Is Hart’s Legal Obligation Too Obscure? 
 
 Hart tries to develop an account of legal obligation that does not reduce it to either 
morality or force, but if legal obligation is not one of these, what exactly is it?  The 
prudential ought is fairly straightforward.  It says that you ought to do some X, because X 
is in your self-interest in some way.  The reason you should do X is because doing X 
would benefit you.  The nature of the moral ought is not quite as clear as the prudential 
ought, but we do have some idea what it means too.  Broadly speaking, morality has to do 
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with what it means to be a good person, or what is ultimately good for human beings, or 
what it means to do the right thing.  The moral ought describes behavioral requirements 
based on such moral considerations.  But what is legal obligation if it is distinct from 
moral and prudential concerns?  What kinds of reasons does it give people for 
conforming to the law’s demands?  Our notions of prudential and moral obligation 
provide more or less clear ways of answering these questions.  On the prudential account, 
you ought to obey the law, simply in order to avoid punishment or sanction.  On the 
moral account, legal obligation is based on moral considerations.  You ought to obey the 
law, because the law is based on or in some way contributes to the ultimate good of 
human beings.  It is not clear how, if at all, a distinct notion of legal obligation answers 
these questions.  (This has implications for political obligation and legitimacy, but I want 
to put off  explaining just how until a little later.) 
 As a result, one might claim, as Philip Soper does, that Hart makes a mistake in 
trying to account for legal obligation in non-moral and non-prudential terms.  Soper 
seems to have two problems with Hart’s approach.  First, Soper sees no clear middle 
ground between moral and prudential obligation.  What else could legal obligation be?  
So he thinks it must be moral or prudential in nature.  Second, Soper thinks it just 
muddies the water to introduce an obscure notion like Hart’s legal obligation.  Prudential 
and moral obligations and reasons for action are complex and difficult enough to sort out 
and compare on their own.  Introducing some distinct legal notion of obligation adds 
unnecessary complexity to an already messy situation.  Soper thinks we need to approach 
legal obligation from the common sense point of view of the average citizen.  Citizens 
can understand prudential and moral duties and reasons for action.  They want to plan a 
174 
course of action through life, so they want to know if they will be punished for behaving 
in certain ways, and how to act morally.  On Soper’s view, these concerns exhaust the 
average citizen’s interest in the law.  They want to know what the law forbids, and how 
the law connects to their moral duties.  But if the law is distinct from morality and 
prudence, it is not clear how citizens should regard it, or factor it into their calculations 
about how to live.  How much do legal obligations weigh against moral or prudential 
ones?  This question is easier to answer (so Soper argues) if we characterize legal 
obligation as either moral or prudential in nature.  This is one reason Soper gives for 
rejecting Hart’s approach to legal obligation. 
 Hart could respond that he distinguishes legal obligations from moral and 
prudential ones because, as a matter of descriptive fact, legal obligations are distinct from 
the others.  That legal obligation may be hard to understand, or that it may add 
complexity to an already difficult situation, is irrelevant from this descriptive perspective.  
Descriptively speaking, the law is what it is, even if it is difficult to understand.  Soper 
ultimately rejects Hart’s descriptive approach, for reasons I will explain later.  I will set 
this issue aside for now, but it will come up again.  The point I wish to emphasize here is 
that some find Hart’s notion of legal obligation too obscure to be helpful.  Soper and 
Rawls agree with Hart that legal obligation is not the same thing as moral obligation, but, 
unlike Hart, both link the law’s normative force to a kind of moral sincerity among 
individuals (officials or citizens) responsible for the law.  According to Soper and Rawls, 
this link gives the law a distinctively moral quality.  In this way they avoid Hart’s 
problem. 
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 Alternatively, one might claim, as Michael Martin does, that Hart does not think 
law creates “real” obligations at all, but only “descriptive” ones.243  Hart’s descriptive 
account of obligation is anthropological.  It describes the duties a person is said to have, 
according to the behavioral standards of his society.  But descriptive obligations are not 
real obligations, Martin says.  He seems to think Hart’s “merely descriptive” obligations 
have no genuine moral claim on a person’s behavior.  Martin thinks this is why Hart 
insists that we should always morally evaluate the law’s demands, before we decide to 
comply with the law.  On Martin’s account, the obscurity of Hart’s notion of legal 
obligation is not a problem, because so-called legal obligations have no real genuine 
moral claim on citizens.  Citizens will recognize, of course, that it would be prudent to 
obey the law, since laws will be enforced by the state.  As a result, citizens will factor 
their “legal” obligations into their deliberations about how to act, but for prudential 
reasons only, not legal or moral ones.  And they will do this despite the fact that legal 
obligations are not real moral obligations. 
 I think Hart would resist Martin’s claim that legal obligations are not real.  Martin 
seems to think moral obligations are essentially different from legal ones, because legal 
ones are conventional and (Martin assumes) moral ones are not, but on Hart’s account 
both are fully conventional in nature.  From Hart’s perspective, if legal obligations are 
merely descriptive, then so are moral obligations.  But I do not believe he would say 
either kind of obligation is merely descriptive, if this means not real or genuine.  Rather, 
he would say that real obligations, moral or legal, are rooted in conventional social 
practices. 
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 In any event, I do not hope to resolve this issue here.  I will leave that to Hart 
scholars.  But I wanted to bring the issue up, because both Soper and Rawls will take a 
different approach.  While both reject the claim that legal obligation can be reduced to 
morality or justice, each sees the law’s normative force as essentially connected to the 
moral values of a society. 
  
Can there be a Legal Obligation to Immoral and Unjust Governments? 
 
 On Hart’s account, even the worst Nazi laws may have been genuine laws.244  
Nazi laws were generally obeyed, so if Nazi officials had the proper internal attitude 
toward their secondary rules, their laws gave German citizens genuine prima facie 
reasons to comply with even the worst and most immoral laws of that regime.  Of course, 
Hart does not think people should obey the Nazis.  But for positivists, the question of the 
law’s normativity is distinct from the question of its moral value.  It may be that no one 
ought to obey immoral Nazi laws, all-things-considered, because the moral obligations 
outweigh the legal ones.  Nevertheless, an immoral law is still a law, so even immoral 
laws may generate genuine prima facie duties to comply.  Some see this as a major 
failing of Hart’s theory of normativity and of positivism in general.  No plausible account 
of legal normativity could hold that people have reason to comply with the immoral 
interests of such an evil government.  Thus, there must be something wrong with Hart’s 
approach to obligation. 
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 For instance, Edmundson rejects accounts like Hart’s on these grounds.  
Edmundson insists that citizens have a prima facie obligation to obey only sufficiently 
just laws, and no duty (not even prima facie) to obey laws as such.  Why?  When a person 
fails to perform a prima facie duty, because it is overridden by other considerations, it is 
appropriate for there to be a “residue of regret or remorse.”  This is because the reasons a 
person has for performing a prima facie duty still exist, even when a prima facie duty is 
overridden.  But no one should feel regret or remorse for failing to obey clearly immoral 
or unjust laws.  In Nazi Germany, for instance, no one should have felt regret for 
violating laws requiring them to turn in Jews.  Such regret is just not consistent with our 
considered moral convictions.  Thus accounts of legal normativity like Hart’s fail.  They 
imply positions that are not morally sound. 
 Hart could respond in a couple of ways.  He might reject Edmundson’s claimed 
account of our considered moral convictions.  Edmundson insists that our considered 
moral convictions indicate that regret is not an appropriate response for one who violates 
immoral Nazi laws, but this might not be as obvious as he says it is.  Hart could respond 
that a weak or mild form of regret is appropriate, simply because a valid law has been 
broken, even when the law is clearly immoral.  This regret need not imply any undue 
sympathy for the Nazi cause.  If one thinks that law as such is valuable, then some regret 
may not be inappropriate.  This just seems to be a battle of intuitions. 
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 Alternatively, Hart might argue that legal reasons that get overridden by moral 
reasons are not simply defeated, as Edmundson insists, but silenced altogether.245  A 
defeated reason is one that is overridden by another reason, but continues to apply to the 
situation.  A silenced reason is one that is overridden by another reason and, as a result, 
ceases to apply.  Thus Hart might hold that a person’s legal obligation to the Nazis is 
silenced by that person’s moral obligations.  It is probably wrong to say that just any 
moral reason can silence a legal one, but it is plausible to claim that some especially 
weighty moral reasons could silence legal ones.  In such cases, there would be no residue 
of regret, because the legal duty would no longer factor into the deliberation about how to 
act.  This would not mean that the legal duty was not real.  It would just mean that the 
competing considerations changed the situation in some key way.  In the first instance I 
had only prudential and legal reasons to consider, but now I have moral reasons to weigh 
too.  When certain weighty moral reasons apply to a situation, one might hold, the other 
kinds of reasons cease to.  There is no obvious or a priori reason to rule out the 
possibility. 
 Hart might also respond that the appropriateness of regret depends on the content 
of the obligation that gets overridden.  He might admit that overridden moral reasons still 
apply to a situation, and generate an appropriate residue of regret, but deny that 
overridden prudential reasons follow the same pattern.  That is, one might hold that 
overridden prudential reasons still apply to a situation, but insist that they need not be 
accompanied by any residue of regret.  A moral reason is a fairly serious matter, having 
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to do (in at least a minimal sense) with the welfare or dignity of some morally salient 
agent.  Prudential reasons need not be related to such serious matters.  Thus, while an 
overridden moral reason may always be an occasion for regret, an overridden prudential 
reason need not always be such an occasion.  If this is plausible, Hart might insist that 
overridden legal reasons are more like prudential reasons than moral reasons in this 
respect. 
 One issue this problem raises is the relative weight or strength of legal 
obligations.  Should we think that all legal obligations have equal weight?  Or should we 
hold that the normative force attached to different laws can vary from law to law?  On 
Hart’s account, all legal obligations seem to carry the same weight, to have same amount 
of normative force.  So Hart cannot easily claim that some legal obligations are weaker, 
and more easily overridden, than others.  Soper claims that both legal and political 
obligation can vary in strength.  On his account, any particular law has normative force in 
part because (he argues) having a legal system is better overall for everyone than having 
no laws at all.  It might seem that we would be better off without some particular law, but 
other laws are clearly beneficial.  The strength of the obligation correlated with any 
particular law depends in part on the plausibility of the claim that the particular law 
contributes something to the common good that having a legal system generally 
promotes.  We can hold consistently that a legal system is good overall, and still have 
good reason to think some particular law is especially good or helpful, that some other 
law is particularly harmful, and that the bulk of particular laws fall somewhere in 
between.  Given this kind of variation, Soper holds, some particular laws have greater 
normative weight than others.  And political obligation—the duty to obey the law—is in 
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part a duty to respect those officials who are responsible for the law.  On Soper’s account, 
the normative weight a particular law carries depends in part on how much officials want 
that law to be obeyed by citizens.  Thus citizens have the strongest duty to obey the laws 
officials feel strongest about, and less of a duty to obey the laws officials are least 
concerned that citizens obey. 
 
Does Hart Distinguish Law from Force? 
 
 Some critics question whether Hart’s account of obligation distinguishes it from 
force.  There are a couple of ways of advancing this charge against Hart.  One approach 
focuses on the reasons citizens have for complying with law.  Another focuses on reasons 
officials have for accepting the secondary rules.  In each case, it is argued, citizens cannot 
distinguish law from force, so we have reason to doubt that the law has genuine 
normative force. 
 The first challenge to Hart’s distinction between law and force is based on his 
claim that citizens need not have any particular attitude toward their laws.  Hart says that 
in order for a legal system to exist, private citizens must obey the primary rules.  
However, he does not require that citizens accept the rules for any particular reason.  
Each citizen can accept them for any reasons whatsoever.246  At the extreme, Hart says, 
we can imagine a genuine legal system in which all citizens view the law as a set of 
demands backed by threats of sanction.  Citizens may comply with the law just because 
they fear harm or punishment.  The problem with this is that it is the same reason people 
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have for complying with the gunman.  When the gunman demands obedience and 
threatens to punish disobedience with violence, people have reason to comply, because 
they fear being hurt.  If this is the only reason citizens have for complying with law, then 
it is not clear how Hart’s account distinguishes law from force. 
 Hart rejects this, because for him the issue does not turn on the way citizens 
understand law and force, but on whether or not official conduct is constrained by rules.  
The key distinction is between governments that conform to the rule of law and 
governments that do not.  The gunman does not follow rules.  He controls citizens 
arbitrarily, in any way he chooses.  The government that is not constrained by secondary 
rules is like the gunman.  In such a situation, official exercise of government power is 
merely an arbitrary act of official will.  On the other hand, officials guided by secondary 
rules cannot exercise their will on citizens in this arbitrary way.  Their conduct is 
constrained by the rules they accept.  Government control of citizens cannot be 
distinguished from force when government power is exercised arbitrarily.  When 
government power is exercised according to rules, it is not reducible to force.  This is the 
key to understanding Hart’s view of legal obligation. 
 One response to Hart is to ask why he ignores citizens’ attitudes toward the law.  
After all, law is supposed to create obligations for citizens.  Why, then, is their attitude 
toward the law irrelevant?  Citizens need to know what their obligations are.  This means 
they ought to be able to distinguish situations that obligate them from those that merely 
oblige them.  Hart could answer that his view does not contradict this.  Citizens can 
distinguish law from force, by paying attention to what officials do.  They can see, in 
principle anyway, whether officials are following the rules or not.  Hart insists only that 
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the law’s normative force does not depend on the knowledge of citizens.  But if some 
citizen does not understand the law to create obligations, can it create obligations for her?  
There is nothing odd about this.  People can have obligations that they do not know they 
have.  For instance, I might join a club, and agree to participate in all of the club’s 
functions, even before I know what all of the club’s functions are.  In this situation, I 
would have obligations to the club that I do not yet know that I have.  It would be a 
problem to claim that people have obligations that they cannot know that they have.  If it 
were simply impossible for me to know that I have an obligation to R, it might be odd to 
claim that I in fact have an obligation to R.  But Hart does not claim this about law.  
Citizens can understand the difference between law and force—it is located in the rule of 
law.  Hart just does not want to make this a necessary condition of legal obligation.  In 
any case, both Soper and Rawls will move away from Hart’s position, and insist that it is 
important for citizens to actually see that their laws generate genuine moral obligations. 
 A second challenge to Hart’s distinction between law and force focuses on the 
reasons officials have for accepting the rules.  Hart claims that officials who accept the 
rules voluntarily need not do so for moral reasons.247  They can accept them for self-
interested reasons, or because they have some non-moral interest in others (as, say, an 
amoral social engineer might).  They can inherit them unreflectively, or merely because 
they want to do what others do.  In fact, those who accept the rules can conclude that they 
have sound moral reason to reject the rules, but accept them anyway for any number of 
reasons.  Hart says that none of this changes the fact that the rules generate obligations 
for citizens.  However, some critics think maybe it should.  One consequence of Hart’s 
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view is that it makes law arbitrary in a way.  Hart thinks that the key difference between 
law and force is that law is governed by rules and force is not.  Force is an arbitrary 
exercise of power.  But by allowing officials to take up the rules for any reason 
whatsoever, Hart adds an element of arbitrariness to the rule of law.  When a citizen asks, 
“why are these rules being enforced?”, the answer is “no reason in particular.”  Some 
officials enforce them unreflectively, out of habit, while others enforce them because the 
rules benefit them personally in various ways.  And so on.  This makes the exercise of 
power, even when it is governed by rules, seem arbitrary, and so law seems to collapse 
back into force.  Hart can respond that there are two senses of “arbitrary” at work here.  
The complaint that acceptance of the rules is arbitrary indicates a worry about the 
ultimate justification for some set of rules.  To ask about reasons for acceptance is to ask 
if there are good reasons for accepting the rules.  But on Hart’s view this is irrelevant, 
because law is ultimately a matter of social fact, not of critical reason.  This is a different 
sense of “arbitrary” than the one that distinguishes law from force. 
 A third challenge to Hart’s account comes from another consequence of officials 
accepting rules for non-moral reasons.  On Hart’s view, citizens can reasonably see 
official exercise of power as force and not law.  Suppose an official accepts the rules for 
self-interested reasons.  When this happens, citizens have reason to worry that the laws 
enacted through the legislative process serve only the interests of officials.  If the official 
is involved in law only because it benefits him, this gives citizens reason to worry about 
the law’s purpose and its proper role in a citizen’s life.  If the law serves primarily the 
interests of officials, and not (or only incidentally) the interests of citizens, then for 
citizens the only reason to comply with the law is fear of punishment.  But this seems to 
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turn law into force, and force cannot generate obligations.  It does not matter that the 
exercise of force is rule-governed.  For example, there is nothing contradictory about the 
idea of a gang exercising power over citizens according to some set of rules accepted by 
gang members.  Consider the Mafia.  So if Hart allows officials to accept the rules for 
non-moral, self-interested reasons, his distinction between force and law collapses, at 




1. A legal system must be rule-governed if it is to generate genuine legal obligations.  
This is a necessary, but perhaps not sufficient, condition of the law’s having 
normative force. 
2. If legal obligation is not prudential or moral in nature, it is hard to understand 
exactly what it is.  There is good reason not to equate legal obligation with force, 
so it may be helpful to think of legal obligation as essentially connected to 
morality in some way. 
3. If legal obligation is moral in nature, the acceptance of the rules (by officials 
and/or citizens) that constitute the legal system may need to be moral acceptance 
of some sort.  This is consistent with a respect for judgment approach to law and 
legitimacy. 
4. Since legal obligations create duties for citizens, it may be important to take 
seriously the perspective of citizens. 
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Philip Soper and A Theory of Law.248
 
 In A Theory of Law, Philip Soper claims that the central problem in political 
theory is the question of political obligation:  why should I, or anyone, obey the law?249  
But he feels that neither legal nor political theory have made much progress.  Legal 
theory asks the wrong question—“what is law?”—and is now of no interest to anyone but 
professional philosophers.250  Political theory asks the right question—“should we obey 
the law?”—but assumes poor accounts of law that make inevitable a negative 
conclusion.251  We can avoid this “remarkably counterintuitive” negative conclusion, and 
make excursions into both political and legal theory profitable again, by bringing them 
together to answer this question:  “what is law that it should be obeyed?”252  A 
philosophically sound answer to this question makes legal theory meaningful, and also 
makes it possible for political theory to solve the problem of political obligation.253
 Soper’s work has two main parts.  In the first he develops his theory of law, which 
is primarily aimed at accounting for legal obligation.  His account is guided by his 
concern for what law must be like if it is to deserve the respect of citizens.  Only law so 
understood can have genuine normative force.  In the second part he builds on his theory 
of legal obligation, and develops a solution to the problem of political obligation.  Given 
that law deserves the respect of citizens, how should it figure into their thinking about 
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their moral obligations?  In the end he argues that all citizens who are concerned to act 
morally have sound moral reason to obey the law. 
 
What Is Law That It Should Be Obeyed? 
 
Soper finds the oft-heard contemporary claim that there is not even a prima facie 
duty to obey the law to be “remarkably counterintuitive.”254  He takes the existence of 
this duty to be part of the data to be explained by theories of legal and political 
obligation.  Some contemporary philosophers argue against the existence of such an 
obligation, but “most moral philosophers who have shaped Western consciousness, from 
Plato to Kant, seem to have assumed or explicitly argued for the opposite view.”255  So 
Soper locates himself in good company.  The question for him is not “does law 
obligate?”, but “if law is to obligate, what must it be like?” 
 Soper’s theory of law is aimed primarily at accounting for the law’s normativity.  
The claim that law has normative force amounts to the claim that law as such deserves at 
least minimal moral respect from citizens.256  What Soper has in mind is accounting for, 
and justifying, the difference in attitude a person tends to experience when confronted 
respectively by the mugger and the tax man.  When the mugger demands money, and 
threatens to punish disobedience with sanctions, a person tends to feel outrage.  When the 
tax man does the same, and with no more care for the personal interests or desires of the 
citizen than the mugger, a person tends to feel at least a minimal kind of respect.  What is 
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the difference?  The tax man represents the law.  This is why there is at least a minimal 
moral response to the tax collector that is absent in the case of the mugger.  This minimal 
moral respect is what Soper means by the law’s normativity.  His theory of law is aimed 
at explaining when and why this moral response is justified. 
 Soper emphasizes differences between his theory and Hart’s, but he also draws 
much from the positivist tradition.  Soper does not offer a full-blown definition of law, as 
positivists like Hart do, but instead works with a citizen’s rough, “common sense,” idea 
of law:  “a set of directives issued or accepted by officials who enforce the directives with 
organized sanctions.”257  Here Soper’s theory both resembles and differs from Hart’s. 
 Soper distinguishes descriptive theories from definitional ones.258  A descriptive 
theory, like Hart’s, identifies common features of standard examples of legal systems.  
Definitional theories identify conceptually necessary features of legal systems.  Soper 
rejects descriptive accounts like Hart’s.  He argues that Hart’s emphasis on the external 
perspective prevents him from adequately accounting for the internal perspective.  For 
instance, this is why he thinks Hart seems to vacillate on the reasons officials must have 
for accepting the rules.  Early in Concept, when Hart talks about rules of obligation, he 
says that they are often thought to protect or promote prized or essential features of 
society.  Later, when discussing morality and law, he seems to back away from this 
claim, and allows that officials might accept the rules for all kinds of non-moral reasons.  
This waffling, Soper thinks, is a result of Hart’s insistence on maintaining an external, 
descriptive perspective.  He seems to feel that Hart is so worried about maintaining a 
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distinction between law and morality that he cannot fully appreciate the internal 
perspective.  At times, Soper even seems to go so far as to insist that the internal 
perspective can only be understood internally.   
 Soper’s theory of law is definitional.  He makes definition proper a function of 
human purposes.  A sound definition of a thing identifies its essential features by 
determining what human beings can do with it, or how they can use it.  This is how Soper 
approaches the definition of law.  He seeks to define law’s essential features, including its 
normative force, by identifying the ways that law connects with significant human 
practical interests.  One interest citizens have is knowing when they might be punished 
by officials for violating laws.  But citizens also have a second practical interest in law:  
they want to act morally, so they want to know how the law is connected to their moral 
obligations.  Soper says Austin’s command theory was on the right track, because it 
attempted to define law in terms of human interests, but it ultimately failed because it 
defined law in terms of the first interest alone.  Soper thinks that an adequate definition 
law must take account of both interests.  Thus he seeks to develop a definition of law that 
conceptually connects it to moral obligation.259
 So we can summarize Soper’s normative project in the following way: 
Law is a set of directives issued and accepted by officials, and enforced by them 
with organized sanctions; what traits must these directives have if they are to 
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deserve at least minimal moral respect from citizens, and thereby fit into citizens’ 
moral calculations about how to act? 
Soper answers that “legal systems are essentially characterized by the belief in value, the 
claim in good faith by those who rule that they do so in the interests of all.”260  The law 
deserves the respect of citizens when citizens have good reason to believe that officials 
sincerely regard the law as promoting justice or the common good.  Soper uses the terms 
“the interests of all,” “the common good,” and “justice” interchangeably as placeholders, 
and they must be read loosely.261  He makes no strong claims about what should count as 
a theory of justice, or a commitment to the common good, for two main reasons.  First, he 
intends his theory to be generic, to account for the law’s normativity in all societies with 
genuine legal systems, and not just in liberal democratic ones.  He does not presume that 
only liberal democracies have legitimately enforceable law.  Second, he recognizes that 
individuals in all societies disagree about what justice requires.  If he were to say much at 
all about justice or the common good, he would run the risk of violating his own 
commitment to reasonable disagreement.  Soper insists on only two things.  First, a 
theory of justice must give some consideration to the interests of all citizens.  Second, 
officials must appeal only to theories of justice that are publicly available to members of 
their society, that are part of a known discourse or tradition of political thought.  This is 
necessary, Soper holds, because citizens will not see any normative reason to respect the 
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law if they cannot see it as grounded in some commitment to justice.  These two 
conditions form the core of Soper’s approach to reciprocity and shared reason. 
 This is what makes Soper’s theory a shared reason view.  It requires two kinds of 
reciprocity.  First, it requires something similar to what Reidy calls “reciprocity in 
advantage.”262  Soper requires that officials sincerely consider the interests of all citizens 
when proposing and enforcing law.  Reciprocity in advantage is a central component of 
shared reason.  We cannot expect citizens to authorize law if they have reason to regard 
having a legal system as worse than not having one.  If the law ignores a citizen’s 
interests altogether, or, worse, if it threatens her interests, she has no reason to regard law 
as preferable to anarchy, to the state of nature or of no law.  It is not reasonable to expect 
citizens to accept law under these conditions.  Thus, a minimum condition of law being 
something citizens could affirm is that citizens can see the law as something that respects 
(in some way) their interests.  While this requires the law to show some consistency (e.g., 
what Hart calls the law’s “formal aspect of justice” and its “natural law content”), it does 
not imply that all citizens must be treated equally.  The interests of citizens could be 
respected in many ways short of full and equal status, and we might expect to find just 
this in societies that do not share modern, liberal democratic values.263
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 Second, Soper’s theory requires something similar to what Reidy calls 
“reciprocity in justification.”264  Soper holds that if the law is to have genuine normative 
force, officials must make a sincere appeal to a theory of justice or the common good that 
is part of a publicly available or known discourse or tradition.  Every society with a legal 
system also has a public discourse about things like law, justice, the common good, the 
good for human beings, citizenship/membership, and so on.  In any given society, this 
public discourse is typically vast and contains many conflicting ideas.  The exact nature 
of these ideas also varies from society to society.  For example, in the U.S. today it is 
unreasonable to deny women the right to vote, but this was not so early in the 19th 
century.  At that time this was a question over which reasonable people could disagree.  
Today, of course, this is no longer the case in the U.S., but in other societies it still may 
be deemed reasonable to deny women the vote.  On Soper’s view, the law’s normativity 
does not depend on whether or not women get to vote.  What matters instead is that 
officials draw the reasons they offer in support of such laws from their publicly available 
discourse on political society.  Here is another example.  Today in the U.S. we affirm the 
ideal of one person, one vote, but some societies may reject this ideal, perhaps because 
they think it is a mistake to regard individual persons as having an equal basic right to 
political participation.265  Even in these non-liberal, non-democratic cases, law-makers go 
some distance toward reciprocity in justification simply by appealing to publicly 
available ideas.  In effect, officials say to citizens the following:  “people relevantly 
similar to you—some of your fellow citizens—actually do affirm these ideas, so it is 
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reasonable to believe that these are ideas that you could affirm as well (even if you 
don’t).” 
 Soper does not mean that officials must correctly judge their law to be just or 
otherwise to promote the common good.  He is trying to give an account of the law’s 
normative force that connects it to significant shared commitments like justice and the 
common good, but that also respects reasonable disagreements about what justice and the 
common good require.  In the case of particular laws that are obvious failures, of course, 
officials would be hard pressed to offer sincere defenses of them.  But with most laws it 
is not so obvious.  People reasonably disagree about the justice of many laws, and about 
the impact many laws have on the common good.  Nor does Soper think it necessary for 
citizens to agree with officials about the justice of the law; it is sufficient that citizens can 
see that officials sincerely believe that the law takes everybody’s interests into account in 
a morally significant way (at least as morality is understood in the culture/society in 
question).266
 Hart would accept Soper’s claim that the law need not actually promote any 
value, but he rejects the claim that official acceptance must be moral acceptance.  Soper 
rejects Hart’s account, because (Soper argues) Hart’s refusal to adopt moral acceptance 
means that his account fails to distinguish law from the gunman.  On Hart’s view, 
officials may accept the rules without making the moral claim that the rules serve the 
common good.  For instance, official acceptance may be based wholly on prudential 
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reasons, such as the desire for income, security, or prestige.  In this situation, citizens are 
likely to see official acceptance of the rules as indicating only that laws will be coercively 
enforced with sanctions.  From the perspective of citizens, the law collapses into 
coercion, and the government becomes the gunman.  When citizens have no reason to 
think the law serves any genuine moral purpose, they have no reason to think law counts 
in their own deliberations about how to act morally.  When the law is not morally loaded, 
its practical significance for citizens is merely self-interested and prudential. 
 
Respect for Authority and Political Obligation. 
 
 Political obligation—a citizen’s prima facie duty to obey the law—has to do with 
respect for authority.  Soper finds the appropriate paradigm of respect for authority in his 
analysis of filial duty.  On his view, filial duty provides a good analog for political 
obligation.267  In a family, a person is confronted by demands for conformity, even 
though that person’s membership is not the result of choice, or any other form of 
complicit behavior (e.g., willful negligence, unjust enrichment, estoppel).  The idea that 
political obligation is analogous to filial duty has been around for a long time, but 
discussion of it has been flawed, because both defenders and critics center their 
arguments on benefits supposedly conferred by family membership.  The problem with 
this approach is that it makes filial duty arguments similar to unjust enrichment (fair play) 
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arguments,268 which are weak and cannot ground political obligation.269  And even if the 
focus on benefits could ground political obligation, it would leave untouched the problem 
of deriving the specific content of political obligation. 
 So if it is not the benefits, then what is it about the family that generates filial 
duty?  The mutual acknowledgement of the members that an enterprise like a family is 
valuable, coupled with the fact that the person who happens to be in charge is trying in 
good faith to act in the interests of all family members, by acting in the interests of the 
family as a whole.  Soper says this makes plausible the following reaction to demands for 
compliance from an authority: 
 
1. Here is a job—directing an enterprise—that I concede someone needs to do. 
2. The person who happens to be in charge is trying to do that job in good faith, 
taking my interests equally into account along with the interests of others who 
also find themselves part of the same scheme. 
3. That effort deserves my respect and provides me with a moral reason to go along, 
though at some point this reason may be outweighed by the seriousness of error I 
think is being made.270 
 
                                                 
268  Soper discusses John Rawls’s fair play argument as a contemporary example of an unjust enrichment 
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195 
One virtue of this approach, says Soper, is that this attitude of respect for authority can be 
connected to themes in moral philosophy stressing empathy (“how would I want others to 
respond if I were in charge?”) and fallibility or the dangers of hubris (“I could be wrong 
about what ought to be done”). 
 For Soper, this analysis of filial duty provides a paradigm example of respect for 
authority.  This is, he argues, the best way to understand political obligation.  On his 
view, two features are sufficient to establish political obligation. 
Those features are (1) the fact that the enterprise of law in general—including the 
particular system, defective though it may be, that confronts an individual—is 
better than no law at all; and (2) a good faith effort by those in charge to govern in 
the interests of the entire community, including the dissenting individual.271
These two features are sufficient to generate a prima facie duty to obey the law.  They 
provide a rational basis for moral respect for the law.  This resolves, for instance, Wolff’s 
worry that the state’s demand for compliance is not consistent with every person’s moral 
duty to exercise autonomy.272  Soper’s view allows a person P to autonomously defer to 
the authority of another, A, even when P judges that A’s view is incorrect. 
 Soper concedes that feature (1) of his account leaves a gap in his solution to the 
problem of political obligation.273  The anarchist insists that (1) is false.  The anarchist 
holds, according to Soper, that people would be better off overall without any state 
enforced legal system.  Whatever person-to-person moral duties people have could be 
handled privately (e.g., through voluntary associations).  If the anarchist is correct, then 
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there is no obligation to the law.  That is, if the enterprise of law in general is not better 
than no law at all, there can be no political obligation. 
Soper does not think it is hard to show the anarchist is wrong, because the 
standard claim that law promotes security and stability is almost universally accepted.  
Further, this flaw in his own theory should be easier to accept than the conclusion that 
political obligation does not exist.  But the anarchist does present a difficult problem:  
does an individual who honestly believes that all law is bad have a political obligation to 
obey it?274
 Soper admits the appeal of arguing that, even if the anarchist is correct, still he 
has an obligation to obey.275  Is not the good faith effort of officials to govern in the 
interests of the entire community sufficient to generate obligations even for the anarchist?  
The answer is no.  Respect for others obligates the anarchist to listen to others in good 
faith.  But if the anarchist is correct that we would be better off without law, he cannot be 
obligated to comply with law without threatening his autonomy.  Soper’s account of 
political obligation depends on the falsity of anarchism. 
 Here Soper points to an asymmetry between (a) disagreements about what kind of 
legal system is best and (b) disagreements about whether any legal system is defensible at 
all.276  Disagreements of the former kind are matters of degree, while disagreements of 
the latter are disagreements in kind.  Between those who accept the value of law, there is 
common ground—a community of value—that makes the possibility of persuasion real.  
If you and I agree that law in general has value V, then it is possible that I can persuade 
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you that my law L contributes more to V than your law M, and vice versa.  This common 
ground, coupled with good faith concern for the whole community, generates respect for 
others.  But with the anarchist there is no such community of value.  How then can the 
anarchist have an obligation to obey the law?  Why should he respect it?  Soper says that 
if we are to hold that the anarchist has an obligation to the law, we must hold that he is 
wrong about its value.  The law is valuable, and deserves the anarchist’s respect, whether 
he believes it or not. 
 Feature (2) of Soper’s account of political obligation holds that those in charge 
must make a good faith effort to rule in the interests of all, including the interests of 
dissenters.  This is important because it emphasizes autonomy and mutual respect, 
especially between citizens in general and officials in the legal system.277  First, it is 
rational for citizens to acknowledge the value of a legal system when the system 
promotes their self-interest.  In this case, respect for authority is consistent with 
autonomy.  Second, the respect officials have for citizens’ autonomy requires them to 
consider the interests of citizens when they use their authority.  Finally, in the case of 
citizens, respect is owed to officials because they do an important job and honestly think 
that compliance with their directives is required, if the job is to get done.  The content of 
the respective obligations of citizens and officials varies and depends on the interests of 
each, but in each case the resulting obligations are generated by respect for the interests 
of the other. 
 On Soper’s view, respect for the law is, more precisely, a duty to obey those in 
charge, who make law and desire that citizens obey it.  “My respect for those in charge 
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provides a reason for doing what these persons believe I should do:  comply with the 
law.”278  He does not focus on large-scale effects of disobedience (e.g., social 
disintegration) or on specific benefits received as the source of obligation.  These will not 
work.  He says that one could develop a utilitarian defense of his view.  Such a defense 
would focus on 
the persons one confronts and their response to one’s disobedience rather than on 
the effects of disobedience on the enterprise itself.  Disobedience cannot easily be 
linked to societal disintegration; but it can be linked in an ascending scale to 
sadness, disappointment, concern, anxiety, and fear on the part of those who think 
the laws are important and my obedience desirable.279
But Soper feels his theory fits more naturally into a non-utilitarian background, “with the 
tradition that traces the source of all moral obligation to the respect that is due other 
equally autonomous, rational beings, mutually concerned for each other.”280
 Soper’s theory of political obligation should not be confused with those that 
analyze it in terms of gratitude.281  On Soper’s view, my duty to obey the Bush 
administration is not a duty of gratitude, but of respect.  In fact, I am not grateful at all for 
many of the things they are doing domestically and around the world.  But Bush and I 
share at least two beliefs:  (1) we both value the enterprise we are in, i.e., we both value 
our democratic society, and (2) we both believe anarchy is worse than government (even 
Bush’s version).  Bush and I agree that our democratic society is good and worth 
preserving and improving.  Is Bush really doing the kinds of things that will strengthen or 
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preserve what is good about our society?  Well, he is not doing what I would do.  But 
here I have to acknowledge Soper’s version of good faith disagreement.  Insofar as Bush 
sincerely believes that his policies are good for our democratic society, and his actions 
are not clearly out of the moral ballpark, I have to admit that his view is one a moral 
person could rationally affirm.  I am not grateful for his actions, but must concede that 
one might honestly see his efforts as good for something we both care about.  I could be 
mistaken about what is best for us, and he could be right.  I doubt it, but I cannot rule it 
out.  Since Bush is making a sincere effort to do what is best for all, me included, and is 
willing to defend his actions in terms of values publicly available in our society, I have 
reason to respect his actions.  Since he happens to be in power, my respect for him gives 
me sound reason to defer to him, to acquiesce, when he demands that I act in certain 
ways that he honestly believes contribute to the common good.  He wants me to obey the 
law, so, out of respect for his sincere commitment to the common good, and his sincere 
commitment to my good as well, I ought to do what he says.  There may come a time 
when I think Bush’s moves are so bad, so wrong-headed, that we have left the area of 
good faith disagreement over how to govern and preserve what is good about our 
democracy.  In that case, I may still have a prima facie obligation to obey the law, but I 
have even greater non-political moral reason to resist it.  The sincerity of his belief may 
give the law normative force, but my strong moral objection to his positions may override 
the political obligation his sincerity entails.  But until that point is reached, our common 
beliefs, coupled with reasonable disagreement, give me sound reason to obey.  Gratitude 
has nothing to do with it. 
200 
 One virtue of Soper’s approach to political obligation is that it helps us 
understand and derive the weight of the prima facie obligation to obey.282  The weight of 
any particular law, and the accompanying obligation, is determined by how seriously 
those who demand compliance view the law in question.   
If I do not believe that abortion is wrong, the intensity with which others hold the 
opposite moral view makes the obligation to obey a law against abortion strong 
…. 283
The intensity with which others hold a moral view can be estimated by considering how 
serious are the sanctions attached for disobedience.  If, on the other hand, no one cares 
much about a law—running a stop sign at 2 A.M.—the obligation to obey can be 
outweighed by less important moral considerations.  The law that no one cares much 
about has less prima facie moral weight than the law about which many people have very 
strong convictions. 
Soper recognizes that many will object to that his theory of political obligation is 
too modest.284  Traditionally, political obligation has been understood to require more 
than minimal moral respect for the law, more than a mere prima facie duty to obey.  So 
even if he were to account for minimal respect, he would not thereby account for political 
obligation.  Soper rejects this for two reasons.  First, accounting for minimal respect is 
more than either legal or political theory can do today.  If he is successful, this will be 
quite an accomplishment in itself.  Second, once one admits that political obligation is not 
absolute—that is, that political obligation can be overridden by other moral 
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considerations—the problem becomes understanding just how much weight political 
obligation carries.  In other words, unless one wants to hold the untenable position that 
political obligation is absolute, (wiping out, for instance, the moral value of civil 
disobedience) one must talk about political obligation in terms of prima facie duties. 
 
The Limits of Law. 
 
 Soper makes officials’ sincere belief in the justice of a legal system a necessary 
condition of the existence of law’s normativity and political obligation.  This sincerity 
condition places limited constraints on the content of law.285  Official justifications for a 
legal system must be (a) consistent with the minimal basis for recognizing the value of a 
legal system, and (b) believable in fact.  These conditions do not imply anything 
substantial about the appropriate content of law, but they do imply certain “natural” rights 
that all legal systems must respect.  These include (i) a minimal right to security of life, 
liberty, and property, (ii) a right to formal justice (formal equality), and (iii) a “right to 
discourse.”  These rights are largely formal, but they do place limits on law, mainly by 
ruling out certain extremely harmful situations. 
 Soper’s sincerity condition places few substantive constraints on the forms 
government can take or on the content genuine laws can have.  Did the Nazis have a legal 
system?  Did South Africa have a legal system during apartheid?  Answers to these and 
similar questions turn on whether officials sincerely believe they are ruling justly, and not 
on whether their beliefs are correct.  A sincere or good faith belief is not necessarily an 
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accurate one.  History tells us that thoughtful and otherwise decent individuals can 
sincerely believe that institutions like slavery are consistent with the common good.  
“Officials who accept the beliefs that underlie such moral judgments are acting in the 
interests of justice and fairness as they see it, and in that sense in the interest of all.”286  
Thus a slave-holding society could have genuine laws and obligations.  Fair does not 
mean equally weighted.  From the official standpoint, the advantaged and the 
disadvantaged in a slave-holding society each fairly get what they deserve. 
 But the sincerity condition does put limited constraints on the law.287  Officials 
who sincerely believe that a legal system promotes the common good must also sincerely 
believe that having a legal system is better than not having one.  That is, having a legal 
system must be better than anarchy or the state of nature.  This limits law, because any 
particular law that clearly would leave subjects in a condition worse than anarchy cannot 
generate obligations.  For example, a policy of genocide could not generate obligations 
for those affected by it, because no official could sincerely hold that laws designed to 
exterminate a class of people are better for those people than no law at all.288  This is 
implied by the sincere belief that law is better than anarchism.  In fact, any policy that 
undermines the minimum security of individuals runs counter to the sincerity condition.  
Thus the sincerity condition entails a sincere commitment to minimal security rights (life, 
liberty, property).  The same is true of the right to formal justice.  A legal system must 
not be wholly capricious, but must in some minimal sense treat like cases alike.  This is 
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necessary if any official is to sincerely hold that having a legal system is better than not 
having one.  In fact, a legal system without formal justice is pretty much the same thing 
as no law at all.  Thus all genuine legal systems must secure rights to minimum security 
and formal justice (formal equality) for subjects. 
 So the sincerity condition implies limited natural rights, and thus minimal 
constraints on law.  But sincerity is difficult to judge.  How can we know when an 
official sincerely believes a policy is just?  We test sincerity with consistency.289  We 
examine policies to try to determine whether or not they are consistent with the claim that 
law is better for those affected by it than the state of nature.  For instance, it is clear that a 
policy of genocide is worse for those affected by it than the condition of no law at all.  No 
one could sincerely claim that a policy that clearly leaves citizens worse off than they 
would be in the state of nature is consistent with the claim that having a legal system is 
better than not having one for those citizens.  However, most laws are not such obvious 
failures as a policy of genocide.  Suppose officials insist that a policy of slavery is 
consistent with the common good.  Could this meet the sincerity condition?  It is not 
obvious that slavery is inconsistent with the sincerity condition.  That is, some forms of 
slavery are not necessarily worse than anarchism, even for slaves.  Certainly some forms 
of slavery are worse, but not all.  In the anarchist condition, many things worse than 
slavery could happen to a person.  Thus it seems that slavery is not inconsistent with the 
sincere belief that having law is better than not having it. 
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Judging sincerity of belief is very difficult, and the consistency test will often be 
indeterminate, leaving us without any firm conclusion.  This leads Soper to insist on a 
third right, which he calls the “right to discourse.”  The right to discourse is a limited 
right of citizens to request evidence of sincere belief among officials, by engaging them 
in dialogue and debate.  Judging sincerity is difficult to do, but knowing when officials 
are sincere is key for citizens who want to know if the law deserves moral respect and 
thereby fits into their moral calculations.  Thus citizens have a limited right to probe 
official claims to sincerity in the public square.  Soper offers several reasons for thinking 
this right is a necessary component of all legal systems.  First, the sincere exercise of 
power in the name of justice implies a commitment to a theory of justice and not just a 
thoughtless response to tradition or self-interest.  A sincere official can reveal the process 
of reflective judgment that supports his personal world view, and will respond to 
dissidents with more than a simple “that’s just how it is.”  Second, officials are charged 
with making disinterested choices in situations that also impact their self-interest.  If 
citizens are to regard claims of justice in such situations as sincere and not merely self-
interested demands for compliance, officials will want to be able to demonstrate how they 
arrived at their conclusions.  One way to do this is by developing decision procedures that 
are impartial, consistent, and objective, and maintaining a certain level of transparency.  
When no such procedures are in place, officials have a duty to explain their decision 
process.  Third, it is not uncommon for people to confuse self-interest and public-interest, 
and to willfully overlook important facts or implications relevant to their decision.  
Sincerity requires a willingness to admit this possibility and to confront apparent 
discrepancies between theory and action.  Fourth, sincerity requires that officials treat 
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citizens as fully competent.  Citizens can understand the value of the legal system, and 
can judge official sincerity by talking with officials about how proposed laws contribute 
to that value.  Citizens have reason to doubt the sincerity of officials who simply refuse to 
engage in such discussion.  In the broadest terms, discourse is necessary because it 
counteracts self-deception and expresses mutual respect between officials and citizens. 
 The right to discourse is not a right to free speech.  The discourse right ensures 
that officials consider all relevant sides of political issues, which gives citizens some 
reason to think officials are sincere.  Discourse has more to do with “soothing wounded 
autonomy,” and producing peace and mutual respect, than it does with the reasons 
traditionally thought to support free speech.  It is not required as a means of developing 
individual capacities, or as a means of ensuring participation in government, or even as a 
means of getting closer to truth, though this plays some role.  Discourse is ultimately 
about making it possible for citizens to sincerely believe they are not simply being taken 
advantage of by government officials.  It affords citizens a certain amount of self-respect, 
by allowing them to conclude that their legal system really does (or could) promote the 
common good. 
 Discourse thus differs from free speech in many ways.  For example, sincere 
officials can prevent debate of all substantive political issues, without violating the 
discourse right, provided that they are willing to engage in honest discussion of the 
justifications for such restrictions on discourse.  The discourse right does not give every 
citizen the right to make political statements, to confront public officials, or even to try to 
persuade officials or other citizens.  What is required is that the reasonable challenges 
each person might mount against official claims of justice find some public expression.  
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A state that offers a more-or-less thorough justification of its basic structure has already 
engaged many potential challenges to its claim to justice.  But since laws and cultures 
evolve, and officials need continuously to impress upon citizens their sincerity, some 
form of discourse must always be possible. 
 
Potential Problems for Soper’s Theory. 
 
 Two potential problems for Soper are the Who? and What? problems.  Who 
exactly must make the moral claim?  What exactly must they claim is moral?  These 
seemingly simple questions interact in complex ways to produce difficulties for Soper’s 
theory.  Another potential problem is the claimed link between respect for officials and 
having reasons to comply with their commands.  These are separable issues, and so the 
link between them needs defense. 
 
The Who? and What? Problems. 
 
 According to Soper, the law merits the moral respect of citizens only when 
officials sincerely affirm that the law is just.  But Who must make the justice claim?  And 
What must they claim is just?290  The Who? problem has two elements.  The first has to 
do with exactly which government officials must make the claim.  The second has to do 
with the number or percentage of government officials who must make the claim.  The 
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U.S. Government, for instance, is composed of the legislative, executive, and judicial 
branches.  Must members of all three branches make the justice claim?  Is it enough if 
members of one (e.g., the legislature) make the claim?  Also, how many members must 
make the claim?  All?  A simple majority?  At least one?  The What? problem asks 
whether officials must claim justice for (a) the legal system as a whole, or (b) particular 
laws.  The Who? and What? problems interconnect in complicated ways.  I will start by 
describing alternative interpretations of the What? problem.  I will discuss the Who? 
problem as it arises for each interpretation of the What? problem. 
 
A.  Government officials claim legal system LS1 as a whole is just. 
  
 This is one generic answer to the What? question.  Below I discuss different 
interpretations of A.  None of them are free from difficulties. 
 
A1.  Some official(s) sincerely believes that every law Px in legal system LS1 is just. 
 
 On A1, the claim that the legal system LS1 is just means that every single law Px 
that comprises it is just.  This is not a plausible interpretation of the justice claim.  It is 
unlikely that any government official could sincerely claim that every law in a legal 
system is just.  Every citizen, officials included, who is aware of all the laws of a legal 
system will certainly find at least one of them morally objectionable.  As a standard of 
legal and political obligation, A1 is simply too demanding.  In this case, the Who 
question is irrelevant.  If we cannot expect even one official to sincerely make this justice 
208 
claim, there is no point in asking whether we should require that some significant number 
of them sincerely affirm it. 
 
A2.  For each law Px in LS1, at least one government official sincerely deems it just. 
 
 One might hold that the whole legal system can be deemed just when, for each 
law, at least one government official affirms that it is just.  On this reading, no single 
official need hold that all of the laws are just.  It is sufficient if official justice claims 
overlap enough to encompass all of the laws.  This is a possibility, though there is 
certainly no guarantee that every law will be affirmed as just.  A potential problem is the 
possibility that some law may be deemed just by only one official, and rejected by one or 
more other officials.  This issue falls under the heading of the Who problem. 
 Exactly how many government officials must make the justice claim?  And what 
does it mean when government officials disagree over the justice of a particular law?  
Suppose, for the sake of argument, that it is necessary for members of the legislative 
branch to make the justice claim.  (Leave aside for now the question of whether or not 
this is sufficient.)  Must every member of the legislature make the justice claim?  Is a 
simple majority sufficient?  Is it enough if just one makes the claim? 
 On A2, the legal system as a whole is held “by officials” to be just, because at 
least one official affirms the justice of each and every law.  But this means that for some 
laws, only one official may affirm it.  This is a potential problem in conflict situations.  
Suppose one official affirms that a law is just, but another official rejects it.  Could we 
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then hold that legal system LS1 as a whole is deemed just by government officials?  This 
seems odd.  We might amend A2 as follows: 
 
A2.1.  For each law Px in LS1, at least one official sincerely deems it just, and in no case 
do more officials reject any law than affirm it. 
 
 As a matter of social fact, A2.1 seems implausible.  I think it likely that in every 
legal system at least some laws are rejected by more officials than affirm it as just, and 
this can change through time.  If this is wrong, however, the modified A2 is a possible 
reading of the justice claim for whole legal systems.  But suppose then that only one 
official does affirm the justice of a law, and the rest are not sure about it.  Would this be 
enough to support the claimed legal and political obligations?  I do not find this 
compelling.  In a complex modern state, in which the government is comprised of many 
different officials, it hardly seems plausible to hold that the sincere belief of one official 
alone could generate the normative force necessary for legal and political obligation. 
  
A3.  An official sincerely believes that legal system LS1 is more just on balance than any 
available alternative legal system LSx. 
 
 On A3, a whole legal system is considered just by an official when she regards it 
as more just overall than any alternative legal system.  That is, an official of LS1 
considers it more just, on balance, than potential legal systems LS2, LS3, and so on, and 
so considers LS1 as a whole to be just.  No one need claim that all of the laws are deemed 
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just.  The claim is only that the legal system as a whole is regarded as more just than 
other alternatives.  This seems like the most plausible interpretation of the claim that 
officials must affirm that the whole legal system is just.  Nevertheless, it is not without 
problems. 
 One problem with A3 is that it is not inconsistent with the sincere belief that some 
particular law P1 of LS1 is not just.  That is, an official can sincerely claim that a legal 
system LS1 is more just than any alternative, but still sincerely hold that policy P1 of LS1 
is not just.  She might hold that the reasons for thinking that LS1 is just (e.g., maximizing 
liberty) actually count against thinking that P1 is just (e.g., because it sacrifices certain 
freedoms for the sake of other goods).  As we saw above in the discussion of A1, it is 
highly unlikely that any official will hold that every law in a legal system is just, even if 
he sincerely considers the legal system just overall.  When an official considers LS1 just 
overall, but considers P1 unjust, does P1 have normative force?  Since the official in 
question considers P1 unjust, there is no reason to think that it merits the moral respect of 
citizens. 
 
B.  Government officials claim particular laws Px of LS1 are just. 
 
 In contrast to A, which had officials claiming justice for the legal system as a 





B1.  Government officials claim this particular law P1 is just. 
 
 Who must make this claim?  In a democracy like ours, for instance, must officials 
from all three branches affirm the justice of P1?  Is it sufficient if the members of only 
one branch make the justice claim?  If so, does it matter which branch? 
 How many must make this claim?  Suppose, for the sake of argument, that 
members of the legislature must make the justice claim.  It is implausible to hold that all 
of the members have to make the justice claim for P1.  And as I suggested earlier, in 
complex societies like our own, we probably need more than one official to make the 
justice claim, if a particular law is to have the normative force necessary for legal and 
political obligation.  But if one is too few, and all is too many, what number seems right? 
 On the face of it, it seems like a simple majority might be sufficient.  However, 
this gets complicated in a two party system like our own.  Imagine a situation in which 
Republicans effectively control Congress.  For the sake of simplicity, I will focus only on 
the Senate, and posit that there are 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats.  When the 
Republicans decide on a policy, they have the political muscle to enact it.  Should we 
require that a simple majority of all Senators makes the justice claim (51), or is it enough 
if a simple majority of the controlling party’s Senators make the claim (28)?  Both 
options have problems. 
 One option requires a simple majority of all Senators (51).  I will describe a 
scenario that is not uncommon but that reveals a potential problem with this simple 
majority reading.  Suppose there are 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats.  On certain 
important issues, e.g., gay marriage, different Republican and Democratic leaders will 
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propose different policies.  That is, different Republican Senators may offer different 
proposals, PR1, PR2, and PR3, and different Democratic Senators may do the same, PD1, 
PD2, and PD3.  The Republican Senators may be divided over the justice or moral merits 
of their three proposed laws:  20 favor PR1, 18 favor PR2, and 17 favor PR3.  The 
Democratic Senators may be divided too.  In this case, the Republican Senators are likely 
to settle on one of their own proposals, PR1, and put all of their support behind it, even if 
most of them do not think it is the just proposal.  Why?  Because the greater proportion of 
Republican Senators support it (20), and all of the Republican Senators are likely to feel 
it is better than any of the Democratic proposals.  In this example, the law enacted, PR1, 
is not thought of as best for the community by most Senators, even Republicans.  Does 
this law merit the moral respect of citizens?  Can we say that a majority of Senators have 
affirmed it as just?  I do not think so.  Nevertheless, I do not think there is anything 
particularly morally suspect about the situation I have described, so I think we need to 
say laws produced this way are genuine laws with the normative force that entails.  Thus, 
if B1 is the best way to read Soper’s theory, there may be a problem. 
 
 These Who? and What? problems are complex and largely overlooked by Soper.  
Neither interpretation A nor B are free from problems, and it is not obvious that any 
interpretation is clearly superior to the others.  Since Rawls draws on Soper, he faces 





From Respect to Obligation. 
 
 Soper argues that when officials sincerely claim that the law is just, citizens have 
a moral reason to respect the officials.  This respect for officials in turn gives citizens a 
reason to do what officials want them to do, namely, obey the law.  Some question this 
link.291  Respect and obligation are clearly separable issues, so the move from one to the 
other needs defense.  Those who act on sincere moral convictions plausibly deserve 
respect, but it is not obvious that this respect implies a duty to obey.  In some cases, for 
instance, respect for moral sincerity might require only a less harsh response to those 
whose behavior we judge foolish or immoral, however sincere they may be.  The mugger 
who steals to feed his family deserves less scorn than the one who does it to feed himself, 
but neither deserves to be obeyed.  Lyons puts the challenge this way:  “the kind of 
respect (if any) that a sincere champion of chattel slavery is due seems to provide me 
with no reason at all to respect (that is, to comply with) his slave laws.”292
 Three points need to be made on Soper’s behalf.  First, Soper’s notion of political 
obligation amounts to a weak prima facie moral reason for citizens to obey the 
government.  It is not an absolute duty, or even a strong prima facie reason to act.  Of 
course, it is still possible to question the link between respect and this weak sense of duty.  
They are separable issues.  But Soper’s weak notion of duty lowers the burden of proof 
for him.  It is easier to draw a connection between respect and a weak duty than it is to 
draw one between respect and a strong or absolute duty. 
                                                 
291   See, e.g., Lyons, “Soper’s Moral Conception,” 162. 
292   Lyons, “Soper’s Moral Conception,” 162. 
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 Second, Soper does not assume that respect as such implies his weak duty to 
obey.  Rather, he argues that certain social contexts make the move from respect to duty 
both natural and plausible.  Soper is not talking about all relationships of respect and 
obligation, but the political relationship between government officials and citizens.  He 
assumes as background context this conventional authority relationship, and wonders if 
this conventional relationship can be morally justified.  He posits (a) a state with 
government officials who give orders backed by sanctions, and (b) citizens who think that 
these commands are “laws” that give them sound reason to obey the government, and 
asks when (if at all) this respectful attitude that citizens have toward law is morally 
sound?  His answer is that this respect is morally justified when citizens have reason to 
think officials are honestly ruling in (what officials believe to be) the interests of all.  
This might be the wrong way to approach the problem of political obligation, but it is not 
the same as assuming that respect implies a duty to obey. 
 Third, Soper’s theory is context or culture sensitive.  What can be sincerely 
affirmed in any society depends on the belief system of the people in question.  Chattel 
slavery could not be sincerely held to be in the interest of slaves in any society, because it 
represents a condition no better for citizens than the state of nature.  But some forms of 
slavery might be sincerely held to be just in some societies today.  In a modern 
democratic society like our own, chattel slavery could not be sincerely held to be just.  
Our science clearly refutes crude determinist or racial arguments for natural superiority or 
inferiority for classes of people that were sometimes offered in the past as justification for 
slavery.  And our deep moral commitments to the freedom and equality of persons also 
count against slavery.  Thus, in a modern democracy like our own, no one could sincerely 
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hold that chattel slavery is just.  But does this not contradict Soper’s contention that 
sincere belief is not necessarily correct belief?  No.  It is true that sincerity does not 
depend on correctness, but there is a complex relationship between them.  The greater the 
evidence against a position, the harder it becomes for anyone to maintain and 
demonstrate sincere belief in it.  For example, a government official could maintain, 
against all evidence and reason, that a practice like chattel slavery is just, but this is less 
an example of sincerity than it is an example of dogmatic insistence.  These are not the 
same thing.  Sincerity requires a rational commitment to a position.  What a person can 
rationally commit to depends in part one her society’s belief system, on her society’s 
views of the natural and moral world.  This implies that where practices like slavery can 
be sincerely held to be just, there will be traditions of natural and moral inquiry that 
support the view.  This does not mean they will not meet opposition, even in those 
societies.  It does mean that possibility that slavery might be sincerely held to be just does 
not amount to an obvious reductio argument against his view. 
 
Soper and Liberal Democracy. 
 
 There is one last issue I would like to take up.  The question is whether or not 
Soper’s view is adequate as a theory of political obligation for a liberal democratic 
society like our own.  This is not so much a criticism as it is a reflection on the larger 
theme of the liberal hope of shared reason.  Soper’s view is generic and intended to apply 
to all societies with genuine legal systems.  What does Soper’s view imply for a liberal 
democratic society?  To the best of my knowledge, Soper never explicitly addresses this 
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question.293  But if we take what he says at face value, we can see how it might work.  
The key is that public officials must base their political activity on some considered 
conception of justice that is publicly available, that has some traction in their particular 
liberal democratic society.  So, for instance, in the U.S. today we can imagine different 
officials acting on the basis of all sorts of different conceptions of justice, including 
utilitarian, explicitly liberal, libertarian, Marxist, socialist, and communitarian 
conceptions, and a variety of religious conceptions as well.  There are resources in our 
public discourse that make it possible for someone to sincerely affirm many views that 
fall into any of these families of conceptions of justice.  In fact, serious and thoughtful 
persons do offer sincere defenses of versions of all of these conceptions in an attempt to 
bring justice to our society.  While it is clear that we can find defects in all of these views 
too, this is not the issue.  What matters is that all of these conceptions are publicly 
available, and all of them give consideration to the interests of all citizens.  Thus, a public 
official in the U.S. could sincerely affirm any of the above views as correct for us. 
 There is reason to worry about this.  Even though Soper’s view is a shared reason 
view, it may be inadequate as an account of the law’s normative force in modern liberal 
democracies like the U.S.  Soper’s account of reciprocity and shared reason is very 
relaxed and open.  This relaxed standard raises two kinds of worries in the liberal 
democratic context.  First, Soper’s view encourages and legitimates types of political 
behavior that some liberal theorists regard as forms of political domination.  Second, it 
                                                 
293   In fact, Soper no longer affirms the view he developed in A Theory of Law.  His new view can be 
found in The Ethics of Deference:  Learning from Law’s Morals (Cambridge University Press, 2002).  
Interestingly, Rawls was much influenced by Soper’s original account, and continued to apply it in his 
work even after Soper had moved away from it.  Soper’s influence on Rawls is explained in the next 
section. 
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authorizes or allows for illiberal political activity, or activity rooted in illiberal political 
views. 
 One worry is that Soper’s view legitimates political behavior that some liberal 
theorists regard as forms of political domination.  I have in mind the kind of complaints 
that (e.g.) Rawls, Nicholas Audi, and Amy Guttmann and Dennis Thompson make 
against political behavior that is ultimately rooted in controversial comprehensive 
understandings of the human good, such as religious views.294  By permitting, e.g., 
religious government officials to ground political activity in controversial and 
comprehensive views taken from just any publicly available discourse or tradition, Soper 
leaves his view open to a number of criticisms, e.g., that it fails to respect the fact that 
other citizens can reasonably reject religious and other comprehensive views; that it does 
nothing to show citizens that official decisions are based on the merits of the various 
political views in question and not on the sheer bargaining power of the different parties; 
that it discourages truly public-spirited political activity; or that it does not promote 
mutually respectful decision-making processes.  In essence, the worry is that Soper’s 
view is so relaxed about shared reason and reciprocity, that it fails to properly constrain 
political behavior.  This amounts to a kind of domination if (as Rawls, Audi, and 
Guttmann and Thompson argue) there are less controversial, more fully shared (or at least 
potentially shared) public reasons that officials can appeal to in politics.  In Soper’s 
defense, though, he does insist that political behavior must be rooted in some conception 
of justice.  So e.g. religious citizens could not simply enforce their religious views as 
                                                 
294   See, e.g., Audi’s contribution to Robert Audi and Nicholas Wolterstorff, Religion in the Public Square; 
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Why Deliberative Democracy?; and Rawls, PL, pp. 212-254, and 
“The Idea of Public Reason Revisited,” in LP, pp. 129-180. 
218 
such, but only conceptions of justice related to or based on those views.  Further, on 
Soper’s view religious citizens would not simply be exerting their will against others, but 
would be acting within constraints imposed by a common commitment to justice, similar 
to the way Hart’s legislators are constrained by secondary rules.295
 A second potential difficulty is that Soper’s view allows for political action 
ultimately rooted in non-liberal or even illiberal views.  Soper’s view authorizes, e.g., 
official law-making aimed at realizing libertarian conceptions of justice.  Rawls has 
argued that libertarianism is at best an impoverished form of liberalism, since, inter alia, 
it does not share liberalism’s desire to prevent social and economic inequalities from 
becoming excessive.296  (Libertarianism does not meet Rawls’s more demanding 
understanding of shared reason and reciprocity, which I discuss in the next section.)  
Freeman has argued that libertarianism is illiberal because it sees political power as 
ultimately rooted in private contracts, and “rejects the idea, essential to liberalism, that 
political power is a public power, to be impartially exercised for the common good.”297  
If Rawls and Freeman are correct, then we might regard Soper’s generic view as 
inadequate to the needs of a liberal democracy, since it legitimates lawmaking aimed at 
realizing non-liberal (e.g., libertarian, Marxist, Christian, and so on) conceptions of 
justice. 
 If it turns out that Soper’s generic view cannot be rescued from these problems, 
this does not necessarily mean that we ought to reject it, even as an account of the law’s 
authority in a liberal democracy.  It may simply turn out to be the best that we can hope 
                                                 
295   Whether this avoids the Mafia problem mentioned in note 17 is not clear. 
296   See e.g. Rawls, LP, p. 49. 
297   Samuel Freeman, “Illiberal Libertarians:  Why Libertarianism is Not a Liberal View,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, v. 30 (2002), p. 107. 
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for from any view that takes seriously both respect for individual judgment and 
reasonable disagreement.  But if Soper’s view represents the best that shared reason can 
do in the face of such disagreements, the liberal political project as many understand it 
may have reached its end.  Shared reason may prove inadequate to securing and 
promoting a liberal society. 
 
Hart, Soper and Rawls. 
 
 Rawls was influenced by both Hart and Soper.  In The Law of Peoples, Rawls 
argues that certain non-democratic, non-liberal constitutional republics (“decent” 
societies) deserve full and good standing in the international community.298  Decent 
societies meet enough conditions of right and justice to merit the respect of liberal 
democracies and the right to self-determination, to be free from the interference of other 
societies.  One condition of decency is that a society’s system of law imposes genuine 
moral duties and obligations on citizens.299  An early version of this idea appears in 
Political Liberalism.300  There Rawls says that in order to be viable, the legal system of a 
decent society must be guided by something like Soper’s common good idea of justice, 
coupled with either Hart’s minimum content of natural law or Soper’s natural rights to 
security, formal justice, and discourse.  Later, in The Law of Peoples, Rawls mentions 
only Soper’s ideas.  Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy can be understood as an 
application of Soper’s generic account of legal and political obligation to the context of 
                                                 
298   Rawls, The Law of Peoples. 
299   Rawls, The Law of Peoples, pp. 65-6, especially footnote 5. 
300   Rawls, Political Liberalism, pp. 109-10, especially footnote 15. 
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democratic political culture.  A large part of Rawls’s liberal project is aimed at providing 
the background context against which sincerity can be judged.  Rawls’s liberal legitimacy 
is the subject of the next chapter. 
 While Rawls clearly draws inspiration from Hart and Soper, he does not offer a 
definition of law.  He rejects Soper’s claim that the sincerity condition and its implied 
natural rights define law proper, and says he does not want to argue that entities like the 
antebellum South did not have legal systems.  But Rawls does seem to regard Soper’s 
theory as an adequate account of the class of laws that do give rise to obligations, 
regardless of whether it adequately defines law as such.  Rawls actually leaves open the 
question of whether some command that does not give rise to obligations might properly 
be called law.  Soper makes the same move in a paper published soon after A Theory of 
Law.301  He scales back his goal, from defining law as such, to accounting for the class of 
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 In the 1960’s, Rawls affirmed a fair play account of political obligation.  By the 
1970’s, he had rejected this view and replaced it with his natural duty of justice.  By the 
1990’s, when he published Political Liberalism (hereafter PL) his natural duty of justice 
had given way to the liberal principle of legitimacy.  This chapter develops and evaluates 
an exegetically sound interpretation of this principle and its role in Rawls’s political 
liberalism.  Theories of legitimacy account for or justify a government’s claimed right to 
coercively enforce laws against citizens, and any duties citizens may have to acquiesce or 
defer to the government when it seeks to exercise this right.  Rawls’s theory is aimed at 
accounting for legitimacy in modern pluralist democracies like our own.  It is not a theory 
of legitimate state power as such, but of the legitimate power of this one kind of state. 
 
Hart, Soper, and Rawls. 
 
 Rawls holds, like Hart and Soper, that political institutions and practices must be 
governed by rules, if they are to be just or legitimate.  Rules are a necessary restraint on 
the arbitrary use of political power, and are an essential element of constitutional 
government.  A fundamental organizing idea in Rawls’s political liberalism is the idea 
that society is a fair system of cooperation over time.302  For Rawls, this means more than 
just that cooperation among citizens is effectively coordinated by some ruler.  It means 
                                                 
302   See, e.g., PL, pp. 15-18. 
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that cooperation among citizens is structured by rules that citizens publicly recognize as 
mutually advantageous and as properly governing their coordinated behavior. 
 Rawls’s commitment to rules is evident in his appeals to a constitutional form of 
government.  The term “constitution” has two meanings.303  It may refer to a text, to 
some written document that proclaims certain fundamental social rules.  The U.S. has a 
constitution in this sense, while England does not.  And it has a prior, deeper meaning, 
which Samuel Freeman calls its “institutional” sense.304  In this institutional sense, a 
constitution is a set of fundamental, shared rules for making and applying laws.  In this 
respect, institutional constitutions are very much like Hart’s secondary practice rules.  An 
institutional constitution is a set of behavioral standards internalized by citizens, and used 
by them as a guide in political interaction.  These fundamental norms define the offices 
and positions of political authority in a political system, their qualifications, rights, 
powers, duties, and so on, and the procedures for making, applying and enforcing laws.  
Constitutions may be written when no institutional constitution exists, but these often 
have little purchase on those whose behavior they are meant to guide.305  The most 
effective written constitutions proclaim important social norms shared by the writers and 
those they represent.  Both the U.S. and England have institutional constitutions.  
Institutional constitutions do several things.  Most importantly, they restrict the arbitrary 
rule of leaders. 
                                                 
303   Samuel Freeman, “Original Meaning, Democratic Interpretation, and the Constitution,” Philosophy and 
Public Affairs, v. 21 (1992), pp. 3-42.   
304  Freeman, “Original Meaning,” p. 6. 
305   This is one reason why it is important to include all major social and religious groups in the current 
effort to produce a constitution for Iraq.  Of course, any group that simply rejects constitutionalism may 
and probably should be excluded.  We should separate the question of how those who affirm the rule of law 
ought to organize their political society from the question of how they as a political society ought to 
structure their interactions with those who reject the rule of law. 
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 But Rawls follows Soper in rejecting Hart’s purely procedural or pedigree 
account of legal normativity.  Instead, Rawls accepts the broad strokes of Soper’s generic 
account of legal and political obligation, which holds that the law has genuine normative 
force only if it is sincerely held to be just by government officials.  In his political 
liberalism, Rawls applies Soper’s generic account to the context of liberal democratic 
political culture.  In liberal democracies, citizens regard each other as the free and equal 
co-authors of their law.306  The state’s power is public power, the power of free and equal 
citizens as a collective body.  For Rawls, then, the law has genuine normative force only 
when it is consistent with an account of justice that all citizens could reasonably affirm. 
 But Rawls rejects Soper’s notion of political obligation.  Rawls holds that 
obligations can only be generated through voluntary acts, but since political society is 
closed—we enter at birth and leave only when we die—citizens cannot have political 
obligations.307  Critics like Simmons would complain that Rawls assumes too much 
here.308  Simmons chastises theorists who assume that membership in political society is 
a social or political fact about persons, because this is one of the more hotly contested 
issues in traditional debates about political obligation.309  No answer should be assumed 
without explanation or defense.  But Rawls and Hume have got it right:  the state’s 
authority cannot be freely accepted, because “the bonds of society and culture, of history 
                                                 
306   PL, p. 136, 217. 
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308   See, e.g., A. John Simmons, “Associative Political Obligations,” Ethics, v. 106, 1996, pp. 247-273. 
309   Some philosophers, such as Soper and Rawls, assume that (nearly) all individuals are in fact members 
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and social place of origin, begin so early to shape our life and are normally so strong.”310  
Not even a right of emigration could change the fact that leaving one’s nation is a “grave 
step” that involves  
leaving the society and culture in which we have been raised, the society and 
culture whose language we use in speech and thought to express and understand 
ourselves, our aims, goals, and values; the society and culture whose history, 
customs and conventions we depend on to find our place in our social world.  In 
large part we affirm this society and culture, having an intimate and inexpressible 
knowledge of it, even though much of it we may question and even reject.311
Membership in political society is not a choice.  For Rawls, this means there is no point 
in talking about political obligation as such.  Instead, he offers an account of legitimacy.  
Whether or not citizens have an obligation to obey the law, it is still important to try to 
understand the conditions under which it would be appropriate for the state to use its 
power to coercively enforce laws against citizens. 
 The conditions outlined in Soper’s account of political obligation cannot generate 
obligations, according to Rawls, because obligations require voluntary commitment.  But 
here we might borrow a page from Finnis and Soper.  Finnis and Soper are not 
comfortable rejecting the correlativity thesis, because any conditions that would account 
for political obligation should also provide justification for the state’s use of force, and 
vice versa.  Finnis and Soper are wrong about the correlativity thesis, but there is 
something to be said for their observation.  The interesting insight is that an account of 
                                                 
310   Rawls, Justice as Fairness (Cambridge, Ma.:  Harvard University Press, 2001), p. 94.  Hereafter JF. 
311   JF, p. 94. 
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political obligation might also work, and might even work better, as an account of 
political legitimacy.  And the proper correlate of legitimacy (as a justification right) is not 
the duty to obey, but the duty to defer.  So Rawls might think that, even though Soper’s 
account cannot explain political obligations (because they don’t exist), it could still 
account for the state’s legitimacy right, and the citizen’s correlative duty to defer to the 
state.   
 Thus, I argue, one way of understanding much of Rawls’s post-1980 work on 
political liberalism is to see it as an effort to explain what it means for democratic 
citizens, in their common role as public officials who jointly co-author their law, to 
evince a sincere commitment to the justice of their constitution.  Rawls’s work describes 
what might be thought of as Soperian “sincerity conditions” applicable to modern 
pluralist democracies.  But these conditions no longer explain a citizen’s duty to obey the 
government; instead they account for the state’s right to use its power against citizens. 
 Both Soper and Rawls hold that the law has genuine normative force only when 
those responsible for it sincerely hold that the law is just.  Soper is careful to avoid saying 
too much about justice.  He makes no claim about what problems it might solve, or about 
what its basic subject might be.  One reason for this is that he wants his account of 
obligation to be generic, to apply to all societies with genuine legal systems.  He does not 
want to bias his account toward any particular sort of society, so he remains largely 
agnostic about the nature of justice.  He also wants to respect what I call good faith 
disagreements about it.  Every society’s tradition of political thought contains a plurality 
of views about justice and the common good, and in every society, people disagree in 
good faith about which of the various publicly available accounts of justice is most 
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appropriate for them.  Thus, Soper intends his view to respect both inter- and intra-
cultural disagreements about justice.  This does not mean that Soper thinks that, say, 
something like Apartheid would be just, according to our modern liberal democratic 
political values.  He simply does not want presume that only liberal democracies have 
genuine legal orders.  Soper offers just two minimal conditions of justice:  no official can 
sincerely hold that terms of political association are just for some citizen if those terms of 
association ignore altogether or threaten (what the official sincerely believes to be) the 
interests of that citizen; and no terms of association can be considered just if they cannot 
reasonably be linked to some publicly available political discourse.  The interests of all 
citizens (as these are understood by officials) must be taken into account, at least in some 
minimal way, if citizens generally are going to have political obligations.  Further, they 
must see that officials are not acting solely on the basis of self-interest, and are instead 
acting on the basis of ideas about justice that have some weight in their culture. 
 Rawls applies Soper’s generic account to a specific cultural and political context:  
modern liberal democracies.  He has a well-developed and fairly specific understanding 
of the nature of justice in this context, which forms the heart of his political liberalism. 
 
From TJ to PL:  Rawls’s Turn to Legitimacy. 
 
 Rawls holds that liberal democracies are constituted by citizens who share a 
commitment to democracy, but who cannot resolve their political differences, or even 
find mutual understanding, in terms of their irreconcilable religious, moral and 
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philosophical understandings of the good for human beings.312  This situation—the 
condition of reasonable pluralism—raises three fundamental political problems:  how can 
citizens so divided constitute themselves as a democratic body politic that is (a) just, (b) 
legitimate, and (c) stable?  Over the course of his career, Rawls proposed solutions to all 
of these problems.  In A Theory of Justice (hereafter TJ), his first sustained effort to 
answer them, he develops and defends an answer to (a) that he calls “justice as 
fairness.”313  Not long after he finished TJ, he realized that the work contained a serious 
flaw.  Roughly put, in answering (b) and (c) in TJ, Rawls assumed that citizens raised in a 
society organized by justice as fairness would eventually converge on a Kantian moral 
outlook, and that everyone would eventually come to see internalizing and acting from 
justice as fairness as a component of his or her own good, as a bit of self-realization as an 
autonomous being.314
 In TJ, after Rawls generated the two principles of justice as fairness, he wanted to 
show that a society guided by them would become stable for the right reasons, that is, that 
they could effectively regulate society if publicly affirmed by most reasonable citizens.  
So he tried to show that citizens have a duty to obey the laws of their just regime, and can 
reasonably be expected to have motivation to live up to their duties.  He offered his 
“principles of natural duty” and “fair play” arguments to solve the first part of the 
problem.315  He offered the so-called “congruence argument” in Part III of TJ to solve the 
second part.  In this congruence argument Rawls assumed citizens raised under just 
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institutions would converge on a Kantian comprehensive doctrine and come to see doing 
justice as part of their own good.  Thus, he claimed, citizens can be expected to 
voluntarily comply with the law.  But by 1980, Rawls realized the congruence argument 
was flawed and rejected it.  There is no reason to expect citizens raised under liberal 
institutions shaped by even justice as fairness to converge on any single comprehensive 
doctrine, let alone Rawls’s favored Kantian moral outlook.  Once Rawls recognized the 
true problem presented by reasonable disagreement, he faced a much more serious 
problem than the one he dealt with in TJ. 
 Reasonable disagreement allows citizens to affirm comprehensive doctrines that 
do not make Rawlsian (or any other notion of) self-realization as an autonomous being a 
part of the human good.  Thus, for some reasonable citizens the human good is 
completely distinct from self-realization or even the realization of justice in society.  
Further, while Rawls recognized in TJ that citizens could reasonably disagree over 
whether or not justice as fairness was the most appropriate understanding of justice for a 
liberal democracy, he did not seem to think that (many) citizens would disagree, 
especially once they had converged on his favored Kantian moral outlook.316  But once 
he gives up the convergence argument, reasonable disagreement about justice as fairness 
becomes much more likely.  At this point Rawls had to find new answers to (b) and (c).  
Under what conditions would it be legitimate to enforce something like justice as 
fairness, given that citizens may reasonably reject it as an account of justice?  And, given 
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the likelihood of such reasonable dissent, would a society organized around justice as 
fairness prove stable through time?  These issues are at the heart of PL.  
 But very few seem to understand Rawls’s post-1980 work.  Rawls certainly shares 
some of the blame for this.  PL is a difficult book to read, largely because Rawls is not 
very clear in the body of this work about his aims.  This is partly due to the fact that the 
book was composed of lectures and papers written separately and at different times in 
Rawls’s career.  Nevertheless, one of his principle aims is showing what legitimacy 
requires, and demonstrating that justice as fairness meets these requirements.317   His 
theory of legitimacy has been the subject of a great deal of confusion.  In fact, a common 
but incorrect reading of Rawlsian legitimacy has taken on a life of its own.  I will explain 
and reject this reading later in the chapter.  Much of this confusion can be traced to the 
fact that the theory of legitimacy is presented in the broad strokes in PL, but it is not fully 
worked out there.  Rawls continues to develop it through time, and though he never 
radically revises it, it finds its most complete expression only in his later works. 
 Two often overlooked keys to understanding the project of PL are the 
“Introduction to the Paperback Edition” and the “Reply to Habermas.”318  Burton Dreben 
claims these additions are so important to understanding Rawls’s project in PL, that we 
are warranted in thinking of the paperback edition, published in 1996, as a second edition 
of the hardback edition, published in 1993.319  These additions provide a context for the 
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body of PL that, on Dreben’s view, modifies the basic thrust or emphasis of the main 
arguments in it.  Whether these additions are meant to alter the meaning of the text, or 
simply to provide proper context for its main parts, it is clear that PL cannot be 
understood without them.  The hardback edition of PL is, in this sense at least, 
incomplete.  In any case, PL is decidedly not a second or revised edition of TJ; the goals 
and methods of these works are simply very different.  A third oft-overlooked but 
essential key to understanding Rawls’s post-1980 work is “The Idea of Public Reason 
Revisited” (hereafter IPRR).320  It is here that Rawls gives his most complete account of 
his theory of political legitimacy.321
 But I am getting ahead of myself again.  In the next section I want to describe the 
basic problem that Rawls intends his political liberalism to solve.  This will clarify 
Rawls’s understanding of the problem of legitimacy. 
 
Political Liberalism and Reasonable Pluralism. 
 
 Rawls’s political liberalism is not an effort to justify constitutional democracy as 
such.322  In neither TJ nor PL does he make any effort to defend democracy against those 
critics who reject it.  His work is more practical than this.  It is aimed at solving a 
particular set of political problems that arises within the liberal democratic state for 
citizens whose particular and diverse understandings of the good are not in conflict with 
                                                 
320   IPRR, pp. 129-180. 
321   LP, p. vi. 
322   See, e.g., Dreben, “On Rawls and Political Liberalism,” p. 323; and Christine M. Korsgaard, “Realism 
and Constructivism in Twentieth-Century Moral Philosophy,” Philosophy in America at the Turn of the 
Century, p. 112-115. 
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the essentials of democratic government.323  To use Rawls’s language, political liberalism 
addresses only “reasonable” citizens.  Reasonable citizens are divided by their particular 
moral, philosophical, and religious commitments, but they are united insofar as their 
different conceptions of the good are not in conflict with the essentials of constitutional 
democracy.  Rawls’s overarching goal in PL is to show this diverse group of citizens how 
they might constitute themselves as a just, legitimate, and stable body politic, despite the 
irreconcilable disagreements about the good that divide them. 
 A reasonable citizen affirms what Rawls calls a reasonable comprehensive 
doctrine (RCD).324  RCD’s have four main traits: 
(a) “Theoretical reason.”  A person’s RCD expresses a more or less consistent and 
coherent account of value for human beings, covering the important religious, 
philosophical, and moral aspects of human life.325 
(b) “Practical reason.”  A person’s RCD, in singling out human values and ordering 
them when they conflict, provides practical guidance through life.326 
(c) Tradition.  Most RCD’s belong to and draw on some major religious, moral, or 
philosophical tradition.  They are not fixed, but tend to evolve slowly.327 
(d) Democratic.  RCD’s are consistent with the essentials of constitutional democracy 
and the idea of legitimate law.328  Comprehensive doctrines not consistent with 
                                                 
323   Rawls says he is working on “long recognized questions” that to some “seem more political than 
philosophical.”  But he is not overly worried about this, because “it doesn’t matter which we say, so long as 
we recognize the nature of the questions.”  See PL, p. xli. 
324   PL, p. 59. 
325   PL, p. 59. 
326   PL, p. 59. 
327   PL, p. 59. 
328   PL, pp. xviii-xix; IPRR, p. 132:  “The basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a 
constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.” 
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these essentials are not reasonable.  This does not mean that comprehensive 
doctrines need to be democratic (in fact, most won’t be); they simply must not be 
in conflict with democracy. 
To summarize, a reasonable comprehensive doctrine is a broad conception of the good 
for human beings that is consistent with the idea of legitimate democratic government. 
 There has been some confusion in the literature over the nature of Rawls’s 
RCD’s, for which Rawls shares some of the blame.  Rawls describes the first three traits 
(a-c) in the body of PL.  But the fourth trait (d) does not appear in the body with (a-c).  
Trait (d) appears in the “Introduction” to the first edition of PL, and in various places in 
IPRR (Rawls’s revised account of public reason).  This has hindered discussion of PL.  
For example, in a well-regarded and much-read paper, Leif Wenar rejects Rawls’s 
characterization of reasonable comprehensive doctrines as “unsuccessful” because it fails 
to rule out comprehensive doctrines that Rawls clearly regards as unreasonable, such as 
Muslim fundamentalism, white supremacy, and rational egoism.329  The problem with 
Wenar’s objection is that he thinks RCD’s are fully characterized by traits (a-c) alone.  
This is not correct as an interpretation of Rawls.  Thus Wenar’s criticism fails because it 
is based on an incomplete account of Rawls’s idea. 
 Traits (a-c) are distinct in ways from trait (d).  Traits (a-c) appeal to one sense of 
reasonable, and focus primarily on the life of an individual person.  RCD’s are efforts at 
theoretical and practical reason, drawn from some tradition of moral, religious, or 
philosophical thought.  They represent our efforts to make rational sense of our individual 
                                                 
329   Leif Wenar, “Political Liberalism:  An Internal Critique,” Ethics, v. 106 (1995), pp. 35-6.  This paper is 
included in The Philosopher’s Annual, v. 18 (1996) as one of the 10 best articles published in philosophy in 
1995. 
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lives.330  In this way, at least, Muslim fundamentalism, rational egoism, and even white 
supremacy (reprehensible though it is) can be regarded as reasonable.  Characteristic (d) 
invokes something different.  Here “reasonable” has less to do with thinking as such, or 
with practical guidance for some individual, and more to do with political cooperation or 
fairness in a society of individuals.  Further, it suggests that there is a tradition we might 
draw on for some understanding of how we ought to cooperate in this society that is 
distinct from the traditions drawn on by traits (a-c). 
 In a way, Wenar’s complaint shows that he does not recognize the limited and 
practical nature of Rawls’s political liberalism.  The problem that Rawls is trying to solve 
in PL is this:  how is it possible for persons who might affirm democracy, but who are 
deeply divided by their different comprehensive doctrines, to constitute themselves as a 
just, legitimate, and stable democratic society?  Traits (a-c) can be seen as fully 
characterizing reasonable comprehensive doctrines, only when they are seen in the 
context of this practical problem that Rawls tries to solve in PL.  Trait (d) puts traits (a-c) 
in the proper context.  For Rawls, the possibility that a person might commit to 
constitutional democracy is part of the very idea of a reasonable person in democratic 
societies like our own. 
 The distinction between traits (a-c) and trait (d) mirrors Rawls’s belief that each 
democratic citizen is partly the product of some particular moral, philosophical, or 
religious tradition, but also partly the product of a democratic political culture.  Our 
particular moral, philosophical, and religious views divide us, while our shared 
                                                 
330   This does not rule out the possibility that some person might think his individual good is, in fact, 
identical with his community’s good.  It is just that each person must make this determination on his own. 
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democratic political culture unites us.  The reasonable citizen is, of course, an ideal, but it 
is an ideal that Rawls thinks that “you and I, here and now”—real democratic citizens in 
real democratic societies—hope to realize.  The way we realize such an ideal is to figure 
out just what it commits us to, and then to start living up to those commitments. 
 Rawls recognizes, of course, that every society contains people who hold 
unreasonable, irrational, or even mad comprehensive doctrines, but these people present a 
different kind of problem for reasonable persons:  the issue is not how we might see 
unreasonable persons as cooperative members of democratic society, but rather how “to 
contain them so that they do not undermine the unity and justice of a society.”331  A 
democratic society is constituted as a body politic, as a set of social and political 
institutions, by citizens who share fundamental political values.  This is the root or 
institutional meaning of constitutionalism.  As reasonable citizens work to constitute 
themselves as a just, legitimate, and stable democratic body politic, they need not consult 
those who reject their democratic values.  Such communication would serve no real 
purpose.332
 In the same way that Rawls distinguishes comprehensive doctrines with traits (a-
c) alone from those with traits (a-d), he also distinguishes pluralism as such from 
                                                 
331   PL, pp. xviii-xix. 
332   Richard Rorty says something similar in his defense of “solidarity” in Objectivity, Relativism and 
Truth (New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1991), p. 30.  We have to be “ethnocentric” about value, 
he argues, because useful conversation about values is only possible with others who share a certain 
amount of our beliefs.  Here he draws on Bernard Williams’s distinction between “genuine confrontation” 
and “notional confrontation” (Moral Luck, New York:  Cambridge University Press, 1981, p. 142).  
Notional confrontation is the kind that occurs between modern liberal democratic citizens and members of 
primitive tribes.  Their belief systems do not represent “real options” for us, according to Williams.  
Genuine confrontation occurs only when there is some significant overlap in belief systems.  Rorty 
ultimately rejects Williams’s relativism, but otherwise finds this point enlightening. 
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reasonable pluralism.333  In a free society, we expect a variety of comprehensive 
doctrines to develop.  What impresses Rawls is that “… among the views that develop are 
a diversity of reasonable comprehensive doctrines” (my emphasis).  That is, in a free 
society, many views develop, some of which are reasonable.  “These [reasonable ones] 
are the doctrines that reasonable citizens affirm and that political liberalism must 
address.”  So “pluralism as such” refers to the totality of comprehensive doctrines that 
develop in a free society.  (This might be what I call good faith pluralism in the Preface.)  
“Reasonable pluralism” refers to a subset of that totality, which Rawls defines as those 
doctrines that are not inconsistent with democracy (at least, this makes his use of 
“reasonable” here consistent with his use of it when identifying certain normatively 
significant comprehensive doctrines). 
 Political liberalism (the book and the theory) is about how reasonable citizens, 
those holding reasonable comprehensive doctrines—i.e., those persons who hold 
comprehensive doctrines not inconsistent with the essentials of constitutional 
democracy—can constitute themselves as a stable, (nearly) just, and legitimate 
democratic society, despite the fact that they don’t share a comprehensive view.  Political 
liberalism is about politically managing reasonable pluralism, not pluralism as such.  PL 
has little or nothing to say about unreasonable people, except that they must be 
“contained” to protect “the unity and justice of society.”334
 I think there is a kind of “Lockean” moment here for Rawls.  Locke develops a 
two-stage account of the formation of civil society in the Second Treatise.  For Locke, a 
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“community” is formed when persons, wishing to leave the state of nature, agree to 
transfer some of their individual rights to the collective comprised by those entering the 
compact.  In essence, each person voluntarily gives up individual control of certain 
natural powers for an equal share in the joint of control of the community’s pooled 
power.  The formation of this community requires unanimous consent.  It is comprised 
only of people who choose to be part of it.  (Locke’s appeal to tacit consent in this 
context does present certain problems for this account.)  But this community is not yet a 
state.  In the second stage, the members of the community must develop a constitutional 
form of government that can remedy the problems associated with the state of nature.  (If 
joining a political community were not preferable in some way to living in the state of 
nature, no one would join.)  Those who have agreed to form a political community will 
disagree over what form their government should take, so, after discussion, they will vote 
and the majority decision will settle the issue.  On Locke’s view, those who agreed to the 
initial compact have implicitly agreed to be bound by the majority decision on what form 
of government to have. 
 Rawls does something similar.  Each person must reflect on his or her 
comprehensive doctrine, and decide whether they can accept democracy or not.  Some 
will find their doctrines incompatible with democracy.  Rawls calls them unreasonable.  
When these individuals judge their comprehensive doctrines to be inconsistent with 
democracy, they basically remove themselves from the democratic community.  Rawls 
does not think those committed to democracy need to consult those who reject it, when 
they are trying to settle the question of what democratic institutions ought to govern their 
democratic political relations.  Other people will find their doctrines compatible with 
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democracy.  Rawls calls these people reasonable.  Here, I think, is the formation of 
something analogous to the Lockean pre-state “community.”  That is, in our society, 
some people agree that democracy is consistent with their comprehensive doctrines.  
These reasonable people come together to constitute themselves as a democratic society.  
Rawls must believe most members of actual democratic societies will (or could) find 
their comprehensive views compatible with democracy, or else there would be little point 
to his political liberalism, even as ideal theory.  It is not a philosophy of the minority, but 
an effort to come to grips with the political problems faced by the bulk of the members of 
any actual democratic political community.  The trick is showing this society of 
reasonable citizens how they might have a just, legitimate, and stable government, when 
they do not share a comprehensive view.  Here Rawls must develop something like 
Locke’s second stage.  And while unreasonable persons almost always live in the same 
territory with reasonable persons, the unreasonable are not part of the democratic 
community, in the sense that they are not part of a community of value (though of course 
the unreasonable have the full slate of rights and so on). 
 According to Dreben, Rawls has no interest in arguing against those who reject 
democracy, nor any interest in consulting them or considering their views when 
discussing what democracy entails or requires.335  Rawls takes democracy as a given, and 
tries to see if it can work, given the fact that the people committed to it do not share a 
comprehensive view.  Dreben notes Rawls’s emphasis on our “working out” or “working 
through” notions implicit in the tradition of democratic thought that is publicly available 
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to citizens, and which most of them have some familiarity with.336  Rawls does not argue 
for this democratic tradition, but instead intends to see what it leads to.  He is not trying 
to justify liberal democracy, but is instead trying to see how it might work, and what it 
demands of us. 
 My reading of Rawls’s aims may leave some readers cold.  If reasonable 
pluralism is defined as consistent with democracy, how is it a problem?  To some, the 
project will now seem less ambitious, and less interesting, than it is generally understood 
to be.  Nevertheless, I believe that Rawls has the aims that I have described.  As I have 
indicated above, political communities are quite literally constituted through the shared 
commitments of individuals.  Rawls restricts political liberalism to his understanding of 
the community of the “reasonable.”  I think there are reasons to question his 
understanding of this community.  In my view, Rawls may have restricted the community 
too much.  I will explain this later.  In any case, even if Rawls’s project is limited in the 
way I’ve suggested, many serious problems still remain.  First, he has to explain to 
citizens when it is and is not appropriate to appeal to RCD’s in political debate.  Our 
RCD’s describe some of our deepest value commitments, so it will be natural for citizens 
to want to appeal to them when disagreements arise over what justice requires, especially 
when it is not clear what our democratic political values are, or how they apply to some 
question.  Rawls has to explain why citizens ought to resist the natural urge to fall back 
on RCD’s, and why citizens must forge ahead with political values, as difficult as this 
may be.  Second, he has to say something about how citizens can appeal to their political 
culture.  It is one thing to claim that we share some democratic political culture, and an 
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altogether different thing to explain what exactly this amounts to.  At first glance, the 
political culture of any liberal democracy seems to be an incoherent mix of competing 
ideas.  Rawls admits as much, but holds that if we look deeper, we can see that certain 
shared political commitments are implied in these public political debates, e.g., freedom, 
equality, the common good, and so on.  What we need, according to Rawls, is an 
(“Dworkinian”) interpretation of our political practice that shows it in its best light, that 
shows how it is organized around important shared political norms, and, perhaps most 
importantly, that shows how this interpretation of our political practice fits into a 
compelling account of our moral self-understanding.  This is no easy task, and it is made 
more difficult by a third problem, “liberal” pluralism.337
 So far I have just talked about reasonable pluralism, but another problem is raised 
by “liberal” pluralism.  The burdens of judgment (described in the Preface) apply 
paradigmatically to disagreements over comprehensive doctrines, but they also apply to 
disagreements over political matters.  Even if, as Rawls insists, we share a democratic 
political culture, we should not expect that citizens will converge on a single 
understanding of that culture.  Rawls thinks that the best interpretation of our political 
practice is captured by what he refers to as a family of liberal views.  These views share 
certain important features, but it is impossible to publicly justify one as uniquely correct.  
There will always be reasonable disagreements about political matters, even between the 
members of this liberal family.  Explaining how we might manage liberal pluralism is 
another difficult task that Rawls faces. 
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 So even my stripped down version of Rawls’s political liberalism leaves Rawls, 
and democratic citizens, with several serious problems.  When and why is it appropriate 
to restrict appeals to RCD’s in political debate?  What are the values implicit in 
democratic political culture?  How can we determine what the values are?  How should 
we put these ideas together to solve our political problems?  How do we manage liberal 
pluralism?  What are we to make of these reasonable disagreements about political 
matters?  How could any particular constitutional order be considered just, legitimate, or 
stable under these conditions? 
 
Reasonable Citizens, RCD’s, and Shared Democratic Values. 
 
 The fundamental political problems that reasonable citizens face are how to 
constitute themselves as a just, legitimate, and stable democratic body politic.  According 
to Rawls, they must find basic terms of political association that all could accept as 
appropriately explicating the various rights, liberties, and opportunities of liberal 
democratic citizens.  Reasonable pluralism prevents citizens from basing such terms of 
association solely on one RCD.  Reasonable citizens understand the burdens of judgment 
(described in the Preface) and accept their consequences for the legitimate use of public 
power.338  One consequence of the burdens is simply the fact of reasonable pluralism 
itself.  The free exercise of human reason, even under a just and democratic regime, does 
not lead to convergence on one RCD, but instead leads inevitably to a plurality of often 
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irreconcilable RCD’s.339  This is not an accident of history, but a permanent fact about 
societies with free and open social institutions.  It is not an “unfortunate condition,” but is 
simply the result of the free exercise of human reason.  A second consequence of the 
burdens is what Rawls calls the fact of oppression.  The only way we could get all 
citizens to affirm one RCD is through the oppressive use of state power.  If political 
society requires that all citizens share one RCD, then political society requires oppressive 
state power.  The only way to have a political community that rests on one doctrine—
even liberal Kantian or Millian doctrines—would be to impose that doctrine on all with 
the state’s might.  Unless the free exercise of human reason is suppressed, divergent 
views will develop. 
 Reasonable citizens do not agree on the truth of any particular religious, moral, or 
philosophical doctrine.  They do not agree, for instance, that just terms of association can 
be found in the Christian Bible, or that we have access to an independent moral order that 
we can use to produce such terms.  As a result, reasonable citizens will not insist that 
their own favored RCD should structure their political society.  To insist on this is to be 
unreasonable.  Acceptance of the burdens lead to a kind of toleration.340  Reasonable 
citizens recognize the fact of reasonable pluralism.  They do not view this with suspicion, 
but see it a natural result of the difficulties involved in human judgments regarding 
especially questions that involve judgments about complex empirical matters and abstract 
values.  Reasonable citizens recognize that the burdens affect everyone equally.  All are 
subject to these problems.  Reasonable citizens believe that their RCD’s are probably 
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true, but they recognize that everyone else feels the same way.  Almost all reasonable 
citizens think their RCD’s are true.  But since there are no generally agreed upon 
standards for determining the truth or falsity of comprehensive doctrines, it is clear that 
no comprehensive doctrine has any particular claim on people generally.  No shared 
dictates of reason require citizens to believe any specific comprehensive doctrine.  Given 
this, reasonable citizens regard people who insist that fundamental political issues be 
resolved in terms of the own favored comprehensive doctrine as unreasonable, not 
because they believe that their view is true—most of us do—but because these people fail 
to appreciate the burdens and the limits this places on what can be justified to others 
generally.   Reasonable citizens thus understand that their RCD’s cannot serve as the 
basis for public justification of political decisions on fundamental issues.341
 There seems to be an important difference here between Rawls’s and Soper’s 
shared reason views.  Soper’s understanding of “publicly available” reasons is much 
broader than Rawls’s.  For Soper, an RCD itself may be publicly available, if it can be 
demonstrably and not unreasonably linked to some current tradition or discourse.  If the 
RCD contains (resources for) a conception of justice, Soper holds that it could generate 
genuine legal and political obligations.  For example, on Soper’s view a Christian 
conception of justice could be sincerely held to be just by a liberal democratic public 
official, since there is a viable and current tradition of Christian political thought, as long 
as the Christian political view in question respects the interests of all in some way.  If 
these conditions are met, our Christian politician could base his political activity solely 
on what Rawls regards as a comprehensive view, without this interfering with the law’s 
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normativity.  For Soper, reciprocity in justification requires only that public officials can 
say to citizens, “people relevantly similar to you—some of your fellow citizens—actually 
do affirm this view, so it is possible that you could too (even if, in fact, you don’t).”  
Soper sees just about everything in a culture as publicly available, as long as it is part of a 
discourse or tradition of thought that remains current, that still carries some weight.  He 
does not require what we might think of as active or engaged sharing of ideas.  You just 
need to be part of the culture.  Rawls, on the other hand, has a much more stringent 
understanding of what is publicly available.  It is not enough that other citizens do affirm 
a view, so you might too.  This is too weak a sense of what “could” be affirmed for 
Rawls.  For him, ideas are publicly available only if they are part of some more actively 
shared tradition or discourse.  Rawls thinks liberal democratic political culture provides 
just such an actively shared discourse.  Thus, it represents a public pool of ideas from 
which democratic citizens may appropriately draw reasons that others “could” affirm. 
 So Rawls argues that the shared public democratic political culture could serve as 
the basis for public justification of political activity in a democratic society.  Democratic 
citizens share a political culture that provides certain fixed and general points that could 
serve as starting points that everyone could at least reasonably accept.  Democratic 
political culture contains a wealth of political ideas about democratic values, that most 
citizens are familiar with, e.g., a more perfect union, justice, domestic tranquility, and the 
values they imply or assume, such as equal basic rights, liberties, and opportunities.342  
According to Rawls, reasonable citizens see their task as working these democratic ideas 
into some understanding of the basic terms of political association for their society.  An 
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idea of political justice worked out from such recognizably democratic political values 
can be seen to stand free from any particular RCD.  As such, it is the kind of view that 
any citizen could affirm, as a democratic citizen. 
 At the heart of Rawls’s public/non-public split there is a distinction between 
persons as individuals and persons as citizens.  The idea of a person does not necessarily 
require the idea of political community.  That is, we can think of persons as individuals in 
a “pre-political” sense.  Individuals’ RCD’s often require community for their realization, 
but they need not require specifically political community.  Many RCD’s might be 
realized in the state of nature.  However, there are no citizens in the state of nature.  
Persons are not citizens until they enter a political community.  The term “citizen” 
describes an office in a political society.  It is through the constitution of that political 
society that the office of citizen comes to be, with all of its attached rights and duties.  
The proper understanding of democratic citizen, Rawls holds, comes not from our 
understanding of ourselves as individuals pursuing particular RCD’s, but from our 
understanding of ourselves as a democratic society committed to the sort of freedom and 
equality that makes it possible for individuals to pursue their RCD’s.  This does not mean 
that RCD’s can make no reference to citizenship.  There is nothing that prevents any 
RCD from making this sort of political participation an element of the human good.  The 
point is that RCD’s need not require this political participation.  But citizenship is a 
fundamental element of democratic political culture.  In democracies, final political 
power rests in the hands of individuals as free and equal citizens.  This is simply part of 
what we mean when we talk about democracy.  This is not to imply that there are no 
disagreements about what rights and duties of citizens have, nor disagreements about just 
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how they wield final political authority.  What it means is that it wouldn’t make sense to 
talk about a democracy that is completely devoid of any notion of citizen. 
 So reasonable citizens must find political terms of association that can be justified 
in terms of shared democratic values.  But what are these democratic political values?  
And how are they to be worked into basic political terms of association?  On Rawls’s 




 Rawls explicitly distinguishes political constructivism from ethical 
constructivism.  Ethical constructivism is generally considered an anti-realist approach to 
ethics.344  Ethical constructivists claim that moral facts are not real or true, but 
constructed in some way from our beliefs or attitudes about human beings and what is 
ultimately good for us.  Rawls’s Kantian constructivism is one version of ethical 
constructivism.345  Rawls’s political constructivism is not anti-realist.  It is intended to be 
neutral between all controversial comprehensive commitments.  It does not assert the 
truth of anti-realism or deny the truth of realism.  It remains agnostic on such issues.  
This neutral stance is important to political constructivism, because one of its main 
purposes is to construct principles of justice that citizens could affirm at the same time as 
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they affirm their particular RCD’s.  There must be no conflict between them.  This is 
necessary if they are to serve as publicly affirmed political principles for people who 
share a commitment to democracy but are also committed to a plurality of incompatible 
RCD’s.  In other words, the process of construction, and the principles of justice 
constructed, must not conflict with the essentials of RCD’s, or they will not be publicly 
affirmed by all reasonable citizens.  Political constructivism would conflict with some 
RCD’s, if it took a stance on the realism/anti-realism issue.  If the process of construction 
itself cannot gain such an overlapping commitment, no principles constructed through it 
have any chance of success.  Thus the process of construction must be such as to gain the 
support of an “overlapping consensus” of comprehensive doctrines.  So Rawls is careful 
to make political constructivism consistent with, for example, Kantian constructivism.  
For instance, those committed to Kantian constructivism as a moral doctrine must be able 
to affirm that it does not reject Rawls’s political constructivism.  A reasonable person 
committed to Kantian constructivism must acknowledge the facts of reasonable 
disagreement and oppression.  The aim of political constructivism is to provide a method 
for resolving the political problems posed by reasonable disagreement that is consistent 
the essentials of comprehensive doctrines.  Thus, a reasonable citizen committed to 
Kantian constructivism as a moral doctrine should also be committed to political 
constructivism as a method of resolving political differences. 
 It is certainly possible, though, that different citizens will feel different levels of 
commitment to political constructivism.  Citizens’ RCD’s will vary in terms of the 
relationship they draw, if any, between the human good and a just political society.  The 
weakest forms of commitment will be felt by citizens whose RCD’s make political justice 
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irrelevant to the human good.  These citizens might affirm democratic society, just 
because it produces a more or less stable political setting, which makes possible the 
pursuit of their own RCD’s.  Otherwise, though, these citizens may have little interest in 
political justice, and so little commitment to political constructivism.  They will be 
satisfied with any political society that is stable enough to allow them to live out their 
RCD’s.  Other citizens might may be more strongly committed to political 
constructivism, because their RCD’s tie the realization of the human good in some 
important way to the realization of political justice in their society.  Rawls’s Kantian 
constructivism, for instance, makes pursuit of political justice an important part of the 
human good of self-realization as an autonomous being.  Kantian constructivists, then, 
may have a particularly strong affinity for political constructivism. 
 Principles of justice are constructed through the development of “political 
conceptions of justice.”  There are many possible political conceptions of justice 
(hereafter political conceptions) in any society.  All political conceptions have three main 
features.346  First, a political conception is a moral conception of the basic terms of 
political association for a society.347  Its subject is what Rawls calls the basic structure of 
society.348  The basic structure is the set of basic social, political, and economic 
institutions in a society, the way the fit together as a whole, and the basic rights and 
duties they assign to various political offices, including the office of citizen.  All of this is 
structured by, or is ultimately consistent with, principles of justice that form the core or 
“content” (to use Rawls’s term) of the political conception.  The content of Rawls’s 
                                                 
346   PL, pp. 11-15; JF, pp. 26-27; IPRR, p. 143. 
347   See, e.g., PL, pp. 11-2. 
348   See Lecture VII of PL, pp. 257-288. 
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political conception justice as fairness are his “two principles.”349  Other political 
conceptions may specify different content.  This content is what gets “constructed.” 
 Rawls argues that the basic structure is the first subject of justice for two main 
reasons.350  First, we need a way to maintain what Rawls calls the background conditions 
of justice.  If we were to prescribe an initial just distribution of goods, and social 
conditions under which fair agreements might be reached, still it would be possible for 
inequalities in wealth and property to become large enough to threaten important political 
values, such as equality of opportunity, the fair value of political liberties, and so on.  
This is a serious threat to political justice.  The basic social structure, when properly 
organized, can regulate these inequalities, and thereby maintain the background 
conditions necessary for justice.  Second, the basic structure has a “profound and 
pervasive influence on the person who live under its institutions.”351  Even in a just 
society, many contingencies affect a person’s prospects in life.  These include the social 
class a person is born into, their native endowments and their opportunities to develop 
them, and good or bad fortune over the course of a life.  The basic structure does not seek 
to eliminate these differences, or otherwise to remedy them.  It does, however, have a 
role to play in ensuring that these contingencies do not render a citizen simply incapable 
of making effective use of her liberties, opportunities, and so on.  For these two reasons, 
                                                 
349   Rawls’s formulation of his two principles of justice has changed a bit through time.  In JF (p. 43) the 
two principles read as follows:  “(a) Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all; and 
(b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions:  first, they are to be attached to offices 
and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the 
greatest benefit of the least-advantaged members of society (the difference principle).” 
350   See, e.g., JF, pp. 52-57. 
351   JF, p. 55. 
249 
the basic structure is the first subject of justice, and so a necessary component of all 
political conceptions. 
 Second, a political conception does not depend on any particular comprehensive 
doctrine, but is presented as free-standing.352  The goal of a political conception is to gain 
the acceptance of reasonable citizens holding a plurality of reasonable comprehensive 
doctrines, to become the subject of an “overlapping consensus” of them, so it cannot 
depend on any one of them.  A political conception needs this kind of support if it is to 
play its “public role” in society, and thereby “well order” it.353  A well-ordered society is 
one effectively regulated by publicly recognized principles of justice.  In a well-ordered 
society, everyone accepts, and knows that everyone else accepts, the same principles of 
justice, and they have good reason to believe that the basic structure of their society 
satisfies these principles.  Further, citizens have a normally developed sense of justice, so 
most see the basic structure as just and comply with its rules.  Rawls admits that this is 
highly idealized, but any political conception that cannot well order a democratic society 
is inadequate as a democratic conception.  A sound and enduring democratic regime must 
be stable “in the right way,” that is, it must be affirmed and supported by the majority of 
politically active citizens.  A political conception that does not gain such support is one 
that is not stable, that can only be maintained through manipulation, deceit, or force.  Of 
course, unpopular political conceptions are forced on people all the time, but none of 
them counts as a democratic regime. 
                                                 
352   Free standing also means that a political conception does not depend on a disjunction of reasons taken 
from some diverse set of CD’s.  Rawls does not consider this possibility, probably because he is doing ideal 
theory, but it is worth noting that this possibility is not clearly ruled out by Rawls’s theory. 
353   PL, pp. 35-40. 
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 Third, a political conception is worked out of ideas implicitly or explicitly 
expressed in the public political culture of a democratic society, and does not depend on 
ideas explicitly drawn from any RCD.  A political conception must be explainable in 
terms of shared democratic values, without any reference to comprehensive religious, 
philosophical, or moral commitments such as Christian salvation or Utility.  Proper 
political ideas include some that are explicit in democratic political culture, such as the 
idea that citizens as free and equal, politically speaking, and political values such as those 
expressed in the preamble to the Constitution of the United States:  a more perfect union, 
domestic tranquility, the common defense, the general welfare, and so on.354  Other 
proper political ideas are implicit in democratic political culture.  One of the more 
important ones for Rawls is the idea of society as a fair system of cooperation. 
 The idea that society is a fair system of cooperation means three things.  First, a 
democratic political order is more than mere coordinated effort among citizens.  It is not 
enough for a ruler to effectively coordinate the behavior of citizens, even if this leads to 
more-or-less effective government (i.e., basic human rights are secured and people are 
materially and spiritually satisfied).  Fair cooperation is social cooperation between 
citizens that is structured by rules those citizens publicly affirm as appropriately 
governing their cooperative activity.  It is a specific kind of rule-governed social activity.  
Second, the rules that structure the political order must specify “fair terms” of 
cooperation.  This is Rawls’s idea of reciprocity.  It has two aspects.355  One aspect is the 
idea that each citizen can reasonably accept the rules, provided that others accept them 
                                                 
354   IPRR, p. 144. 
355   Rawls never explicitly distinguishes these two aspects of his idea of reciprocity, but Reidy does in his 
“Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement.” 
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too.  It is a kind of reciprocity in judgment or justification.  Another aspect is the idea that 
“all who are engaged in cooperation and do their part as the rules and procedures require, 
are to benefit in an appropriate way as assessed by a suitable benchmark of 
comparison.”356  This we can call reciprocity of advantage.  According to Rawls, this idea 
of reciprocity lies between “impartiality, which is altruistic (being moved by the general 
good), and the idea of mutual advantage.”  Reasonable citizens try to create a democratic 
political order that allows them to advance their own lives, in terms of the values 
expressed in their particular RCD’s, but that also allows others to do the same.  This idea 
is implicit in democratic political culture, and does not depend on any particular RCD.  
As such, it is properly seen as part of the shared democratic culture 
 Principles of justice—“substantive principles specifying the content of political 
right and justice”—are constructed through the development of a political conception.357  
The starting points for the process of construction are basic conceptions of society and 
the person, the principles of practical reason, and the public role a political conception 
must play.  I will illustrate this by briefly discussing Rawls’s notion of “justice as 
fairness,” which is one example of a political conception.  According to Rawls, the 
fundamental idea implicit in democratic political culture is that society is (or should be) a 
fair system of social cooperation.  Other fundamental ideas include the idea of democratic 
citizens as free and equal and the idea of a well-ordered society.  These ideas can be 
described in many different ways.  A conception is a more-or-less well-developed 
description of an idea.  Thus, there are many possible conceptions of the ideas at the heart 
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of democratic political culture.  Different conceptions, while possible, are not necessarily 
equally compelling.  Citizens in every particular democracy must make a judgment about 
which interpretation of their democratic political practice shows it in its best moral light, 
which interpretation makes it most morally appealing, and that also makes it fit best with 
their own past political practice and moral self-understanding.  Which interpretation the 
citizens of any particular democracy will judge best is, in a way, an empirical and 
contingent matter, partly shaped by vagaries of history and culture.  In defending justice 
as fairness, Rawls fleshes out the bones of these key ideas by developing conceptions of 
them that he believes most accurately represent the shared ideals of our society.  These 
conceptions are intended to clarify or make explicit our own implicit self-understanding.  
After describing these conceptions in detail, Rawls draws on them to lay out a procedure 
for determining which principles of justice best fit that self-understanding.  According to 
Rawls’s favored political conception, “justice as fairness,” the “original position” is the 
procedure for finding principles of justice that is most consistent with our self-
understanding. 
 The original position models what Rawls sees as our conceptions of our 
fundamental ideas of citizenship and society as these are expressed in our public political 
culture.  The original position has agents, who represent citizens, choose principles of 
justice for those citizens from behind a veil of ignorance.  The agents model the 
“rational,” the capacity for a conception of the good for human beings.  They also model 
the idea of a well-ordered society.  Thus, they are guided in their choice by two main 
considerations.  First, they seek principles of justice that maximize the rational self-
interest of those they represent.  Second, they know that the principles they choose will 
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be publicly recognized, so they must keep in mind the consequences of the mutual 
recognition of whatever principles they choose, for instance, the way common acceptance 
of any chosen principles would affect the self-understanding of those raised according to 
them.  The veil of ignorance prevents the agents from knowing exactly who they 
represent, and exactly what interests they have.  The agents know they represent rational 
and reasonable democratic citizens, and that these citizens have and are trying to realize 
the ideals of their comprehensive doctrines, i.e., their conceptions of the good, but they 
do not know what comprehensive doctrine is affirmed by the person they represent.  Here 
the veil of ignorance models the capacity for a sense of justice, by hiding from the agents 
information that we (you and I, here and now) think of as improperly influencing fair 
decision-making.  Once the agents and the veil of ignorance are fully laid out, the agents 
are presented with a list of principles of justice.  If we have done a good job of 
developing our conceptions of the fundamentals of democratic political culture (society 
as a fair system of cooperation, free and equal citizens, and so on) and of representing 
these commitments in our decision procedure (e.g., the original position) then the 
principles of justice indicated by the procedure are reasonable for us—you and me, here 
and now.  In this way we can construct principles of justice implied by and consistent 
with our own self-understanding, with our own ideals as they are expressed in our public 
political culture. 
 There are two ways that disagreement can arise here.  First, citizens might 
disagree with Rawls about conceptions of the different ideas of citizenship and society 
expressed in public political culture.  Different citizens might offer different conceptions 
of, e.g., society as a fair system of cooperation.  Second, citizens might accept Rawls’s 
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conceptions of these ideas, but think that the agents in the original position would pick 
different principles of justice. 
 The original position does not represent a hypothetical agreement, nor is it 
intended as a method for discovering the objective truth about justice.  It is a way of 
constructing a solution to a practical problem faced by us as reasonable democratic 
citizens.  The original position is a “thought-experiment for the purpose of public- and 
self-clarification.”358  On Rawls’s view, we—“you and I, here and now”—face a practical 
political problem:  we are reasonable citizens, divided by reasonable pluralism, who must 
develop just terms of association for our society.  How are we to do this?  The original 
position helps us to see what our considered political convictions commit us to.  It models 
our ideas of citizens as free and equal, reasonable and rational, and our ideas of fairness, 
and so on, and thereby helps us to see what principles of justice “we regard—here and 
now—as fair and supported by the best reasons.” 
 While political constructivism does not attempt to discover the objective truth 
about justice, taken in realist terms, when performed properly it does produce results that 
are inter-subjectively objective.  Inter-subjective objectivity requires a public framework 
of thought that:  (a) is sufficient to support an idea of judgment, where conclusions can 
generated from reasons and evidence after due deliberation; (b) specifies an idea of 
correct or reasonable judgment; (c) specifies an order to reasons to be weighed; (d) 
distinguishes an “objective” point of view from that of any particular agent or group; and 
(e) accounts for agreement in judgment among agents.359  Political constructivism meets 
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these requirements.  For example, justice as fairness provides a public framework that 
meets conditions a-e. 
 While justice as fairness is Rawls’s favored political conception, there are many 
possible political conceptions.360  Rawls does not deny this.  The ideas from which 
political conceptions are formulated, ideas like free and equal citizens, are open to a 
variety of interpretations.  These ideas are subject to the burdens of judgment.  As there 
are many possible ways to interpret these ideas, there are many ways to develop political 
conceptions of justice.  Rawls identifies Habermas’s discourse conception of legitimacy 
and Catholic views of the common good as potential rival conceptions.  He requires only 
that these views be expressed in terms of political conceptions, that is, that they be 
developed as free standing prescriptive models of the basic structure from ideas implicit 
or explicit in public political culture.  Since principles of justice are constructed from 
political conceptions, there are also many possible principles of justice. 
 Political conceptions can be divided in two groups, liberal and illiberal.  Liberal 
political conceptions share three features.361  First, they contain a list of basic rights, 
liberties and opportunities, such as those commonly found in democratic societies.  
Second, they give priority to these rights, liberties and opportunities over, for example, 
the common good or perfectionist values.  Third, they secure basic social security, by 
ensuring that all citizens have all-purpose means sufficient to make use of their freedoms.  
Since all of these ideas can be specified in a variety of ways, there are many possible 
liberal political conceptions.  They may differ in how they specify and order the various 
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rights and liberties, or in what form social security is provided, and so on.  Political 
liberalism does not specify any one liberal political conception as correct.362  Rawls 
thinks his favored conception, justice as fairness, has a “special place” in the family of 
liberal political conceptions, but there are always several possible political conceptions.  
If a few conceptions come to dominate, or if one eventually takes a central role in a 
society, still it is always permissible and appropriate to propose new conceptions, to 
supplant old conceptions with new ones, and for old conceptions to fade from the public 
consciousness. 
 This is where the liberal principle of legitimacy comes into play. 
 
The Liberal Principle of Legitimacy. 
 
 Legitimacy is one of the fundamental political problems faced by democratic 
citizens under conditions of reasonable pluralism.  Democratic citizens are the free and 
equal coauthors of their political order.  In this way the coercive power of the state is 
always theirs as a collective body.  They determine, through their constitutional order, 
how and when political power may appropriately be used.  A constitutional order is part 
of or expressed by a political conception.  Reasonable citizens face two related legitimacy 
problems.  First, many different political conceptions (constitutional orders) are possible 
in any given society.  Since citizens can reasonably affirm different political conceptions, 
under what conditions can the terms of one political conception be legitimately enforced 
against all citizens?  For instance, we need an account of why the state might enforce 
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something like justice as fairness, even though it is open to reasonable dissent.  Second, 
even when citizens affirm the same political conception (constitutional order), they may 
disagree about how its content, the basic principles of justice it specifies, are to be 
worked out in practice in their actual society.  For instance, citizens may agree that each 
should have claim to “a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties,” but disagree over 
whether or not this includes a right to abortion.  Thus, the second problem is this:  since 
citizens may and will reasonably interpret the content of a political conception in more 
than one way, under what conditions is it legitimate to enforce one interpretation against 
all citizens?  Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy is meant to solve both problems.363
 Rawls’s theory of legitimacy belongs to his ideal of public reason.364  Public 
reason does not apply to all political discussion, but mainly guides public officials—
legislators and executives, candidates for political office, and judges—engaged in 
deliberations over constitutional rights and liberties and other matters of basic justice.365  
Rawls claims that citizens rarely have the opportunity to vote on fundamental political 
issues, so public reason guides citizens mainly in voting for representatives.366  The 
theory of legitimacy explains how public reason can generate enforceable laws.   
                                                 
363   These two questions are not always as distinct as I make them here, because “there is not … a sharp 
line between where a political conception ends and its interpretation begins.”  IPRR, p. 145, footnote 35.  
Happily, it does not matter for my discussion whether we describe this issue as two problems, or two 
aspects of one problem.  Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy works the same way in either case. 
364   IPRR, p. 133. 
365   IPRR, p. 133, especially footnote 7. 
366   IPRR, pp. 135-6.  Rawls claims citizens rarely have the opportunity to vote on fundamental political 
issues.  Their most significant role, in this context, is selection of representatives who do vote on these 
issues.  Thus the impact of citizens’ political behavior on the legitimacy of law is almost always indirect.  
This raises some interesting issues.  For instance, if citizens fail to live up to the ideal of public reason, does 
this affect the authority of the persons they put in office?  Suppose that Wyatt is put in office by citizens 
who reject public reason.  Is Wyatt’s authority as a member of Congress somehow corrupted?  Is it possible 
for him to take part in the enactment of legitimate law, or does his participation corrupt the process, even if 
he lives up to the ideal of public reason? 
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 The liberal principle of legitimacy receives its most complete treatment in IPRR.  
The liberal principle of legitimacy holds that 
Our exercise of political power is proper only when we sincerely believe that the 
reasons we would offer for our political actions—were we to state them as 
government officials—are sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other 
citizens might also reasonably accept those reasons.367
To these two conditions Rawls adds a majoritarian democratic principle:  “on a 
constitutional essential or matter of basic justice … the legal enactment expressing the 
opinion of the majority is legitimate law.”368  In summary, Rawls’s theory of legitimacy 
has three parts:  (a) the Reasonableness Condition, (b) the Sufficiency Condition, and (c) 
the Majority Principle.  My discussions of the Sufficiency Condition and the Majority 
Principle are brief, so I will present them first.  My discussion of the Reasonableness 
Condition takes up most of the remainder of the chapter. 
 
The Sufficiency Condition. 
 
 The Sufficiency Condition is in one respect straightforward—we must sincerely 
believe that we have adequate justification for the political positions we offer to fellow 
citizens in the public square.  This is a somewhat open-ended condition, as there is no 
                                                 
367   IPRR, p. 137.  This formulation of the principle of legitimacy is relevantly similar to Rawls’s 
formulation of it in other works.  See, e.g., PL, where he says legitimacy requires a constitution “the 
essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of 
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their common human reason” (p. 41). 
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shared public standard for determining what counts as sufficient justification.  In many 
cases, people may disagree over whether or not sufficient justification actually exists for 
various positions.  This is not a problem.  Such agreement is not necessary for legitimacy.  
What is necessary is that the person offering the position to fellow citizens sincerely 
believes (and reasonably believes, as the Reasonableness Condition holds) that she has 
sufficient justification for doing so.  How we might know when someone is sincere is not 
obvious, for, as we saw in the discussion of Soper, testing sincerity is not an easy thing to 
do.  Nevertheless, this is part of the Sufficiency Condition. 
 The Sufficiency Condition also requires that political conceptions be 
“complete.”369  A complete political conception describes principles, standards, and 
ideals, and guidelines of inquiry, that are sufficient to generate and unify a determinate 
order of values that gives reasonable answers to most questions involving constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice.  Justice as fairness is well-worked out and might 
be regarded as more or less complete.  Completeness is significant for two reasons.  First, 
when some citizen’s political values are seen as unified by a political conception, and not 
viewed separately, it is evident to other citizens that the political values are not being 
distorted by any comprehensive doctrine.  Any order of political values so distorted is 
clearly unreasonable.  This is one of the consequences of the burdens of judgment.  An 
order of political values may mirror the order generated by any comprehensive doctrine, 
without losing its claim to reasonableness, as long as the order in question is also 
demonstrably supported by a political conception.  Second, an incomplete political 
conception does not provide a sufficient framework for public discussion of fundamental 
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political issues.  A political conception is supposed to make it possible for reasonable 
citizens to resolve such issues without appeal to comprehensive doctrines.  A complete 
political conception provides all of the basic values necessary for such political 
resolutions. 
 It does not seem plausible, though, to think that most citizens have or ever will 
have a complete political conception.  One might defend Rawls by pointing out that he 
holds that the liberal principle of legitimacy does not apply to all political discourse, but 
is meant mainly as a constraint on discussion and action regarding constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice that occurs in what Rawls calls the public political 
forum.370  This forum consists of the discourse and action of judges (especially supreme 
courts justices), of government officials (especially legislators and the executive), and of 
candidates for public office (in particular when they make public political statements).  
Constitutional essentials have to do with e.g. what political rights and liberties could 
reasonably be included in a written constitution, and matters of basic justice have to do 
with questions of basic economic and social justice not covered in the constitution.371  
The principle applies only indirectly to citizens, mainly in their selection of public 
officials.372  Thus, it might be sufficient if public officials have complete political 
conceptions, even if citizens do not. 
 But this issue is not clear.  Citizens do have an important role to play, even if they 
do not get to vote on the most fundamental political issues.  Citizens realize the ideal of 
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public reason by holding government officials to it.373  Ideally, citizens should think of 
themselves as if they were public officials:  they should “ask themselves what statutes, 
supported by what reasons satisfying the criterion of reciprocity, they would think it most 
reasonable to enact.”  When citizens generally start to see themselves as ideal legislators, 
they will reject public officials who ignore public reason.  If citizens do not do this, their 
democracy will lose its strength and vitality.  Does this role require citizens to have 
complete political conceptions?  It is hard to see how they could ask themselves what 
statutes are best supported by what reasons without one.  This seems to require that 
citizens have some more or less well-worked out political conception. 
 
The Majority Principle. 
 
 Rawls’s theory of legitimacy holds that when we are resolving a dispute over a 
constitutional essential or matter of basic justice, “the legal enactment expressing the 
opinion of the majority is legitimate law” (provided that citizens and the relevant public 
officials have followed public reason).374  This is clear enough, but one might well ask 
how Rawls can justify this appeal to majoritarian democracy.  There is a regress problem 
here.  Democratic institutional design is an issue subject to the burdens of judgment.  
Thus, there are several decision procedures that might reasonably claim to be 
“democratic.”  We have to decide which of these possible democratic decision 
procedures can legitimately be used to resolve disagreements.  But how can we make this 
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decision?  Our decision on this issue will not be legitimate, unless it results from a 
decision procedure that is itself legitimate.  But this just pushes the problem back a step.  
So it is not clear why Rawls thinks we can regard any particular democratic decision 
procedure as a legitimate means of resolving disagreements.  It is certainly not obvious 
why he thinks it is safe to assume majoritarian democracy. 
 
A Common Misreading of The Reasonableness Condition:  The Consensus Reading. 
 
 The Reasonableness Condition requires that citizens, when attempting to resolve 
disagreements over constitutional essentials or matters of basic justice, appeal only to 
reasons that “may reasonably be accepted by other citizens as a justification of those 
actions.”375  This is one aspect of Rawls’s familiar commitment to reciprocity.376  By 
honoring this requirement, citizens show the proper kind of respect for one another.  This 
solves part of the problem of legitimacy by requiring that the constitution of political 
authority be acceptable to all members of the body politic, from an appropriate and 
shared moral point of view.  Distinct political actions should be acceptable to all as at 
least consistent with that authority, even if some see the action as unwise, unjust, etc., and 
express this view by voting against certain measures or candidates. 
 Before discussing the Reasonableness Condition in more detail, it will be helpful 
to describe and dismiss one common misreading of Rawls’s principle of legitimacy.  
Rawls is often read as insisting that legitimacy requires constitutional essentials no 
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reasonable person could reasonably reject.  I will refer to this misreading as the 
Consensus Reading in what follows.  Commentators who hold this view think that 
Rawls’s liberal principle of legitimacy requires that we find a liberal political conception 
that all reasonable citizens would converge on and affirm without reservation, i.e., one 
that is somehow immune to the burdens of judgment and thus free from what I earlier 
referred to as liberal pluralism.  This would be a very demanding theory of legitimacy, 
one that is similar in ways to Scanlon’s moral philosophy.377  On the Consensus Reading, 
the liberal principle of legitimacy requires citizens, when voting or acting as public 
officials, to act from principles they could justify in terms others could not reasonably 
reject.  It requires us to find reasons somehow immune to the burdens, that are somehow 
free from reasonable disagreement.  It should be clear from what I have already said that 
this is not actually Rawls’s view of legitimacy.  But this Consensus Reading is attributed 
to Rawls by many prominent political theorists, including Jeffrey Stout, Joseph Raz, Kent 
Greenawalt, and Nicholas Wolterstorff.378  Since this misreading has taken on a life of its 
own, I want to spend a little time showing that it is not actually Rawls’s view.  I will 
describe two exegetical problems with the Consensus Reading, and reject two potential 
sources of support.  After that, I will offer a better reading of the Reasonableness 
Condition. 
 First, Rawls does not say that legitimacy requires constitutional essentials no 
reasonable person could reasonably reject.  His statements are ambiguous.379  For 
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instance, in “The Idea of Public Reason Revisited” he says that legitimacy requires that 
“we sincerely believe the reasons we would offer for our political actions … are 
sufficient, and we also reasonably think that other citizens might reasonably accept those 
reasons” (my emphasis).380  This can be read several ways.  The Consensus Reading 
describes one way.  But Rawls could be asking for something less:  reasons any (and thus 
every) person could reasonably affirm, that is, that it would not be unreasonable to 
affirm.  This reading describes a less demanding theory.  I believe this is his view, but for 
now I just want to establish that he does not use the language of the Consensus Reading. 
 Second, the Consensus Reading contradicts Rawls’s claims about reasonable 
disagreement and the burdens of judgment.381  These ideas are central to his work, so this 
is exegetically troubling.  This problem can be demonstrated in many ways.  I will give 
one example, which has to do with the implementation of democratic decision 
procedures.382
 In democratic societies, Rawls says, legitimacy requires a liberal constitution.383  
Minimally, liberal constitutions assign basic and familiar rights and opportunities to 
individuals, give them priority over the common good and perfectionist values, and 
secure their effectiveness with adequate social security.  But citizens who share these 
commitments will still disagree over many issues, e.g., how to specify and order the 
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actually Rawls’s view.  He argues convincingly that this view (no matter who holds it) suffers from several 
serious philosophical defects, including the one discussed here, and is thus weak as a theory of legitimacy.  
I argue the exegetical point—that the example shows that Rawls did not in fact hold the view described in 
the Common Reading. 
383   IPRR, pp. 140-143. 
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rights and opportunities.384  Rawls says such disagreements should be resolved 
democratically, because this is most faithful to the ideal of citizens sharing ultimate 
political authority.385  But even if we agree, we face more questions.  For instance, which 
procedures best satisfy this condition?  Does shared authority require winner-take-all 
democracy or proportional representation?  Some argue that the latter is most consistent 
with shared authority, others that the former is, and still others that the former could be, 
in the context of certain prohibitions on gerrymandering.  In any case, every reasoned 
answer depends on abstract value judgments, e.g., how to describe and order freedom and 
equality, and solutions to complex empirical issues, e.g., how the drawing of districts 
affects the representation of minority groups in elections.  Here the Consensus Reading 
founders. 
 Democratic decision procedures are constitutional essentials, so, on the 
Consensus Reading, legitimacy requires procedures no reasonable person could 
reasonably reject.  Otherwise citizens could claim the outcomes were illegitimate.  But 
Rawls’s view is that questions like this, which involve judgments about abstract values 
and complex empirical situations, are subject to the burdens of judgment.386  The burdens 
explain how thoughtful and sincere individuals can arrive at different answers to such 
questions, and why these differences always exist in free societies.  They apply 
paradigmatically to disagreements over comprehensive doctrines, but also to questions of 
                                                 
384   IPRR, p. 141. 
385   Rawls also thinks democratic decision procedures are necessary because they most reliably produce 
nearly just outcomes. 
386   PL, pp. 54-58; JF, pp. 35-37. 
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constitutional design.387  When the burdens of judgment apply to a question, every 
answer could be reasonably rejected (even if they could also be unreasonably rejected).  
This is just what Rawls means by the burdens of judgment and reasonable 
disagreement.388  This illustrates a family of problems for the Consensus Reading, 
because the issue of democratic design involves many questions over which citizens will 
reasonably disagree.389  In fact, the explication and implementation of all constitutional 
essentials will involve such reasonable disputes.  The Consensus Reading has Rawls 
insisting on consensus in situations he identifies as those where consensus will never 
appear. 
 Still, some things Rawls says appear to support the Consensus Reading.  First, he 
seems to use its strong language in TJ.  Second, he cites approvingly T. M. Scanlon’s 
work, and Scanlon clearly uses language like that of the Consensus Reading.390  In fact, 
neither case actually supports it. 
 Rawls’s search for unanimous agreement in TJ appears to support the Consensus 
Reading.  His goal is to find principles of justice appropriate for democratic societies.  An 
appropriate principle is one that would be accepted by parties suitably situated behind his 
                                                 
387   Rawls holds that ideas like freedom and equality can be interpreted in various ways, and that this leads 
to different understandings of basic principles of justice and the content of public reason.  See e.g. IPRR, p. 
141.  This has important implications for his theory of legitimacy, as I will explain below. 
388  Similar reasoning could show that Rawls’s second condition, reliable nearly just outcomes, also fails to 
determine a unique answer to the question of democratic design.  Free citizens, using the common 
resources of human reason, will disagree about what justice requires and which decision procedures most 
reliably produce those outcomes.  The burdens of judgment present any such resolution.  See Reidy, 
“Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement,” for a good discussion of this problem. 
389   There are many reasonable disagreements over the most appropriate way to design and implement 
democratic political institutions.  For an introduction to the breadth and depth of disagreement on this issue, 
see, e.g., Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, Shapiro, The State of Democratic Theory, and Guttman and 
Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement. 
390   See, e.g., Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other. 
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veil of ignorance.391  This is his “original position.”  The agents behind the veil are 
moved by rational self-interest and seek principles all could agree to.392  They express our 
sense of the rational.393  The veil models our sense of the reasonable, our willingness to 
advance fair principles of justice, by removing from consideration factors that might 
improperly influence us.394  In TJ, Rawls develops one version of the original position 
argument that he believes all citizens could reasonably affirm.  In fact, he thinks it is the 
most reasonable conception of justice for a liberal democracy.  He develops a conception 
of citizens from ideas found in the public political culture of a democracy.  These form 
the basis of his construction of the agents and the veil.  From this perspective, he feels, 
his two principles would meet unanimous consent.  But if we find his substantive 
principles too at odds with our moral convictions, we should not reject his approach.  
Instead, we should adjust the original position argument, by reconstructing the veil, the 
agents, or both, until we find an arrangement of them, and principles they support, that 
fits our convictions.  He seems to think that, in the end, some version of the original 
position argument will produce principles of justice that (nearly) all citizens would (in 
fact) affirm, even if they could (in principle) be reasonably rejected.395  Rawls says we 
just need the right construction of the argument. 
                                                 
391   See, e.g., TJ, chapter 3, section 20. 
392   It is perfectly acceptable, on any reading of liberal legitimacy, to characterize the agents behind the veil 
of ignorance as seeking unanimous agreement.  But this has little to do with legitimacy.  The agents so 
described represent only one of our two moral powers.  They are not reasonable, and so cannot reasonably 
reject anything.  They simply do not possess this moral capacity. 
393   See TJ, pp. 123-130, for discussion of the significance of “the rationality of the parties.” 
394   See TJ, pp. 118-123, for discussion of the significance of the veil of ignorance. 
395   See, e.g., TJ, p. 18. 
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 Then why think the Consensus Reading mistaken?  In TJ, Rawls’s concern is 
justice; in most of his post-1980 work, it is legitimacy.396  These are different virtues 
states might possess, and are subject to different evaluative standards.397  Rawls holds 
that justice as fairness best answers the question of what justice requires, but he admits it 
is just one possible answer.398  What if people disagree?  We must make some laws.  Can 
we do this legitimately?  Much of his post-1980 work deals with these problems.  
Rawls’s claims in TJ do not support the Consensus Reading. 
 Rawls’s appeal to Scanlon’s work seems to provide a second reason for affirming 
the Consensus Reading, since Scanlon uses the “could not reasonably reject” language.399  
But this support is only apparent.  Rawls appeals to Scanlon when discussing what Rawls 
calls the “reasonable,” our willingness and desire to find fair terms of cooperation and to 
offer justifications for action others might accept.400  What Rawls does here is explain 
one of our two moral powers, not offer a principle of legitimacy.  In fact, it is reasonable 
to think many of our desires will never be wholly satisfied.  We may desire to find 
justifications for political action that no reasonable person could reasonably reject, but be 
forced by the burdens of judgment to settle for justifications reasonable persons could 
reasonably affirm.  This seems most consistent with Rawls’s view that it is unreasonable 
to deny the burdens of judgment and the reasonable pluralism that results.401
                                                 
396   This includes PL, IPRR, and JF.  Even The Law of Peoples centers on legitimacy.  Rawls holds that 
“decent” peoples deserve respect and have a right to self-determination, not because they are just, (they are 
not just, on Rawls’s view,) but because they are legitimate structures of authority and obligation.  I owe 
David Reidy for valuable discussion on this point. 
397   PL, pp. 427-429. 
398   See, e.g., IPRR, p. 142. 
399   See, e.g., PL, p. 49, note 2, and p. 124; JF, p. 7, note 6. 
400   See PL, pp. 49-50. 
401   See, e.g., JF, pp. 33-38. 
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A Shared Reason Reading of the Reasonableness Condition. 
 
 Rawls’s view is a shared reason account of legitimate state power.  Following 
Kant and Soper, Rawls does not insist that citizens converge on some particular liberal 
conception of justice, or that they find one that no reasonable person could reasonably 
reject.  Such a requirement is simply unrealistic.  What Rawls does with his liberal 
principle of legitimacy is to apply Soper’s generic understanding of the law’s normative 
force to the liberal democratic political context.  It is enough if public officials treat all 
citizens with a certain kind of respect, a respect that is captured by reciprocity in 
advantage and reciprocity in justification.  Rawls’s theory of legitimacy is thus less 
demanding, and more plausible, than many suppose.  This relaxed version of reciprocity 
is the heart of Rawls’s account of shared reason, and the core of his Reasonable 
Condition.  Roughly put, public officials in a democracy show respect for democratic 
citizens when they base their political activity (regarding, in particular, constitutional 
essentials and matters of basic justice) on the liberal political conception they judge best, 
because doing so responds to the requirements of reciprocity in advantage and reciprocity 
in justification. 
 When public officials in a democracy base their political activity on the liberal 
political conception each judges most appropriate, public officials show respect for 
citizens by fulfilling the requirements of reciprocity in advantage and reciprocity in 
justification.  For example, Rawls insists that the basic structure is the first subject of 
justice, because this network of institutions deeply affects people’s characters, plans and 
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aspirations, and prospects, and because it can protect the background conditions of 
justice, by keeping inequalities in wealth and property from getting large enough to 
threaten poor citizens’ political liberties.  This is a kind of reciprocity in advantage—
citizens would have little reason to affirm the law if it ignored their interests altogether, 
or was obviously insufficient as a means of protecting those interests.  And he insists that 
only liberal political conceptions are reasonable.  For instance, he holds that it is not 
reasonable to believe that liberal democratic citizens could accept a political conception 
that put some citizens’ perfectionist values ahead of the individual liberties of all citizens.  
And it is not reasonable to believe that such citizens could accept a political conception 
that did not guarantee the effectiveness of their rights and opportunities with some form 
of social security.  This again is reciprocity in advantage.  But he also insists on 
reciprocity in justification.  For instance, he insists that the ideas used to develop political 
conceptions be drawn from the public political culture of a liberal democracy, because 
(he holds) these are ideas shared by citizens committed to liberal democracy (i.e., by 
those individuals whose common commitments quite literally constitute their liberal 
democratic body politic).  It is wrong for a person to include in her political conception 
her controversial comprehensive commitments, because it is unreasonable for her to 
believe that every reasonable person would accept such a conception, given the obvious 
fact that many citizens reasonably reject her comprehensive doctrine.  This is reciprocity 
in justification.  But while appeal to public reasons is necessary, it is not sufficient to 
demonstrate sincerity.  This requires that public reasons be drawn together into a more-
or-less coherent whole (i.e., a conception of the whole basic structure).402  If an official in 
                                                 
402   This is what I refer to above as the Sufficiency Condition.  I will say more about it below. 
271 
were to appeal to public reasons willy-nilly, citizens might regard her behavior as simply 
opportunistic.  Here we find another idea that Rawls takes from Soper.  Soper argues that 
officials sincerely committed to the justice of their law can do more than simply give 
public reasons in defense of it—they can also explain why they offer the particular public 
reasons they do, by explaining how these reasons fit into some larger understanding of 
the common good.  For Rawls, officials do this by being prepared to show that the public 
reasons they invoke are firmly rooted in their own favored political conceptions of 
justice.  This is necessary for reciprocity in justification. 
 Thus, when officials in a liberal democracy base their political activity on a liberal 
political conception, citizens have good reason to think their officials are sincerely 
committed to justice and the common good.  Of course, some citizens will always see 
their constitution and laws as suboptimal in ways—as not the most just, or not the most 
reasonable—but their normative authority does not depend on such agreement.  The 
constitution, and laws enacted pursuant to it, deserve moral respect when they are 
reasonably seen as rooted in shared democratic ideals, that is, when they are linked to 
some liberal conception of democratic justice.  When laws are generated in this way, the 
process respects all citizens as citizens, through reciprocity in justification and reciprocity 
in advantage.  Further, it results in laws that at least approximate liberal justice.  This is 
the most that we can expect of shared reason under the conditions of reasonable 




A Challenge to Rawls’s Reasonableness Condition:  Only Liberal Political Conceptions 
are Reasonable? 
 
 Rawls holds that only liberal political conceptions meet the demands of his liberal 
principle of legitimacy.  This means that only liberal political conceptions of justice may 
reasonably be offered by citizens to others understood as free and equal.  Only liberal 
conceptions can be offered by citizens in the right spirit, that is, as reasonable terms that 
respect citizens in the right ways (reciprocity in justification and advantage).  Rawls’s 
view is not troubling insofar as it rules out extremely illiberal conceptions of justice, for 
instance, a new Nazi regime or a slave society, which reject the very idea of citizens as 
free and equal and deserving of respect.  But Rawls also seeks to rule out as unreasonable 
less extreme views, like Libertarianism, Marxism, and Communitarianism.  He rejects 
Libertarianism as unreasonable, because it does not take seriously the idea that the basic 
structure is the first subject of justice.  He rejects Marxism and Communitarianism as 
unreasonable, because these views give priority to the good over the right.  What is not 
clear is just what sort of mistake Rawls thinks that each makes.  Why are these issues 
over which reasonable citizens cannot reasonably disagree?403
 Rawls rejects libertarianism as unreasonable because libertarians do not take 
seriously the idea that the basic social structure is the first subject of justice.  But exactly 
why this makes libertarianism unreasonable is not clear.  Rawls could be claiming that 
                                                 
403   Reidy argues that Rawls reject these views because he takes them to be based on simple errors, i.e., 
obvious factual or uncontroversial logical mistakes.  See his “Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement.” 
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libertarianism is unreasonable because it is based on a simple error.404  Libertarian 
principles of justice govern the acquisition and transfer of holdings.  People are entitled 
to hold whatever they obtain without violating these principles.  If we start from a state of 
nature where the existing distribution is just, then all future distributions are just as long 
as everyone follows the rules.  Rawls’s problem with this could be the libertarian reliance 
on the initial state of nature.  Why think that initial distribution was just or unjust?  Here 
the libertarian seems to need an account of the basic social structure.  When the 
libertarian rejects this, he makes a simple mistake.  The problem with this, as Reidy 
points out, is that its hard to see what the mistake is here.  If we need a basic social 
structure, then it is a mistake to reject it.  But libertarians like Hayek and Nozick seem to 
reject the idea that we need a basic social structure in the first place, or even that there is 
any sense to talking about distributive justice as a virtue of social systems taken 
holistically in the first place.  What is the simple error here?  Given the burdens of 
judgment, there is no reason to think the libertarian makes such an error.  Why then it 
libertarianism unreasonable? 
 There is another way of reading the problem.  We can see Rawls’s dispute with 
the libertarian as what I call a good faith disagreement, a disagreement rooted in the 
burdens of judgment.  However, it may not be what Rawls calls a reasonable 
disagreement.  That is, it is not one that occurs between citizens who share a commitment 
to democracy.  The libertarian view is not founded on a simple mistake, but it is 
nevertheless unreasonable.  That is, Rawls might see generic liberalism (the family of 
liberal political conceptions) as the dividing line between democratic and other forms of 
                                                 
404   Reidy reconstructs Rawls’s argument this way in “Reciprocity and Reasonable Disagreement.” 
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government.  I think this is how Freeman reads Rawls’s rejection of libertarianism.405  
What is not clear is how Rawls might justify this dividing line. 
 It is not obvious that libertarianism is inconsistent with democracy.  Nozick does 
reject democracy in the “Demoktesis” in Anarchy, State, and Utopia.406  And Nozick’s 
libertarian project seems inconsistent with Rawls’s liberal one.  Libertarianism is rooted 
in an ideal of persons as free individuals who own themselves and their assets and 
cooperate only on the basis of private contracts.  Rawls rejects voluntaristic accounts of 
political society.  His liberalism is based on an ideal of persons as free and equal citizens 
permanently engaged in a cooperative activity that is structured by reciprocity.  Political 
society is not something we can join or opt-out of.  So if the only reasonable conception 
of democracy is Rawls’s, then libertarianism is unreasonable.  But there is no reason to 
think that Rawls’s conception of democracy is the only reasonable one.  To make good 
on the claim that libertarianism is inconsistent with democracy, we would have to show 
that libertarianism is inconsistent with democracy simpliciter.  But I do not believe that 
this is the case.  That is, if a libertarian argued that libertarianism is consistent with some 
form of democracy, it is not obvious to me that he would be wrong.  I cannot see any 
reason to say, before looking at the argument, that he must be mistaken. 
 Rawls could be arguing that libertarianism is not consistent with liberal 
democracy (even if it could be consistent with some understandings of democracy).  This 
strategy is suggested by some of what Rawls says about inequalities and the possibility of 
democracy.  Vast inequalities in wealth undermine fair equality of opportunity, the fair 
                                                 
405   See Samuel Freeman’s “Introduction” to The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (New York:  Cambridge 
University Press, 2003), pp. 43-4. 
406   Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, pp. 276-294. 
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value of political liberties, and so on.407  If we ignore vast inequalities, and the way these 
affect people’s prospects in life, we do not take seriously the idea of society as a fair 
system of cooperation.408  A person’s self-understanding is deeply influenced by the 
public’s understanding of the social institutions of the society in which he is born.  In 
societies where huge inequalities are allowed, it is difficult for people to come to see 
themselves as free and equal citizens, and those low on the social ladder have little reason 
to be hopeful or optimistic about their own life prospects.409  This is not to say that 
libertarianism does not treat people as free and equal, but that it does not do so in a way 
that is consistent with the democratic values implicitly expressed in our public political 
culture. 
 According to this argument, libertarians can, in good faith, reject democracy for 
philosophical or moral reasons, but they cannot do so reasonably, because the reasonable 
implies a commitment to liberal democracy.  Unfortunately, if this is Rawls’s strategy, it 
is not a good one.  It amounts to nothing more than the claim that libertarians reject 
liberalism.  But we already know this. 
 So it is not clear that Rawls has good reason to reject libertarianism as 
unreasonable.  The different arguments that he might make for this claim seem vulnerable 
to reasonable disagreement or otherwise very weak.  This problem and others like it 
suggest that Rawls’s view does not adequately deal with the scope of the burdens of 
judgment.  His view seems too demanding. 
                                                 
407   JF, p. 53. 
408   JF, p. 56. 
409   JF, pp. 56-7. 
276 
 Similar problems arise for Rawls’s rejection of Marxist and communitarian views.  
He rejects these views as unreasonable because they give priority to the right over the 
good, but it is not clear why he thinks this makes them unreasonable.  Rawls could hold 
that it is a simple mistake to give priority to the good over the right.  But, once again, it is 
not clear just what the simple mistake is.  Disagreements over whether the good or the 
right has priority are better understood as rooted in the burdens of judgment, and not as 
based on simple factual or logical errors.  Alternatively, he could hold that views that 
give priority to the good are not consistent with democracy simpliciter.  But, again, this 
hardly seems plausible.  The only strategy left seems to be arguing that Marxist and 
communitarian views are unreasonable because they are not liberal.  Of course, this is not 
satisfying either. 
 In the end, it is not clear why the problems Rawls has with libertarianism, 
Marxism, and communitarianism, should be taken as evidence that these views are 
unreasonable.  It seems like the disagreement between liberals and libertarians over the 
basic structure, and the disagreement between liberals and Marxists and communitarians 
over the priority of the good and the right, are best understood as disagreements rooted in 
the burdens of judgment.  On my view, this makes them good faith disagreements.  I 
think Rawls sees these disagreements as rooted in the burdens of judgment too, but that 
he does not see them as reasonable disagreements.  What I do not see is how Rawls can 
justify this. 
 There is one more possibility that we can consider.  Rawls holds that every body 
politic is literally constituted by those individuals who share certain fundamental values 
and norms, which define the offices and positions of political authority in a political 
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system, their attached right and duties, and so on.  This is the root or institutional 
meaning of constitutionalism.  Rawls also draws on Hart’s understanding of rules.  Rule-
governed behavior is more than regular, patterned of behavior; it is better understood as 
an internal attitude toward patterns of behavior.  Rawls could be rejecting libertarian, 
Marxist, and communitarian views because the people who hold these views simply do 
not share the fundamental norms and values that are held by people who affirm liberal 
democracy.  That is, Rawls may think that liberals and libertarians share some values, 
e.g., a commitment to citizens as free and equal, but that they do not ultimately share the 
kinds of values that would allow them to constitute themselves as a body politic that is 
just, legitimate, and stable.  Libertarians are, in this sense, “foreign” to liberals.  And 
Rawls may think that liberals do share some values with Marxists and communitarians, 
but that these groups do not ultimately share the kinds of values that would allow them to 
constitute themselves as a just, legitimate, and stable body politic.  Marxists and 
communitarians are also foreign to liberals.  Rawls may think that libertarians, Marxists, 
and communitarians simply live outside of the liberal community of value.  From this 
perspective, it could be the case that his problem with libertarianism, Marxism, and 
communitarianism is that they are not liberal. 
 If this explanation is correct, we should read the arguments that Rawls offers in 
defense of his political liberalism as aimed specifically at his reasonable (i.e., liberal 
democratic) citizens, and not at citizens as such (i.e., all those people who happen to have 
political membership in a liberal democracy).  From the perspective of those committed 
to liberal democracy, libertarians, communitarians and Marxists are unreasonable.  They 
insist on values not shared by individuals committed to liberal democracy.  These 
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unreasonable views are not based on simple errors, but those who affirm them remove 
themselves from the liberal democratic community.  This is significant, because citizens 
as such cannot constitute a liberal democracy.  A liberal democracy can only be 
constituted by citizens who share liberal democratic values.  It is not clear if citizens as 
such can constitute a body politic at all, insofar as they do not share the values that might 
make this possible.  Rawls might think it is simply not possible for them to do so. 
 Does this reading imply that Rawls is simply assuming the legitimacy of liberal 
constitutional democracy?  In a way, yes.  In IPRR he holds that “a reasonable doctrine 
accepts a constitutional democratic regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.”410  
What he is trying to understand is how citizens committed to liberal democracy can see 
their law as legitimate in the face of both reasonable pluralism and liberal pluralism.  But 
the reading I am suggesting now does not require Rawls to assume that liberal democratic 
values are immune to the burdens of judgment, that is, that there are not good faith 
disagreements about whether the basic structure really is the first subject of justice, or 
whether the right really does have priority over the good.  What he seems to be assuming 
is that citizens committed to liberal democracy form a community that is in important 
ways distinct from the communities of libertarians and the communities of Marxists and 
communitarians.  This again is not the same as assuming that liberal democracy is 
legitimate.  It is, rather, to assume that liberals form a community apart from these others. 
 In a way, this is similar to Rawls’s approach to the problem of international 
relations in The Law of Peoples.  There Rawls develops “laws” meant to regulate 
                                                 
410   IPRR, p. 132:  “The basic requirement is that a reasonable doctrine accepts a constitutional democratic 
regime and its companion idea of legitimate law.” 
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relationships between different societies in the global community.  But when he develops 
these laws, he does not ask what terms of association all societies would adopt.  Rather, 
he begins by asking what terms of association all liberal democratic societies would 
adopt as properly regulating international relations between societies.  He then wonders if 
other types of societies might not also adopt these terms of association.  Perhaps Rawls’s 
arguments in political liberalism are aimed simply at his reasonable (i.e., liberal 
democratic) citizens. 
 In the end, I am not sure if this is Rawls’s view.  I think it is one way to 
understand his rejection of libertarianism, Marxism, and communitarianism.  If this view 
is correct, Rawls does not hold that his generic liberalism is immune to the burdens of 
judgment, but he nevertheless does hold that reasonable citizens do not reject it. 
 
A Plurality of Legitimacy Theories? 
 
 One problem Rawls’s theory of legitimacy faces is the possibility of an 
incompatible plurality of theories of legitimacy.  His theory is based on his conceptions 
of shared ideas implicit in our public political culture (e.g., free and equal citizens, 
reciprocity), roughly those that support his favored political conception, justice as 
fairness.  But Rawls insists that there are many reasonable ways to describe these shared 
ideas.  They are subject to the burdens of judgment.  This suggests that it is possible to 
have good faith disagreements over theories of legitimacy.  Apparently, one can reject 
Rawls’s theory of legitimacy in good faith, and prefer a different one, so long as it is 
suitably grounded in some conception of shared democratic ideas.  This seems like the 
280 
only approach that respects the burdens of judgment.  Rawls insists that reasonable 
persons acknowledge the burdens of judgment and accept their consequences for public 
justification of solutions to political problems.  Thus, reasonable persons must be willing 
to accept the fact that different theories of legitimacy will develop in any society, and that 
it is not reasonable to expect all citizens to converge on a theory of legitimacy.  This 
seems to be implied by Rawls’s understanding of reasonable persons, unless some 
conceptions of our shared commitments are simply immune to reasonable disagreement.  
But this seems unlikely.  So Rawls’s view implies a plurality of reasonable and possibly 
incompatible theories of legitimacy. 
 For example, Rawls holds that legitimacy is rooted in reciprocity.  On his view, 
reciprocity has two aspects, reciprocity in justification, and reciprocity in advantage.  
Reciprocity in justification has to do with each person offering reasons others could 
reasonably affirm.  Reciprocity in advantage has to do with each person benefiting in an 
appropriate way from political arrangements.  But it is not obvious that this is the only 
way to develop a conception of the idea of reciprocity implicit in our political culture.  
Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson have developed an idea of reciprocity that is 
different from Rawls’s version.411  Rawls ultimately rejects their view, for his purposes at 
least, because it is grounded (he claims) in a comprehensive doctrine and is not properly 
political, i.e., neutral between competing conceptions of the good. 
 Reidy has developed an account of legitimacy that draws on Rawls’s theory and 
that is, in Rawls’s terms, appropriately political.  Reidy narrows Rawls’s idea of 
                                                 
411   Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson, Democracy and Disagreement (Cambridge, Ma.:  Harvard 
University Press, 1996).  See especially chapters 1 and 2. 
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reciprocity to reciprocity in advantage.  Reidy calls his approach Democratic Legitimacy, 
to distinguish it from Rawls’s Liberal Legitimacy.  Democratic legitimacy is Rawlsian in 
spirit, but avoids certain problems by dropping Rawls’s commitment to reciprocity in 
justification.  It is enough, Reidy says, if we can develop an account of reciprocity in 
advantage that does justice to our understanding of democratic citizens as free and equal 
and committed to particular comprehensive doctrines. 
 The point is not that Reidy’s Democratic Legitimacy solves all of our problems, 
but that it is a plausible account of legitimacy, in that it is developed from properly 
political ideas.  It does not depend on any comprehensive commitments, but seems 
instead to have the kind of political neutrality that Rawls seeks.  What this shows is that it 
is possible to develop many “free standing” accounts of legitimacy.  The problem is that 
it is not obvious how we might decide between them.  None of them are free from the 
burdens of judgment.  Nor are there any publicly recognized methods or standards for 
determining if any are true, or which might be regarded as most reasonable.  Thus, 












“What we affirm, when we align ourselves with democracy, is hesitant, confused 
and often in bad faith….  Above all what we deny is that any set of human beings, 
because of who or what they simply are, deserve and can be trusted with political 
authority.  We reject, in the great Leveller formula, redolent of England’s 
seventeenth-century Civil War, the claim (or judgement) that any human being 
comes into the world with a saddle on their back, or any other booted and spurred 
to ride them.” 
John Dunn 412
 
“The utility of moral and political philosophy is to be estimated, not so much by 
the commodities we have by knowing these sciences, as by the calamities we 
receive by not knowing them.” 
Thomas Hobbes 413
 
A Reasonable Hope for the Future of Liberal Democratic Society? 
 
 In this dissertation I have sought to develop and defend an account of the 
conditions under which a modern democratic government could rightfully enforce the 
law against its citizens, and the nature of any duties that citizens might have to obey or 
                                                 
412   John Dunn, Democracy:  A History (New York:  Atlantic Monthly Press, 2005), pp. 69-70. 
413   Thomas Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy.  Quoted in C. B. Macpherson, ed., Thomas Hobbes:  
Leviathan (New York:  Penguin Books, 1985), p. 10. 
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acquiesce.  My account draws on a line of thought that develops through the works of 
Hart and Soper and reaches its culmination in Rawls’s political liberalism.  Soper’s 
generic account of political obligation is a helpful way of thinking about the normativity 
of political relations.  There is reason to think, though, that this generic account is 
inadequate as it stands for a modern liberal democratic context.  Rawls’s account of 
legitimacy is an advance on Soper’s, insofar as it represents one way to apply Soper’s 
generic account to this democratic context.  Thus, although I am not sure that Rawls’s 
account ultimately succeeds, I think that Rawls is on the right track.  I find the 
Soper/Rawls line of thought particularly attractive for several reasons.  First, it takes 
seriously the depth and breadth of good faith disagreement.  Second, it respects the 
judgment of individuals in a particularly strong way.  Third, it is particularly faithful to 
the liberal ideal of shared reason.  Finally, it offers what Rawls’s might call a reasonable 
hope for the future of democratic society. 
 Good faith disagreements are a fact of social life.  The common resources of 
human reason are simply inadequate to the task of publicly justifying answers to many of 
the most important questions we ask about our individual good and the good of our 
society.  The burdens of judgment get in the way.  Political theory must recognize this 
fact.  The line of thought I have developed in this dissertation does just that, by putting 
good faith disagreements front and center in our thinking.  The Soper/Rawls line makes 
the law’s normativity a function of a sincere commitment to justice, but it does not 
depend on any implausibly strong consensus regarding what justice requires.  It requires 
only the much weaker notions of reciprocity in justification and reciprocity in advantage.  
While Soper never talks explicitly about the liberal democratic context, I have suggested 
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one fairly straightforward way of constructing such a Soperian view.  On this direct 
Soperian reading, we end up with a very generous and open understanding of what public 
officials are allowed to affirm in the name of justice.  But as we saw, this view may be 
too open, as it may allow too much.  Rawls has a more narrow understanding of liberal 
democratic justice.  It is rooted in an ideal of free and equal citizens who, as co-authors of 
their law, offer terms of political association to one another that they think those others 
might reasonably accept, from their shared moral point of view as citizens.  While 
Rawls’s view avoids the problems that the Soperian view faces, by developing a robust 
understanding of justice appropriate for liberal democracies, it has problems of its own.  
In particular, while Rawls’s view of liberal democratic justice makes some room for good 
faith disagreement, it is not clear that the room it makes is sufficient to encompass all of 
the views of justice that might be held in good faith in any modern liberal democracy, 
even if we require that conceptions of justice be couched in political terms.  So although 
Rawls’s view does not depend on the implausibly strong notion of consensus, which is 
correctly rejected by the power friendly theorists, it may still depend on a sort of 
consensus that is implausible nonetheless.  Nevertheless, I think the Soper/Rawls line 
represents a more promising way of handling the issue of good faith disagreement than 
does the family of respect for judgment views. 
 One worry I have about respect for interest views, such as Shapiro’s competitive 
democracy, is that they do not make sufficient room, or the right kind of room, for good 
faith disagreement.  The family of respect for interest views that includes Shapiro’s view 
makes the law’s normativity (or the government’s right, or the citizen’s duty) a function 
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of some significant shared interest of citizens.414  Shapiro argues that democracy 
“deserves our allegiance” because it represents our best chance of minimizing domination 
in society.  Individual persons face the possibility of domination any time someone else 
can threaten their basic interests, which Shapiro defines in terms of the essentials any 
person needs to become and survive as an independent agent in the world.  Democracy, 
in particular Schumpeter’s competitive democracy, reduces the threat of domination by 
making politically powerful agents compete for the allegiance of politically weak 
individual citizens.  Competitive elections give citizens the means to remove from office 
elected officials who do not take seriously their basic interests.  This gives politicians 
incentive to protect these basic interests.  While I think there is much that can be said in 
favor of Shapiro’s competitive democracy, the reason that I cannot whole-heartedly 
affirm it is that there are good faith disagreements over just what our basic interests are, 
and, maybe more importantly, over what sorts of democratic decision procedures best 
protect and promote those interests.  One might think that we can easily resolve such 
disagreements over the nature of our basic interests through democratic political 
processes themselves, but before we can see the results of any such decision procedure as 
authoritative, we would need to overcome the problem of good faith disagreement over 
what sorts of democratic decision procedures any society ought to have, even given the 
stated goal of protecting basic interests.  But it is not obvious how we might do this. 
                                                 
414   Another family of respect for interest views seeks to add up citizens’ expressed interests in various 
ways.  See my discussion of aggregative and deliberative democracy in Chapter 1. 
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 Respect for interest views all suffer from versions of this problem.  And here we 
bump up against a worry expressed by Waldron.415  Respect for interest views tend to 
reject some people’s considered judgments about their basic interests, or about what form 
of democracy best protects those interests, in the name of (as Waldron puts it) some 
fancied consensus regarding how to answer these questions.  But there is no such 
consensus, and we should not pretend that such a consensus is even an achievable goal.  
Of course, one might simply reject the idea that consensus plays any important role in the 
identification of the relevant normatively significant basic interest, but this puts us in the 
position of asserting that some people do not really understand what their basic interests 
are, or of admitting that they do understand their basic interests, but that this is irrelevant 
to a discussion of the nature of their relationship to the state.  Both of these options are 
unattractive, in particular because they seem to fail to give sufficient weight to the idea 
that people are capable of understanding and determining for themselves how they ought 
to live, or to the basic normative ideal that people ought to be free to exercise this 
capacity in their actual political lives (i.e., political autonomy is threatened or ignored).  
While I reject Simmons’s consent account of political obligation, I think there is 
something right in his insistence that political authority (broadly construed) ought to have 
some close relationship to the way citizens freely choose to live. 
 This is one reason that I find the Soper/Rawls line particularly attractive.  It 
respects the judgments of individuals in a particularly strong way.  Not only does it make 
room for good faith disagreements over comprehensive doctrines, it also makes room for 
good faith disagreements about justice and democracy and other political matters.  It does 
                                                 
415   Waldron, Law and Disagreement, Chapter 1. 
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not presuppose or assume some consensus about what justice or democracy require, but 
instead makes room for each person to express his or her good faith views about these 
issues.  The views that people actually hold take on a fundamental significance.  The free 
choices that citizens actually make determine what justice requires, what our basic 
interests are, and so on.  There are limits to this, of course, and one of the problems with 
Rawls’s view in particular is where and how he sets the limits.  Nevertheless, individual 
judgment is given more room, and a more appropriate place, in respect for judgment 
views like Shapiro’s and Rawls’s, than it is in respect for interest views like Shapiro’s or 
Buchanan’s. 
 Another reason that I find the Soper/Rawls line particularly attractive is the way 
these views come together to further the liberal ideal of shared reason.  Neither Soper nor 
Rawls ignores the fact that good faith disagreements deserve a central place in political 
theory, but this does not lead either to give up on the idea that terms of political 
association might still be shared in some normatively significant sense.  They offer 
instead a relaxed account of shared reason, that is rooted in reciprocity of justification 
and reciprocity in advantage.  Rawls sees in the relaxed account of shared reason an 
opportunity to make good on the liberal claim that democratic state power is the power of 
free and equal citizens as a collective body, in a way that responds as well to freedom of 
conscience or political autonomy.  This resolves the worry, expressed forcefully by 
Wolff, that state power is always immoral because it is simply incompatible with 
individual moral autonomy.  The relaxed account of shared reason reconciles individual 
autonomy with the fact that democratic power must often be exercised under conditions 
of good faith disagreement. 
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 Finally, any theory of justice, political legitimacy, or political obligation must be 
concerned (at least instrumentally) with civic virtue.416  Liberalism recognizes that people 
have differing views of the value of political participation, and that many citizens are 
generally uninterested in political issues.  Nevertheless, it is important to maintain what 
Rawls calls republicanism.417  The idea here is roughly that certain political virtues need 
to be instilled in some minimum number of citizens in order to keep a liberal democratic 
society from degenerating into some form of tyranny or fanaticism (e.g., religious or 
nationalist).  Citizens should recognize a minimal duty to foster and uphold just social 
and political institutions.  In addition, citizens should develop what Kymlicka calls the 
virtue of “civility” or “decency.”418  Minimally this requires that citizens generally do not 
break the law, or harm others, and so on.  It also requires that we treat other citizens as 
free and equal citizens.   
 Much more could be said about civic virtue, but I do not intend to develop and 
defend any robust account of it here.  My point in raising this issue is to indicate one way 
that I think the Soper/Rawls line is superior to Shapiro’s view.  Republicanism and 
civility are instrumentally necessary for the maintenance of any decent democratic 
political order.  But we have reason to worry about whether or not citizens would 
willingly affirm and support democracy under the conditions described by Shapiro.  He 
hardly presents an attractive vision of democracy.  This is not a problem for all respect 
                                                 
416   For an introduction to the issue of civic virtue, see, e.g., Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Theory, pp. 
299-312. 
417   This is not a form of perfectionism.  Perfectionist theories argue that civic virtue is necessary because 
this sort of political activity is essential for the realization of some significant component of the human 
good.  I do not find perfectionism compelling.  My interest in civic virtue is instrumental.  I am mainly 
concerned with the minimal conditions necessary for the promulgation of a decent liberal democratic 
society. 
418   Kymlicka, Contemporary Political Theory, p. 300. 
289 
for interest views.  It is a problem for Shapiro because he presents a fairly grim account 
of what it is reasonable for us to hope for from a democratic society.  Justice has little to 
no role to play in his proposed democratic society, even as a regulative ideal.  The best 
that the majority of us can reasonably hope for is that we will not be dominated by those 
who wield political power.  This is better than nothing, I suppose, but it is hardly 
inspiring.  We do not need to be inspired, of course, to develop civic virtues, but 
Shapiro’s dim assessment makes me doubt that his democratic society would find much 
support at all among citizens.  He may be correct when he says that many people around 
the world aspire to have democracy largely because it represents their best chance at 
avoiding domination.  However, it does not seem unreasonable to think that people in 
other democratic societies, where the worst sorts of domination have been relegated to 
the past, might hope for more than this from their democratic society.  We might prize 
democracy initially because it protects us, but once we have achieved that aim, is it 
wrong to hope that democracy might also bring something more? 
 The Soper/Rawls line presents a more hopeful vision of the future of democracy 
than does Shapiro’s view.  Even the straightforward Soperian understanding of 
democratic political authority does better than Shapiro’s view on this measure.  For in 
Soper’s proposed society, officials are at least guided by their own understanding of the 
common good.  This is what gives their political activity its distinctively moral character, 
and what gives citizens reason to respect it, at least a little bit.  In Shapiro’s democracy, 
the law can be made to serve any private interests whatsoever, just as long as citizens 
maintain the means to “throw the bums out” when they deem it necessary.  In the 
Soper/Rawls version of democracy, the law is made to serve justice and the common 
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good.  This gives citizens a reason to affirm the Soperian/Rawlsian society that is simply 
missing from Shapiro’s democracy. 
 In the end, I agree with Dunn when he says that our commitment to democracy is 
often hesitant and confused, because it is fairly clear that We, the People, do not hope for 
the same things from our democratic society.  We agree, of course, that people are free 
and equal, but this agreement does not get us very far.  We disagree at the deepest levels 
over what these ideals commit us to, and over how a democratic society committed to 
these ideals ought to be organized.  But I believe that if we all seek justice in our 
democratic political order, even though we know that there is no real hope that we will 
reach a consensus on what justice requires, what we will achieve instead is a political 
order society that is legitimate, that is comprised of genuinely authoritative relations of 
authority between citizens and their democratic state.  In this way we can avoid the 
calamities that so worried Hobbes, the chief of which, in his estimation, was a society 




 I want to end this dissertation by briefly describing two directions for further 
research that develop out of this project.  First, despite my worries about Soper’s and 
Rawls’s views, I think this line of thought is a helpful way of thinking about political 
authority in modern liberal democracies.  I am not convinced that the generic Soperian 
account of political obligation works for a liberal democracy, nor am I convinced that 
                                                 
419   Hobbes, Elements of Philosophy, p. 10. 
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Rawls’s effort to apply Soper’s generic view to the context of liberal democratic political 
culture is entirely successful.  However, I do think that Soper and Rawls are on the right 
track, so one of my projects for the future will be to develop an account of liberal 
democratic political authority in the Soper/Rawls line.  One way to do this might be 
simply to find a better way to apply Soper’s generic account to the liberal democratic 
context. 
 Second, I ended Chapter 4 with the suggestion that, because of the burdens of 
judgment, we might be faced with an irresolvable plurality of legitimacy theories.  This 
gives us reason to worry about the possibility of there being a legitimate democratic state.  
Nevertheless, the prospect of such an irreconcilable plurality need not be the end of the 
road for the Soper/Rawls line.  Most theorists recognize a distinction between legitimacy 
and justice.420  These are different virtues that a state or the law might possess.  Justice 
refers, in the broadest sense, to some appropriate distribution of benefits and burdens 
(however defined) among the morally significant entities (e.g., individuals, associations, 
peoples) in a society (domestic or global).  Political legitimacy refers to a state’s right to 
use coercive force against its citizens to compel obedience to its laws.  Most believe 
justice and legitimacy vary somewhat independently of each other.  The upshot is that it 
may be legitimate to enforce appropriately enacted but unjust laws, and illegitimate to 
enforce just laws that are not enacted properly.  For instance, one might argue that current 
laws against same-sex marriage are legitimate, insofar as they have been properly 
enacted, but unjust, as they fail to treat people equally, or to properly respect liberty 
rights.  Or one might argue that justice requires a more equitable distribution of wealth in 
                                                 
420   This is discussed in Chapter 1. 
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(for instance) the U.S., but that it would be illegitimate to do this by executive order 
without legislative input, or by overthrowing the current government and placing society 
under the care of some bureau of benevolent guardians. 
 With this in mind, perhaps Soper and Rawls make a mistake when they insist that 
a sincere commitment to the justice of the law is sufficient to generate the law’s 
normative force.  It might more appropriate, all-things-considered, to see the justice claim 
as one, but not the only, necessary condition.  The other condition might be the sincere 
conviction that the just law is also legitimate.  Since we recognize a distinction between 
justice and legitimacy, and we have resources available to support claims to each, we 
might want to insist that public officials show a sincere commitment to both.  Thus, a 
citizen may have good moral reason to respect the law only when government officials 
sincerely hold that the law is both just and legitimate, even if the citizen disagrees with 
the normative evaluations of the officials in question.  What I am suggesting is that a 
sincere claim that the law is legitimate might deserve respect in the same way that the 
sincere claim that the law is just merits respect. 
 How does this help us?  It offers a more complete account of respect for the law, 
and it makes room for good faith disagreements over what legitimacy requires.  We 
recognize that it is sometimes illegitimate to coercively enforce just laws.  What, then, 
determines when citizens ought to respect the law?  We could require government 
officials to make both the justice and legitimacy claims.  This is important for two 
reasons.  First, since legitimacy and justice vary somewhat independently, citizens cannot 
tell from either the justice or the legitimacy claim alone if the law merits respect.  
Citizens can only know that the law merits respect when officials sincerely make both the 
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justice claim and the legitimacy claim.  Here something like Soper’s sincerity condition 
comes into play, but we must now judge sincerity according to two normatively 
significant measures, justice and legitimacy.  Second, the exercise of government power 
in the name of justice, when it is not exercised legitimately, amounts to an abuse of 
government power.  The sincere commitment of government officials to both justice and 
legitimacy might resolve this problem, and so it seems that both a commitment to justice 
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